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This theoretical/clinical-case study explores the function of provocative 
enactments as a means to regulate underaroused states and the affects associated with 
underarousal.  A great deal of psychoanalytic literature emphasizes the function of 
provocative enactments as destructive or as a way to devalue others or disconnect from 
them; this function certainly exists in one class of such enactments where the actor’s goal 
is to destroy interpersonal ties or enhance self-esteem by kindling negative affect in the 
other person.  However, this dissertation proposes that there exists another, distinct class 
of provocative enactments where their function serves to activate or reengage another 
person as a way for the actor to receive more stimulation and to dissipate the anxiety 
associated with experienced or anticipated underaroused states and the affects that 
accompany them; such affects can range from feelings of emptiness, deadness or 
boredom to a painful longing or deep sadness.  This dissertation proposes that the 
distinction between the two classes of provocative enactments is clinically meaningful in 
the application of therapeutic interventions.  This dissertation also attempts to describe 
the particular dyadic paradigms manifested in early development that would give rise to 
representational schema underlying this class of enactments; it is suggested that the 
elicitation of negative affect in the caretaker produced more effective dyadic regulation of 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
This dissertation explores the possibility that provocative enactments may play a 
role in some individuals’ ongoing attempts to regulate the affects associated with 
underarousal and loss, specifically, by seeking to modulate the underaroused state itself 
by eliciting stimulation from another.   I will explore the possibility that provocative 
gestures may sometimes be offered with the expectation that they will enliven and engage 
the person provoked; in such cases, provokers hope to elicit stimulation from their targets 
as their preferred way to modulate their own underaroused states, repair breaches in the 
relationship, and dispel the affects associated with loss that the breaches have caused.  
This is a theoretical dissertation that incorporates a review of theoretical and research 
literature and features a clinical case study as a way to illustrate different functions that 
provocative enactments may serve.  It also contains a theoretical exploration of a 
particular course of development of those representations upon which this set of 
provocative enactments might be based; an exploration of provocative enactments must 
necessarily focus on the transferences that underlie the specific scenarios that the patient 
seeks to enact, and further, on the origins of the representations and internal models that 
comprise these particular transferences.   
I have used the term “provocative” several times thus far, so let me provide a brief 
definition, at least for the purposes of this dissertation.  A provocative gesture can be said 
to have occurred when the patient conveys some information to the analyst with the 
conscious or unconscious belief that such information will (i) impart to the therapist an 
unpleasant or painful feeling, and (ii) cause the therapist to react as a result of that 
feeling.   Such a feeling might be irritation, anger, guilt, longing, or sadness, and the 
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patient would expect it to arise out of the frustration of what the patient construes to be 
the therapist’s needs.  (I thus distinguish provocative gestures from seductive gestures, 
where the latter are intended to elicit pleasurable or positive feelings in the therapist by 
fulfilling what the patient construes to be the therapist’s needs.)  The provocative 
enactment is comprised of the patient’s provocative gesture coupled with any response or 
non-response to the gesture by the therapist. 
 Why is a study of provocative enactments important?  We must first ask why the 
clinician must understand transference phenomena generally.  Transferences and the 
enactments that flow from them make up a significant portion of the raw data that the 
analyst assesses in formulating a diagnosis.  Moreover, to foster a dialogue between 
patient and analyst about such phenomena furthers the therapeutic goal of “making the 
unconscious conscious” or, alternatively, making the unspeakable speakable.  Most 
centrally, transferences and their enactment reflect the organized system of internal 
schemas that patients use to understand and negotiate their own emotional lives and their 
interpersonal worlds.  To the extent that existing schemas impair the patient’s social 
functioning or otherwise make the patient unhappy, the therapist would work to alter 
those schemas.  This sort of change is accomplished by fostering the patient’s ability to 
reflect on the nature and origin of transference phenomena, and by creating the 
opportunity for dyadic interactions that disconfirm existing expectancies and create new, 
less problematic ones. 
Provocative enactments are part of a great many clinical relationships.  They are 
also very common in everyday interactions and are considered to be socially normative or 
problematic, depending on the context.  Laypeople are apt to explain the motive force 
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underlying a provocative gesture in one of two ways: either the actor is expressing anger 
and aggression, or the actor is “just trying to get attention”.  In fact, several 
schoolteachers with whom I discussed this topic were surprised that there could be any 
academic interest in, or controversy about, this latter motive.  To them, it was common 
knowledge.  They all could recount many experiences with children who would “act out” 
as the children’s preferred way of gaining contact with the teacher, which behavior was 
invariably viewed as troublesome by the adult toward whom it was directed. 
It would seem reasonable to many that childhood acting-out patterns can often 
persist into adulthood, and that such persistence can be explained by the continued 
efficacy of the behavior.  Popular depictions of adult acting out often allude to the actor’s 
underlying desire to communicate with someone and to elicit a response.  For example, in 
the film Fight Club, Marla (Helena Bonham Carter’s character) offhandedly remarked 
about her imminent drug overdose: "This isn't a 'for real' suicide thing. This is probably 
one of those 'cry for help' things."  The person who wrote that line seemed to 
acknowledge that it had become a cliché in popular culture to depict suicidal behavior as 
an interpersonal gesture, a depiction almost worthy of satire.  Nonetheless, Marla still 
believed in the utility of the remark: she was speaking to Edward Norton’s character, 
Jack, a man who had suddenly broken contact with her.  In that scene, Marla hoped to 
elicit some sort of response from Jack; it was clear that her comment was a gambit in 
trying to reestablish contact with him.  Although Jack viewed her as “a predator posing as 
a housepet”, Marla successfully attained her goal.  One would expect that her belief in the 
efficacy of her behavior would thus be reinforced. 
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In both clinical and lay relationships, I observed that the ruptures I myself had 
initiated – empathic breaks as well as physical absences – typically would precede a 
provocative gesture from the other person.  If subsequent discussion were ventured, it 
would frequently uncover some causal link, specifically, that the rupture had engendered 
a particular affective response arising out of the resulting sense of loss.  But the question 
of motive or goal often remained less-than-fully explored: either (i) the sense of loss gave 
rise to shame and loss of self-esteem, so that the provocation was meant to hurt me as a 
way to assert power over me and/or destroy a connection, or (ii) the sense of loss gave 
rise to despair or longing, so that the provocation was meant to hurt me as a way to draw 
my attention, kindle my empathy, and stir me to activity and interaction.  I had harbored a 
vague intuition that one or both of these motives were always at the root of a provocative 
gesture.  And although the “connection-destructive” motive seemed antithetical to the 
“connection-reparative” motive, the potential remained for both motives to be active and 
to create a conflict of their own.   
It had struck me that clinical responses to provocative gestures ought depend a 
great deal on which of the two motives were in ascendancy when the gestures were 
offered, so that the patient can differentially understand the triggers for such enactments, 
the wished-for outcomes, and the way the respective motives may impact the patient’s 
functionality.  I chose to write on this topic because I suspected that the distinction 
between the two motives was important, but that the distinction was not much 
acknowledged and explained in the psychoanalytic literature.  And although I discovered 
an abundance of discussion in the literature about the “aggressive” motive, I could not 
find much that explicitly identified this second, connection-reparative motive such that 
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clinical approaches to it might be formulated.  I also wondered about the developmental 
origins of the representations and expectancies characteristic of the connection-reparative 
motive, and the scenarios that provocative patients hope to actualize with the therapist.  
Did two distinct sets of representations exist, each constructed around one of the motive 
forces?  For example, were there any particular dyadic patterns in early development that 
were precursors to one set of representations versus the other?  What role did the 
experience of pain and negative affect play in the functioning of the dyad and in the 
formation of these representations?  Most fundamentally, what particular bodily 
experiences were implicated as the foundation for the motive forces in the development 
of those representations?  It occurred to me that the experimental literature relating to 
infant research and attachment theory might be a useful supplement to psychoanalytic 
theory in addressing these questions.   
These are very broad ranging questions, and my attempt to consider possible 
answers must necessarily leave some avenues of inquiry unexplored.  For example, this 
dissertation describes a possible role of underaroused bodily states in the development of 
one subset of provocative scenarios.  As part of this discussion, I will identify as crucial 
the distinction between the pain of underarousal and the pain of overarousal; I will 
speculate about the development of particular representations, which representations are 
derived from dyadic attempts to regulate underaroused states and the affects with which 
they would become associated.  I do not explicate the developmental life of 
representations derived from attempts to regulate overaroused states and their own 
distinct set of concomitant affects.  I can certainly envision a completely separate, 
companion disquisition on the affects that might arise out of overaroused bodily states, 
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the successful and not-so-successful dyadic attempts to regulate them, the way such 
patterned interactions cohere into particular representations, the manifestation of those 
representations as transference and enactments in adult life, and the clinical approaches to 
those manifestations that are deemed to be maladaptive.  And although I suggest that 
dyadic experiences with underarousal give rise to sets of representations and behaviors 
that may overlap with those evident in borderline pathology, I will not attempt to suggest 
any direct associations or correlates, or even address this overlap at all.  However, one 
cannot help but wonder about the nature of that overlap, if one were to find the 
speculations put forward in this dissertation to be worthy of consideration. 
In keeping with the focus on provocative enactments and the regulation of arousal 
levels and affect states, the literature to be reviewed will be organized according to the 
following subtopics: (A) definitions of “arousal” and “affect”, and theories about their 
origins; (B) theories about the development of representational systems; (C) views about 
transference and enactments generally; and (D) views about the nature of aggression and 
the manifestation of aggression in transference and enactments.  Transference and 
enactments are clinical phenomena identified and defined by psychoanalytic theories, and 
a range of psychoanalytic and psychoanalytically-influenced schools of thought are 
surveyed as the relevant literature domains.  They are clustered in roughly three groups: 
classical, object relations/self psychology, and analytically-informed infant research.  
Theorists in all three groups have formulated developmental and clinical theories of 
arousal and/or affect, representations and transference.   
A clinical case presentation will follow the literature review.  The patient to be 
presented offered an abundance of provocative gestures during the treatment, and because 
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these gestures seemed at times to arise out of a primarily connection-reparative motive 
and at times out of a connection-destructive one, the case provides useful comparative 
illustrations.  The final section of the dissertation contains a more theoretical discussion 
of those provocative enactments that serve as regulators of underaroused states and their 
associated affects, including some thoughts about the way that the underlying 
representations might develop out of early dyadic experiences, and about potential 
clinical approaches to these sorts of transference patterns. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. Arousal, Affect, and the Relationship Between Them 
 A change in a person’s state of “arousal” can be described simply as a set of 
physiological changes, where such changes consist of responses to any set of stimuli, 
internal or external to the organism.  By contrast, “affect” has been viewed both as an 
internal experience as well as external behavior.  Many theories exist to help explicate the 
causes of the phenomenology as well as the outward expression of affect.  Many theorists 
also discuss the intrapsychic and interpersonal impact of affect; they illustrate how, 
during infancy, individual and dyadic systems are formed that serve to regulate arousal 
and affect in ways that will be altered and reorganized over the course of early 
development.  Though many theorists have concluded that a physical state or a 
physiological change (i.e., arousal) correlates with an affective experience, there are 
differing views regarding the causal relationship between the objective physical state and 
the subjective affective experience.  Although arousal can be described in purely 
physiological terms, it is hard to say whether emotional experience is based more on 
physiological sensation or on some primeval psychological phenomena originating in the 
limbic system.  Moreover, there are differing theories about the exact role of higher-level 
cognitive functions in the generation of emotion.   
 The relevant literature on arousal and affect will be surveyed in this section to 
support several points to be made in the second half of this dissertation.  First, there is a 
relationship between arousal and affect; but specifically, changes in arousal level cause 
changes in affective experience.  Second, it is adaptive for an organism to maintain a 
particular arousal state at certain times, and to change its arousal state at other times, 
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namely, when the arousal state is problematically too high or too low.  It can be said that 
at any given time, there is an “optimum” range of arousal for that organism.  It can also 
be said that the relationship of the actual arousal level to the optimal arousal level gives 
rise to the affect’s associated qualities: positive versus negative (or pleasure versus 
unpleasure), intense versus mild, etc.  The valence of an affect connotes a motive 
component of the affect: the organism “desires” to maintain the positive affect and 
eliminate the negative affect, and thus the organism is motivated to effect the 
maintenance or elimination of a given affect.  Finally, since arousal level is altered by 
both endogenous and exogenous stimulation, the quantity of such stimulation has a direct 
bearing upon the individual’s affective experience, and it can be said that the organism is 
motivated to control or impact that stimulation in pursuit of the maintenance or the 
elimination of the particular affect. 
1. Definitions of arousal and affect 
 a. Arousal  
 From the time an organism is conceived until it is weaned, a mother and her 
offspring share a direct, physiological intimacy.  The physiology not of only humans but 
of all mammals is characterized by a large number of systems devoted to keeping the 
offspring alive and physiologically regulated and within homeostatic limits, despite 
potentially wide environmental variations.  For example, in the intra-uterine environment, 
fetal levels of temperature, oxygen, water, electrolytes and nutrients must all be regulated 
via direct connection to the mother’s body.  The fetus shares the maternal blood supply 
and body temperature.  The mother also provides proprioceptive and audio sensory 
stimulation to the fetus (see Michel & Moore, 1995).  At birth, this direct biological 
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connection is broken.  The newborn must then begin to rely upon its own respiratory, 
circulatory and excretory systems to maintain its physiological equilibrium.  As long as 
the child remains alive, such self-equilibrating physiological systems must function 
continually and effectively. 
 The human organism shows signs of some self-regulatory capacity pre- as well as 
post-natally.  Nonetheless, no mammal is capable of independent function at birth, but 
rather must maintain regulatory connections with its mother.  To this end, newborns 
possess the “inborn” capacity to produce behaviors that enable them, in effect, to seek out 
and respond to environmental stimulation.  Such ongoing ties between the infant and its 
environment provide a foundation for the development of bi-directional systems that 
organize parent-child interactions.  To survive and develop in a healthy way, a newborn 
must breathe, eat, sleep, and be kept clean, and it must otherwise receive some quantity 
of sensory stimulation through interaction with its environment.  The infant’s 
environment must provide the opportunity for all these needs to be met, and indeed the 
environment must be able to be shaped by the infant’s developing requirements.  In other 
words, the environment must somehow provide for the infant’s needs in a contingent 
way.  Given that the infant’s needs are quite variable, when should the environment 
change to meet a particular need, and in what way?  The infant’s level of arousal and the 
associated infant behaviors play an important role in the way the infant can alter its 
environment. 
 Arousal has been defined as a multidimensional activating process that can be 
manifested at a central nervous system, autonomic, endocrine, and even cellular level of 
analysis (Derryberry & Rothbart, 1988).  For example, an infant’s arousal level can be 
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measured by examining a series of physiological indices (EEG, heart rate, respiration) or 
observable behaviors (orienting responses, sucking speed, head-turning, other motoric 
activity).  The physiological manifestations are governed by the autonomic nervous 
system (ANS).  Generally speaking, one component of the ANS, the sympathetic nervous 
system, is associated with bodily preparation for activity and energy consumption.  
Stimulation of the sympathetic system produces increased heartbeat, raised blood 
pressure, release of glucose into the bloodstream and increased bloodflow to muscles 
used in physical activity.  Such changes can be said to reflect increased arousal.  
Activation of the second component of the ANS, the parasympathetic nervous system, 
has the effect of conserving energy.  Stimulation of the parasympathetic system produces 
lowered heart rate, lowered blood pressure and diversion of bloodflow from skeletal 
muscles to the digestive system (Barron, 1995).  These changes can be said to reflect 
reduced arousal.  Eysenck (1967) emphasized that it was important to also include 
cortical and limbic arousal in a general measure of arousal.   
 Clearly, there is a useful and adaptive relationship between some behaviors 
produced by arousal changes and the resulting regulation of the infant’s physiologic 
requirements.  There is certainly evidence that an imbalance of physiologic needs causes 
biochemical changes in the infant that leads to elevated heart rate and respiration, and 
changes in EEG.  For example, a reduction in the infant’s blood glucose level will lead to 
an increase in insulin secretion and an associated increase in blood adrenaline and 
cortisol levels (e.g., Marchini et al., 1998).  Such biochemical changes will lead to an 
autonomic nervous system reaction: an elevation in heart rate and respiration.  Eventually 
these changes will produce behaviors in the infant sufficient to cue arousal regulating 
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behaviors on the part of the caretaker – in this example, feeding.  Arousal changes can 
also lead to self-regulatory responses, e.g., rising arousal can lead to gaze aversion, which 
can reduce environmental stimulation, while falling arousal can lead to environmental 
search for stimulus.  The biological substrates of the link between lack of nutrition and 
subsequent arousal are well documented.  The biological underpinnings of some other 
arousal-producing stimuli are less clear.  For example, it is less clear why novel sensory 
stimuli increase physiological arousal, why the magnitude of the stimulus seems to be 
proportional to the magnitude of the arousal produced, and why repeated exposures to the 
same stimulus produce less and less arousal over time.  Nonetheless, we can assume that 
some neural connection exists between the sensory organ and the brain, that some 
rudimentary signal processing takes place in the brain, and that the resulting brain activity 
leads to a particular endocrine response.   
 Experimental research indicates that the experience of understimulation impacts 
the brain and the body in a way that is distinct from overstimulation (see Schore, 2003).  
Repeated experiences of maternal deprivation and hypoarousal lead to significant 
elevations in the secretion of ACTH and glucocorticoids (e.g., cortisol) (Zhang et al., 
2002), whereas experiences of hyperarousing stressors cause the elevation in the 
secretion of not only glucocorticoids, but of catecholamines (epinephrine, 
norepinephrine, dopamine) as well (Chaparro-Huerta et al., 2002; Guilarte, 1998; 
McDonald et al., 1988).  Catecholamines impact the body in a very different way than do 
the glucocorticoids (see Yehuda, 1999).  Increases in levels of epinephrine and 
norepinephrine have the same effects on target organs as direct stimulation by 
sympathetic nerves, i.e., the initiation of the “fight-or-flight” response (although the 
 13
effect is longer lasting): increased rate and force of contraction of the heart muscle, 
constriction of the blood vessels and increase in blood pressure, dilation of the 
bronchioles, and increased metabolic rate, including increased oxygen consumption and 
heat production.  By contrast, a simple increase in the level of cortisol will primarily 
impact carbohydrate metabolism so as to increase concentrations of blood glucose, e.g., 
through increased gluconeogenesis (synthesis of glucose from amino acids and lipids), 
inhibition of glucose uptake in muscle and adipose tissue, stimulation of lipolysis (the 
breakdown of fat stored in fat cells), and suppression of the immune system.  
Glucocorticoids also increase appetite for food, locomotor activity and food-seeking 
behavior (McEwen, 2000, 1999).  Thus, it is possible to argue that the physical feeling of 
underarousal may be detected even by an infant as a physical state that is distinct from 
overarousal.1 
 b. Affect 
 There is wide agreement among emotions researchers that emotions somehow 
involve changes in physiological arousal state, cognitive processes, and associated 
“typical” expressive behaviors (Izard, 1992; Zajonc & McIntosh, 1992).  However, there 
has been longstanding controversy regarding the causal relationships of these three 
                                                 
1 It has also been shown that chronically elevated levels of glucocorticoids will lead to 
cell death primarily in the hippocampal region of the brain (Ellenbroek & Riva, 2003; 
Lupien et al., 1998; van Oers et al., 1998), which changes have been associated with 
alterations in basal cortisol and stress reactivity in children (Gunnar & Vazquez, 2006): 
Essex et al. (2002) found that elevations in cortisol at age 4½ were predicted by high 
levels of stress during the child’s infancy, where the most robust predictions were 
associated with infant stress caused by maternal depression symptoms; adolescent 
children of mothers who were depressed post-natally were shown to have higher morning 
cortisol levels and more variability in these levels (Halligan, Herbert, Goodyer, & 
Murray, 2004).  By contrast, chronically elevated levels of catecholamines will lead to 
cell death in the other structures of the limbic system, e.g., the anterior cingulate and the 
amygdala, and the orbitofrontal cortex (see Schore, 2003). 
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components.  According to the Cannon-Bard theory (Cannon, 1927), the perception of 
emotion-provoking events simultaneously induces a subjective experience of emotion and 
a set of physiological changes.  By contrast, the James-Lange theory (James, 1890) 
suggests that perception of an external event produces internal physiological changes, and 
that it is the individual’s perception of those changes that leads to the subjective 
experience of emotion.  Although research indicates that different emotions are 
associated with particular patterns of autonomic activity (e.g., Ekman (1983); Levenson, 
1992; Schwartz, Weinberger & Singer, 1981) and cerebral cortex activation (e.g., 
Davidson, 1992), the causal relationship between arousal and subjective emotional 
experience has yet to be proven.   
 Both Cannon-Bard and James-Lange theories imply that cognitive processes 
mediate the relationship among real-world events, physical sensations and subjective 
emotional experience.  Schachter and Singer (1962) attempted to clarify the role of 
cognition in emotional experience by proposing their “cognitive arousal” or “two-factor” 
theory.  They suggested that it is the perception of a given event that produces an increase 
in arousal.  Once this change occurs, the individual then searches for cues, perhaps 
perceptual cues surrounding the event, in order to “label” the heightened arousal state, 
and it is this labeling that determines which emotion is experienced.  The implication is 
that the individual assesses the real-time cues using an experience-based model of 
expectancies and outcomes.  Schachter and Singer believed the quality of the subjective 
emotion to be purely a function of the labeling process.   
 Unfortunately, there are a number of problems with this line of research.  For 
example, Schachter and Singer did not consider whether such labeling (i.e., the cognition) 
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might then in turn lead to further ANS or cortical changes, which changes add greater 
affective color to the previously undifferentiated arousal state.  Also, the original 
“cognitive arousal” studies, as well as subsequent studies by critics of this theory, were 
all based on the assumption that all emotional experience was caused by an elevation in 
arousal – e.g., in many of the studies subjects were injected with epinephrine, exposed to 
different environmental stimuli, and then assessed for subjective emotional experience 
(e.g., Marshall & Zimbardo, 1979; Maslach, 1979).  None of these researchers considered 
whether reduction in arousal might also be associated with affective experiences or 
whether particular affects might be associated with elevation of arousal and others with 
reduction in arousal. 
 These researchers also neglected to consider whether the quality of the affect 
might be in part determined by the magnitude of the change in arousal as compared to 
some baseline arousal state.  Hebb (1955) and Eysenck (1967, 1981) argued that affective 
tone is related to level of activation of the cortical reticular system in a bell-shaped 
function, i.e., hedonic tone reaches its highest level at moderate levels of arousal and 
decreases as arousal becomes higher or lower in intensity.  If this is true, then it can be 
inferred that there always exists in an individual a desired range of arousal that is 
conceptually distinct from the actual level of arousal, and a “hedonic” motive to bring 
actual arousal in line with the desired arousal range.  In simplified terms, such motive 
would be manifested as the desire (i) to maintain arousal within particular bounds, neither 
too low nor too high, and (ii) the desire to shift out of a too-high or too-low arousal state.   
 Other research suggests that the absolute measure of the desired arousal baseline 
in a given individual will itself vary over time.  This baseline level is undoubtedly 
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influenced by cyclical physiological changes, e.g., circadian, basic rest-activity, and 
hormonal cycles.  Certainly, the great majority of a caretaker’s efforts during the infant’s 
first two months of life are spent regulating and stabilizing its cyclical arousal-state 
transitions: sleep-wake, day-night, and hunger-satiation (Greenspan, 1981; Sander, 1962, 
1964).  Emde (1979) suggested that a variety of these sorts of neurochemical processes 
modulate the reactivity of affective-motivational systems during infant development.  
Research shows that such neurochemical processes endure to some extent into adulthood.  
In addition, the quantitative attributes of the change in actual arousal level over time may 
help define the particular affective qualities of the positive or negative emotion.  In other 
words, the perceived direction of the change in arousal influences the quality of the affect 
as does the rate of change of arousal level (see Stern’s (1985) discussion of “vitality 
affects” below).  For example, in a context where actual arousal already exceeds desired 
arousal (i.e., overarousal), rapidly rising arousal and gradually rising arousal may be 
experienced as two qualitatively different negative affects, and falling arousal may be 
experienced as positive.  These same shifts in arousal may produce completely different 
affective experiences in a context where actual arousal is below desired arousal (i.e., 
underarousal). 
 Infant research suggests that at early stages in the organization of an infant’s 
cognitive capacities, physiological responses are linked purely to the quantitative aspects 
of the stimuli.  Only later in development, when the organization of the organism has 
advanced, will responses to the stimuli be based on the qualitative aspects of the stimuli 
(see Schneirla, 1959, 1965).  Transitions to qualitatively based response systems cannot 
occur without the organism’s prior experience of quantitatively based response systems 
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(Turkewitz, Gardner & Lewkowicz, 1984).  For example, researchers have made 
convincing arguments that seeming cross-modal perception during the first three months 
(e.g., Meltzoff & Borton, 1979; Meltzoff & Moore, 1977) is actually the result of 
coincident arousal and habituation responses and that there exists no “innate” amodal 
representations of the stimuli present perinatally.  In other words, a period of simple 
arousal experiences must necessarily precede their organization into categories of 
affective experiences, i.e., there exists no a priori representations of affects; according to 
Turkewitz et al., such an organizational shift would not take place prior to three months 
of age.  Though infants may be born “hard-wired” with particular feature detectors and 
attentional preferences, such predispositions only impact the young infant by allowing it 
to monitor and react to the magnitude of its arousal.   
 By contrast, Stern (1985) accepted the idea that the infant at birth possesses the 
requisite mental structures to abstract patterns of stimuli cross-modally into amodal 
perceptions.  Stern claimed that the infant has a clear albeit rudimentary sense of self 
from birth.  Stern based the definition of this “emergent self” on the existence of 
organized mental structures that exist innately at birth.  He derived this claim 
predominantly from his own interpretations of the cross-modal perception literature and 
from his observation that young infants must innately experience “vitality affects”.  
Deriving these concepts from the work of Schneirla (1959, 1965) and Tomkins (1981), 
Stern asserted that distinct patterns of neural firings (density x time) give rise to these 
special affective experiences that capture the qualities of rates of change of stimuli (e.g. 
the feeling of a burst, a crescendo or a fade-out).  Stern believed that stimuli that share 
similar envelopes of neural firing will evoke similar vitality affects.  The infant’s ability 
 18
to extract these amodal affects from the modal experience exists, according to Stern, 
innately at birth.   
2. Classical psychoanalytic views of affect 
 Prior to his first articulation of drive theory in Three Essays on the Theory of 
Sexuality (1905), Freud’s view of human motivation was comprised of his Constancy 
Principle (1892) and his theory of wishes (1900).  The Constancy Principle in this early 
form assumed that there existed biologically-based, as well as environmental, sources of 
stimulation that act upon the human organism from birth onward; the psychic 
representations of the physiological effects of these stimuli on the organism comprise 
affective experience.  According to the Constancy Principle, quiescence is the most 
pleasing, optimal state, whereas all movement from quiescence to excitation is 
unpleasant.  To Freud, the modulation of arousal states (through his proposed 
homeostatic mechanisms) was an important function of the human psyche.   
 Freud also identified an unconscious, biologically-based force to counterbalance 
such affective experiences, which force existed as a psychic apparatus that works to keep 
stimulation as close to zero as possible.  This unconscious force generated the impulse to 
produce whatever mental or real action is best suited for the reduction (or “discharge”) of 
any given stimulation (e.g., 1900).  More specifically, there exist memory traces of the 
past satisfying experiences of affective discharge.  Upon stimulation of the organism, the 
unconscious will produce the impulse, or “wish”, to reestablish this remembered 
satisfying discharge, which will result in an affective display, among other things.  If left 
unimpeded, the unconscious will produce an uninhibited affective display when it detects 
a particular affective experience.  While these phenomena take place in the domain of the 
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unconscious, some of the products of the generated wishes reach consciousness as 
fantasies, dreams and direct action (1900). 
 However, when the stimuli associated with such affective experiences cannot be 
discharged, pathology may result.  External circumstances may block discharge, as may 
conflicting internal states of mind, such as moral or ethical values.  In such cases, affect 
will get “pent-up” and unpleasure will increase.  The stimulus may continue to act on the 
organism and the “discharger” will continue to generate impulses/wishes.  Should such 
stimulus and discharge-blocking continue, “traumatic” psychic structures are formed 
(1895).  In other words, chronically blocked “discharger” products do not reach 
consciousness in a normal way but rather are repressed, forming a distinct, separate 
psychic entity that resides mostly in the unconscious, but may still impact the organism 
out of the individual’s awareness, and sometimes in problematic ways.  In such cases, it 
is therapeutic to help patient recover memories associated with these repressed affective 
experiences, such that the patient can feel them again (“abreaction”), display the affect, 
and thereby achieve some measure of discharge (1893).  
 In this model, affects are the psychic representations of the effects of a broad 
variety of endogenous and exogenous stimulation.  All stimulus leads to a countervailing 
urge.  So a sexual stimulus will lead the “discharger” to create the impulse to act so as to 
discharge it.  A fear-producing or anger-producing stimulus would likewise give rise to a 
discharging wish.  In this theory, the affective experiences can be grouped categorically, 
but they themselves cannot be distinguished in terms of valence (i.e., pleasurability).  
Affects seem to have no positive or negative valence of their own; rather, the valence lies 
in whether the wish is expressed so as to dissipate the effect of the stimulus.  It is the 
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resultant destimulation that produces pleasure.  Lack of dissipation of the excitement 
produces unpleasure.2   
 In the above pre-1905 model, the motivating force behind all behavior were 
wishes that were varied and could correspond to any sort of stimuli, i.e., any sorts of 
need.  Post-1905, the most important motivating stimulus was defined as fundamentally 
endogenous – an “endosomatic, continuously flowing source of stimulation” from focal 
somatic sources (1905, p. 168, see also 1915a); only such instincts, or “drives”, could 
give rise to wishes/impulses, and were thus the fundamental determinant of motivation.  
Most important, Freud emphasized the primacy of one category of drives, the sexual 
drives that are the aggregation of endogenous sexual stimulation – libido – that emanated 
from an assortment of erotogenic somatic zones.  While Freud acknowledged the 
existence off other various instincts, it was only the repression of libidinally produced 
wishes that gave rise to the psychic disturbances that Freud was describing at the time.  
Furthermore, only the external, physical stimulation of these zones could offset and 
discharge the endogenous stimulation, and thus the associated “discharger”-generated 
wish must address some means of effecting physical discharge (see also 1915: partial 
advance toward actualizing aim leads to partial satisfaction).  The 1905 theory of drive 
thus entailed a somatic source (e.g., mouth), an impulse to discharge, or “aim” (e.g., 
impulse to suck), as well as a target for the expression of the impulse, or “object” (e.g., a 
breast or a thumb).  
                                                 
2 Reiterated in 1915a comment: “[I]nstincts are all qualitatively alike and owe their 
difference only to the amount of excitation they carry.  [Distinctions among] the mental 
effects produced ... may be traced to the difference in their sources. (p. 567)”. 
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 In this 1905 view of human motivation, “accidental [i.e., external] influences had 
been replaced by constitutional factors, and ‘defence’ [i.e., the old version of repression] 
had been replaced by organic ‘sexual repression’” (1906, p. 278).  Freud felt that for 
every endogenous sexual stimulus, there developed an endogenous counterpart force that 
produced an innate aversion to the wish generated by the stimulus.  The unpleasure 
produced by undissipated sexual stimulation itself evoked opposing “reacting impulses 
which, in order to suppress this unpleasure effectively, build up mental dams [of] disgust, 
shame and morality (1905, p. 178).”  At this time, no other repressive forces were posited 
(other than component sexual drives which may conflict with one another, e.g., opposing 
anal instincts (1915)).  Thus, the conflict between libido and organic sexual repression 
occurs in an entirely endogenous way.   
 In the post-1905 world of Freud’s thinking, libido was primary in psychic life.  If 
drive was the only stimulus with a significant impact on the psyche, affects were viewed 
essentially as derivatives of libido; in other words, where the stimulus of libido caused 
impulses/wishes that had to be repressed, this stimulus finds expression in the physical 
processes that the individual experienced as affect (1915b)).  Thus, without repression, 
the only affective experiences would be those of mounting drive tension (unpleasure) and 
discharge of drive tension (pleasure).  The effects of defensive forces add their given 
flavor to an affect over and above its pleasure/unpleasure quality.  Moreover, since the 
relevant stimulus is entirely endogenous, the resultant affects cannot be described as 
having any social origins except insofar as the environment frustrates or facilitates 
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libidinal aims.3  The quality of the affects themselves did not seem to interest Freud; his 
focus at that time was on libidinal energy and those forces that caused repression.   
 In 1910, Freud abandoned organic sexual repression (1906) as a libido-repressing 
force and definitively declared the ego to be a distinct drive with its own self-preservative 
aims.  As described, the ego could compete with libido, and so served as a major 
repressive force.  In this decade, Freud elaborated on the developmental life of the sexual 
and ego instincts.  At different points in development, libido (and resulting discharge 
wishes) could be directed toward one’s body parts (autoeroticism), toward others (object 
love) or toward the ego (primary narcissism) (1911a, 1914).  At that time, ego-directed 
libido seemed to represent the theoretical equivalent of modern notions of self-esteem.  
Freud also considered the ego to be the reservoir from which object-libido is sent out 
from and returns into.  In addition, Freud identified the “ego ideal”, a representation of 
the perfected self used as a self-measure by the ego in the form of “conscience”, the 
contents of which were defined by the external voices of parents, teachers and public 
opinion (1914).  Such mechanisms of the ego (i.e., conscience) served as the primary 
inhibitor of drive impulses by the production of guilt and shame responses.   
 During this time, Freud seemed to be grappling with his conception of those 
internal forces that competed with libido.  It is hard to tell whether Freud believed that 
affect flowed directly from these other (ego) forces, because he also claimed that these 
competing forces nonetheless drew their energy from libido.  For example, the affects 
associated with caretaking in infancy were all considered to be autoerotic sexual 
satisfactions or frustrations, even though the caretaking itself served the purpose of self-
                                                 
3 At this stage of Freud’s theories, the impact of social forces on the content and activity 
of the ego is unclear. 
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preservation (1913) and libido is thus “attached” to ego.  Theoretical questions arose 
regarding the ego’s energy; specifically, did it all come from libido or did it have its own 
energy, and how could the ego act both as an object of libidinal energy and a deployer of 
it in service of its own aims?  Most important, could the operation of the ego be 
considered as “instinctual” a force as the operation of sexual drives?  If so, it would be 
implicit that some affective experiences could flow solely from the autonomous activities 
of the ego.  Yet, how could this be so if the ego were to be the repository of “the subject’s 
cultural and ethical ideas [and] self-respect” (1913) that served to conflict with libidinal 
impulses and initiate repression? 
 This uncertainty seems evident in Mourning and Melancholia (1917), in which 
Freud focused directly on the origins of particular sad and angry affects.  In that article,  
Freud argued that the feelings of melancholy arise because the loss of the object is re-
experienced as loss of libido by the identificatory part of the ego.  Similarly, angry, self-
abusive feelings stem from an attack on this same part of the ego by the ego ideal.  It is 
this attack, the ego ideal channels anal-sadistic libido previously associated with the 
object onto the ego.  The resulting loss of ego-libido was the cause the depressive 
feelings we think of as a lowering of self-esteem.  On the one hand, it can be said that 
these affects are all products of repressive libido channeling.  On the other hand, with the 
ego so active – applying ideals, detecting loss, making identifications, actively 
channeling libido – it seems just as accurate to describe affect as a product of ego 
activity.   
 During the period of 1910-1920, Freud struggled in his attempts to account for all 
psychic motivation and affective experience as a function of the sexual drive and its 
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repression.  Freud proposed the “reality principle” (1911b) to explain the ego’s capacity 
to interact with and adapt to reality’s frustrations, but the uncertainty remained: did those 
feelings of frustration come from the unpleasure of undissipated libido or was it the 
byproduct of some repressive ego activity?  In 1920, Freud proposed the existence of 
another drive, the death instinct – which competed with and potentially conflict with 
libido – as a way to explain human motivation that seemed to lie beyond the scope of the 
pleasure principle.  In his proposal of his structural model in The Ego and the Id (1923), 
he completely rejected his old characterization of the ego as a drive, instead distributing 
its functions among the libidinal drives, the destructive drives and the structure ego. 
 In 1924, Freud rejected his earlier conception that pleasure and unpleasure resided 
as points along a single axis of somatic activation or stimulation, and marginalized the 
constancy principle by saying it that it only applied to the death instinct.  In “The 
Economic Problem of Masochism” (1924), Freud suggested that pleasure and unpleasure 
represent the effects of qualitatively distinct systems, perhaps distinct neurological 
systems.  (The evolution of Freud’s theories about sadism, masochism and aggression 
will be discussed more fully in Section D.) 
 During the 1920s, Freud also addressed the meaning and significance of an 
important affect – anxiety – in mental life.  At the end of The Ego and the Id (1923), 
Freud unequivocally stated that “the ego is the actual seat of anxiety.”4  Only the ego had 
the perceptual and reasoning capacities to determine that a given percept is connected 
with danger.  The ego would then withdraw ego-libido from the percept and/or the 
associated id processes and emit it as anxiety.  Freud reiterated this idea in Inhibitions, 
                                                 
4 He reiterated later that “anxiety is an affective state and as such can, of course, only be 
felt by the ego (1926, p. 71).” 
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Symptoms and Anxiety (1926), explicitly rejecting his earlier view that the cathectic 
energy of the repressed impulse is automatically turned into anxiety.  Anxiety was not a 
simple byproduct of the repression process after all, nor of the underlying unpleasure that 
results from the “damming up” of drive stimulation.  To the contrary, “it is always the 
ego’s attitude of anxiety [toward the impulse] which is the primary thing and [is the 
force] which sets repression going” (p. 109).  In fact, the specific quality of the anxiety 
experienced can never be created de novo in repression.  Rather, “it is reproduced as an 
affective state in accordance with an already existing mnemic image. [To] enquire into 
the origin of that anxiety – and of affects in general – [takes us into] the borderland of 
physiology” (p. 93).   
 Freud regarded birth trauma as the prototype anxiety state.  Accordingly, “the 
other affects are also reproductions of very early, perhaps even pre-individual, 
experiences of vital importance; I should be inclined to regard them as universal, typical 
and innate hysterical attacks” (p. 62).  To Freud, the key to understanding anxiety laid in 
the fact that childhood manifestations of anxiety (including birth trauma) “can be reduced 
to a single condition – namely, that of missing someone who is loved and longed for” (p. 
136).  The infant at birth recognizes the mother as the object who “satisfies all its needs 
without delay” (p. 137).  The real essence of the danger which the infant perceives lies in 
“non-satisfaction of a growing tension due to need ... in which the amounts of stimulation 
rise to an unpleasurable height without its being possible for them to be mastered 
psychically or discharged, [and] must be for the infant analogous to the situation of being 
born” (p. 137).  When the infant develops the capacity to pair the presence of the 
caretaker with regulation of this potentially dangerous situation “the content of the danger 
 26
it fears is displaced from the economic situation onto the condition which determined that 
situation, viz., the loss of object.  It is now the absence of mother that is the danger; as 
soon as that danger arises the infant gives the signal of anxiety [i.e., an affective display], 
before the dreaded economic situation has set in....” (p. 138).  Here Freud distinguished 
the signal anxiety, triggered by the risk of danger, from the traumatic anxiety produced 
by the dangerous disregulation itself.  He went on to describe four developmental stages 
of anxiety: (i) psychic helplessness, (ii) loss of object, (iii) castration anxiety, and        
(iv) moral (superego) anxiety.  This 1923/1926 view of id and ego functioning did not 
undergo much further modification.   
 In the model just described, signal anxiety comes from the ego, because the ego 
must perform the necessary information processing to produce the signal, and it must 
then respond to it by raising defenses.  However, Freud distinguished the arousal 
produced by signal anxiety from the traumatic overarousal characteristic of early infancy, 
but he never made clear whether the experience of overarousal had an affective quality 
prior to the development of the ego.  Freud maintained that trauma occurs only after a 
breach in the stimulus barrier, i.e., overstimulation by exogenous forces.  But when a 6-
week-old becomes overaroused and starts to cry, can it be said to be experiencing affect?     
 In the 1940s and 1950s, significant elaborations of the last incarnation of Freud’s 
model of id and ego functioning were made by Heinz Hartmann.  His most noteworthy 
contribution was his argument that the ego functioned more autonomously from the id 
than Freud had described.  Arguing that the ego has roots in the human constitution no 
less than the id, Hartmann suggested that the ego has its own energy source apart from 
the libido it neutralizes.  He stressed even more than Freud the important role played by 
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the ego as the part of the psyche capable of adapting to real world demands, as well as the 
role of reality in the formation of the ego’s aims, i.e., that such aims are significantly 
shaped by the individual’s need to live in and succeed in the real world.  Moreover, the 
impact of the real world on the ego takes place from birth or before, such that, at birth, 
the infant already possesses the ego apparatus – a set of cognitive tools and capacities – 
adapted to an “average expectable environment” (1939).  Hartmann pointed to the 
infant’s capacity to perceive, remember and control movements as evidence that the 
infant is born in a state of pre-adaptedness. 
 Returning to the question of the origin of pleasure, Hartmann claimed that reality 
experiences might have a primary influence on the individual’s experience of pleasure 
(1939).  Hartman later pointed out that the ego, beyond merely delaying discharge, has 
the capacity to determine whether a given stimulus is even to be characterized as 
pleasurable or not (1956), regardless of whether the stimulus is that of a sexual drive, an 
aggressive drive, or a “real world” danger.  Thus, real world experience comes to bear on 
the stimulus-pleasure sequence.  In this way, even more than Freud, Hartmann claimed a 
significant role for the ego not only in generating but in defining the quality of a given 
affective experience.  He went so far as to propose stages of changing pleasure conditions 
over the course of ego development similar to the developmental progression of libidinal 
phases.  Thus Hartman went farther than Freud in detaching the phenomenological 
quality of affective experience from drive vicissitudes. 
 Charles Brenner (1982) set forth a thorough and unambiguous definition of affect.  
He noted that the theoretical literature up to that point had very little to say about affects 
other than anxiety.  Brenner restated the classical position that (i) pleasure and unpleasure 
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– associated with drive tension and drive satisfaction – are the antecedents of affect, and 
(ii) memories and other ideas become associated with the sensations of pleasure and 
unpleasure that are associated with drive derivatives.  Affect is thus viewed as an 
amalgam of sensations and representations.  The sensations might be distinct, or there 
might be a blend of pleasure and unpleasure as a result of competition among drives.  
According to Brenner, the ongoing development of affects also necessarily depends of 
the function of the developing ego and superego: “the ideational content of every affect 
involves memories, representations of objects, representations of one’s own physical 
sensations... All such ideational elements are part of ego functioning (p. 43).”   
 Brenner affirmed Freud’s (1926) view of anxiety as unpleasure plus the ego’s 
apprehension of impending danger:  
thus if the danger is perceived as acute or imminent, we may speak of fear; 
if the unpleasure is intense, of panic.  If the unpleasure is mild and the 
danger is perceived as slight, as uncertain or as distant, we may well speak 
of worry or uneasiness (p. 46). 
 
Brenner remarked that the depressive affects, by contrast, are not associated with coming 
danger but rather with “a calamity that has already happened.”  For example, misery, 
sadness or discontent are all a function of the intensity of the associated unpleasure.  He 
gave further examples: 
[i]f the emphasis is on ideas of longing for a lost object, of wishing it were 
back, we may speak of loneliness.  If we have no hope for relief, we speak 
of despair.  If the emphasis is on being scolded or being ridiculed, we 
speak of shame or humiliation, and so on (p. 47).  
 
 Brenner pointed out that in the mixture of pleasure and unpleasure (e.g., in stage 
fright, where there may be experienced both fear and anticipation), both sensations need 
not be conscious.  Either one may be defended against and unconscious.  The same may 
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be said of the affect’s representational content.  Because of the potential for unconscious 
elements of the affective experience, Brenner stated emphatically that psychoanalytic 
data is necessary in order to distinguish and classify affects.  This is why he believed that 
it would be a mistake to depend solely on the individual’s consciously-derived label if his 
affective experience were to be well understood. 
 In the analytic theories described thus far, pleasure and unpleasure are integral 
parts of the drive model, and thus it can be said that all drive theorists see the “affects” of 
pleasure and unpleasure as existing at birth as part of the psyche’s experience of the 
drives themselves.  However, there is one drive theorist, Otto Kernberg, who presented a 
different theory.  According to Kernberg, drives are formed as by-products of the child’s 
affective experiences.  The theory of affects presented in his work is quite interwoven 
with his developmental model of the child’s representational world.  However, Kernberg 
considers affects to be the primary motivational system, in that they are at the center of 
the infant’s gratifying or frustrating experiences (1993).  In such discussions, Kernberg 
seems to use the term “affect” in the broadest possible way, i.e., simply to mean 
“feelings” or “feeling-state”.   
 As the basis of Kernberg’s theory of affects, he posited the existence of a 
primordial affective memory (1976).  Feeling-states and cognitions at first evolve 
together in the young infant because the memories are stored in an interwoven, 
undifferentiated state.  This theory holds that the infant at some later point develops the 
capacity to distinguish and categorize pleasurable and unpleasurable experiences, as well 
as the qualities of self and object.  The pleasure and unpleasure categories provide the 
basis for the libidinal and aggressive drives.  Once these representational categories are 
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established, pleasure and unpleasure then serve a signal function for the drives, and 
increasingly complex drive derivatives will develop.   
 To Kernberg, drives will always be manifested by wishes in the context of 
particular object relations, and so all representations involving the drive derivatives have 
self- and-object representations associated with them (1976).  Kernberg described the 
process of internalization as the creation in the child’s psyche of these representational 
self-object-affect units.  These units are comprised of “(i) the image of an object, (ii) the 
image of the self in interaction with the object, and (iii) the affective coloring of both the 
object-image and the self-image under the influence of the drive representative present at 
the time of the interaction” (p. 29).  Kernberg attributed variations in the intensity of 
drives or affects either to constitutional vagaries and individual constitutional differences, 
or to the impact on the child of his particular environment.  The positively valenced 
interactions (i.e., “libidinal instinctual gratification, as in loving mother-child contact” (p. 
30)) all fuse together to form a representation of the “good object”.  Likewise, 
introjections taking place under the negative valence of aggressive drive derivatives all 
fuse together to form the “bad object”.  Kernberg adopted Hartmann’s (1955) concept of 
neutralization of drive energies, asserting that in normal development positively and 
negatively valenced self-object-affect units will combine to form more realistic self- and 
object representations: “The synthesis of identification systems neutralizes aggression 
and possibly provides the most important single energy source for the higher level of 




3. Attachment perspective on arousal and affect 
 While classical analytic theory regards affect as a manifestation of drive that is 
shaped by ego function, attachment theorists and infant researchers prefer to focus on the 
expressions of arousal and affect as signals that play a significant communicative role in 
the caretaker-infant system.  The theories of John Bowlby serve as a useful segue 
between the two perspectives.  Although his theories are not completely incompatible 
with classical analytic views of motivation and psychic functioning, Bowlby shifted the 
focus of inquiry from sexual and aggressive instincts to attachment instincts.   
 As Freud did, Bowlby included under the rubric of attachment instincts an 
assortment of phylogenetically-defined, innate component instincts.  These component 
subsystems all predictably produced physical proximity to the organism’s caretaker as 
their byproduct.  Bowlby described sucking, clinging, following, crying and smiling as 
examples of instinct-produced behaviors that were considered attachment behaviors 
because they helped to bind the parent-infant dyad as the infant developed (1959).  Other 
functionally equivalent behaviors are apparent at further stages of development, e.g., a 
12-month-old’s locomotion to mother, or a 18-month-old’s visual and verbal bids for 
contact over a distance (Slade & Aber, 1992).  Hence, the attachment system, a higher 
level system comprised of lower level, proximity-producing instincts, exists at birth to 
enable the child eventually to form a selective attachment relationship with one or a few 
caretaking adults.   
 Explicit in Bowlby’s perspective is his view that proximity-producing instincts 
are selected for in evolution: the greater the parent-child proximity, the less these children 
are vulnerable to predation, and so the stronger the proximity instincts, the greater the 
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likelihood of survival.  However, Bowlby also implied that greater proximity leads to 
more dyadic interactions.  Such prolonged interactions may be necessary for the 
intergenerational transmission of information and mental constructs in cases where the 
infant could not create sui generis such constructs as adaptably.  Thus, proximity also 
promotes adaptive learning.  As children develop into adults, the goal of the attachment 
system shifts from proximity maintenance to the establishment of what Ainsworth (1969) 
later called a “feeling of security”. 
 Implicit in Bowlby’s views is the idea that affective displays functioned as 
important signals to the caretaker.  Thus it can be said that such affective feelings arose 
as part and parcel of the attachment instincts: “causal factors that either activate or 
terminate [the attachment system] include hormonal levels, the organization and 
autonomous action of the central nervous system, environmental stimuli of particular 
sorts and proprioceptive stimuli arising within the organism (1973, p. 82)”.  Such a 
statement seems to implicate more the level of simple arousal than organized information 
processing (i.e., affect) as the controlling force of the intensity of the attachment 
impulses.  In Bowlby’s view, the attachment system operated as a “goal-corrected 
feedback system”.  When a child is far from mother and/or senses danger in the 
environment, the child feels in need of comfort and this feeling will activate the 
attachment system.  When the child is proximate to mother and feels safe and secure, the 
felt need to signal mother to comfort or to provide safety is deactivated (Slade & Aber, 
1992).   
 Bowlby also posited that many important psychic phenomena are best viewed as a 
function of attachment, and that the attachment system may be seen as the context in 
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which infants learn, as a general matter, to regulate their arousal and their emotions (see 
Sroufe, 1990).  Attachment phenomena will have an impact on the child’s psyche and this 
impact will give rise to affective behavior as a response: “when interaction between a 
couple runs smoothly, each party manifests intense pleasure in the other’s company and 
especially in the other’s expression of affection.  Conversely, whenever interaction 
results in persistent conflict, each party is likely on occasion to exhibit intense anxiety or 
unhappiness, especially when the other is rejecting” (Bowlby, 1969, p. 242).  For 
example, anxiety flows out of the experience of separation from the caregiver.  Early on, 
Bowlby (1959) noted that repeated or prolonged separation experiences (actual or 
threatened abandonment or rejection by parents, or parents’ illness, absence or death) 
would subsequently lead to heightened and chronic separation anxiety.  Similarly, grief 
and mourning reactions are produced, both in children and adults, when attachment 
behaviors become activated but the attachment figure remains unavailable (Bowlby, 
1960).  In Bowlby’s model, social forces obviously have a prominent, explicitly 
acknowledged impact on the child’s affective life.  This theory acknowledges the 
powerful role played by the caretaker’s psyche in co-constructing the attachment system. 
 In 1973, Bowlby presented a more elaborated theory of motivational systems.  
Rejecting the Freudian constancy principle, Bowlby suggested that there exist two 
important motive forces that are kept in a state of dynamic tensions: (i) familiarity-
preserving, stress-reducing impulses (which include attachment as well as novelty-
rejecting impulses), and (ii) exploratory and information-seeking impulses (which include 
novelty-seeking impulses).  Such a dichotomy is reminiscent of the impulses described in 
Mahler’s developmental stages of symbiosis and separation-individuation (Mahler et al., 
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1975).  Included among the stress-reducing instincts are the component instincts of 
another motivational system, the fear system.  The fear system also provides an adaptive 
advantage to children, in that avoidance responses triggered by “natural clues to danger” 
(darkness, loud noises, aloneness and sudden looming movements) provided an adaptive 
advantage.  This theory clearly described the affects produced as part of the fear system 
as instinctual in origin, and these fearful affects serve as behavioral motivators. 
 The interplay between the stress-reducing system and the exploratory system is 
evident in the child’s use of an attachment figure as “a secure base from which to 
explore” (1969).  Infants are motivated to explore their environments, but when they 
perceive danger, the attachment system is activated and the exploratory system 
deactivated.  Most infants achieve some balance between these two behavioral systems, 
responding flexibly to a given situation after assessing both the environment’s 
characteristics and the caregiver’s availability.  Undoubtedly, the child’s affective 
responses are part of these instinct systems, and such responses to the attachment figure 
as well as to the rest of the environment mediate the degree to which the attachment 
system is activated in any given situation.  In contexts such as the Strange Situation (see 
below), the existence of affect on the part of the infant, as opposed to a mere arousal 
response, is apparent.  The loss of the mother clearly disregulates a previously regulated 
child.  It is not the changing sensory quality of his environment that causes the child’s 
affective display, because the specific differential response to loss of mother is so 
obvious.  When a one-year-old protests the loss of the mother, we can, with appropriate 
parsimony, assume that the child has some cognition associated with the loss of that 
specific person, and that it is this cognition that is arousing and triggers the attachment 
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behavior.  To Bowlby, there are certain cues present in particular situations that are 
inherently fear-arousing in the child.  Bowlby listed unfamiliarity, sudden change of 
stimulation, rapid approach, height and being alone as among such natural cues to danger 
(1973).  
 In one of the Bowlby quotes cited above, Bowlby characterized contrasting 
dyadic interactions as “smooth” or “conflicted”.  This remark highlights attachment 
theory’s concern with the way the child’s attachment instincts are reacted to, and molded 
by, the parent – specifically, how the parent might respond to the child’s affective 
expressions, and how such parental responses impact the child’s affective expressivity.  
Mary Ainsworth wanted to understand further the relationship between the mother’s 
responsiveness to the child and the style of the dyad’s attachment activity.  Through her 
Strange Situation laboratory studies with one-year-olds and their mothers, Ainsworth was 
able to classify three distinct patterns of mother-infant attachment activity (Ainsworth, 
Blehar, Water & Wall, 1978):  
 1. Secure pattern - Parents of secure children have relatively little anxiety stirred 
up by their infants’ attachment signals.  Such parents are thus able to stay tuned into their 
infant’s cues, and therefore they can read the cues accurately and respond sensitively 
(Cox et al., 1993, Isabella, 1993), contingently (Isabella et al., 1989), promptly (Del 
Carmen et al., 1993) and moderately (Belsky et al., 1984).  Upon parent-infant reunion 
after separation, secure infants may signal the parent over a distance or allow themselves 
to be comforted by the parent; they can gain comfort and secure feelings from this 
contact and are soon able to reestablish their exploratory activities.  
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 2. Anxious-avoidant pattern - Parents of avoidant children seem to be made 
anxious by the infants’ affective life, and especially by attachment-related affects and 
behaviors.  Because their experience of their child’s affects is too painful (Main, 1985), 
they show difficulty constructing a responsive relationship with genuine affective 
engagement, with freedom in play rather than parental control, and with effective 
comforting or soothing of their infant during times of stress.  These parents actively reject 
their baby’s attachment overtures (Ainsworth et al., 1971, 1978), and by age one, their 
children have learned not to display to their avoidant parent any of the affects associated 
with distress.   
 3. Anxious-resistant pattern - Parents of resistant children are unpredictably and 
insensitively responsive to the infants’ bids for comfort.  Though not actively rejecting, 
they are more disengaged and less responsive to infant crying.  They also discourage 
infant autonomy, and are unresponsive or unavailable in free play (Ainsworth et al., 
1971, 1978; Cassidy & Berlin, 1994).  Affects conveyed by the infant have varying 
impacts on the resistant parent, spurring the parent to act (or perhaps overreact) on some 
occasions, but at other times overwhelming the parent into inactivity.  Such parents may 
have medical illnesses, Axis I disorders, or character traits that make it difficult for them 
to devote their attention for any length of time toward their child’s efforts to attach. 
Resistant infants adopt a strategy of exaggerating attachment behaviors because such a 
strategy the only way to elicit the comforting or protective parental responses that the 
child desires (Main & Hess, 1990).  They persist in attachment behaviors (clinginess, 
preoccupation with parent) when their parent is present and show great difficulty 
engaging in exploratory activity and play.  They also show comparatively greater distress 
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on separation: their crying and protests are more uncontrolled and angry, and they appear 
generally to be more disregulated than infants in the other categories.  On reunion, the 
child does not seem to derive comfort from the reappearing parent and so cannot use the 
parent as a secure base and focus on exploration or play. 
 Simply stated, the three attachment patterns represent distinct strategies formed 
by the infant as a function of the caregiver’s patterned reaction to the infant’s early 
attachment behavior and affective expressions; in essence, the three strategies represent 
three different ways to balance the expression of attachment and exploration instincts.  
Secure infants can readily alternate between the two instincts.  Avoidant infants have 
adopted a strategy that expresses exploration instincts and inhibits attachment impulses.  
Resistant infants overly rely on activation of attachment instincts to the extent that they 
become too fearful or affectively disregulated to implement exploration instincts.   
4. Infant research perspective on arousal and affect 
 In recent years, attachment theory and attachment research have had a significant 
impact on the infant development research literature and have influenced the way 
researchers have thought about early emotional and social development.  This section 
will explore the role of arousal and affect in the developmental theories of Daniel Stern 
and of Beatrice Beebe and Frank Lachmann, infant researchers who have been strongly 
influenced by psychoanalytic, relational and attachment theories.   
 As noted earlier, an infant must exist in some state of quantifiable physiological 
arousal at any given time.  Five arousal states have been identified (listed from high 
arousal to low arousal): crying, alert wakefulness, quiescent wakefulness, REM sleep, 
and NREM sleep (Emde & Robinson, 1979; Wolff, 1966).  Moreover, these states of 
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activation continuously shift in an ordered and cyclical way.  The transitions between 
these states may represent moments of stress or of changing regulatory requirements on 
the part of the infant, and the caregiver’s regulatory efforts are important in helping the 
infant cope with such transitions (Brazelton & Als, 1979).  The infant’s behavior reflects 
increasing organization of arousal control systems through the first year, “beginning with 
biologically primed activity, moving on to early instances of learned actions, then passing 
more rapidly from simple responsiveness to more complex discriminations and finally to 
behaviors conveying a sense of choice and intentionality” (Lichtenberg, 1983, p. 47, 
citing Brazelton & Als, 1979).  Such control systems involve the infant’s maturing ability 
to self-regulate as well as all the environmental stimuli that will impact the infant’s 
physiological and psychological states.  Lichtenberg’s above description implicates the 
increasing organization of lower level regulatory systems into higher level ones so that 
these systems may fully address the infant’s changing needs and cognitive capabilities. 
 a. Daniel Stern 
 As most infant researchers would acknowledge, the maintenance of a particular 
range of arousal levels is an important task for the infant; moreover, the mother has a key 
role in regulating the infant’s arousal.  Stern noted that for each infant at a given point in 
time there exists a range of excitation that the infant will experience as pleasurable (and 
as Stern and Beebe both put it, “optimal”).  It is within such a well-regulated range that 
infants can maintain a state of “alert inactivity”, i.e., they are not preoccupied with their 
internal arousal state and can thus turn their attention to, and learn about, external events.  
However, when the infant’s level of arousal moves above the optimal range, the infant 
experiences this movement as unpleasant, and begins to show specific disregulated 
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behaviors.  When the level of arousal moves below that range, the infant becomes 
uninterested and the experience stops being pleasurable (Lichtenberg, 1983).   
 Both the infant and the parent have the capacity to adjust the level of stimulus 
received by the infant such that the infant’s arousal can stay within this pleasurable range.  
The caregiver can modify the baby’s excitement level by adjusting the way it stimulates 
the baby – for example, by controlling the quantity and dynamic range of facial and vocal 
expressions, gestures, tactile and proprioceptive stimulation, etc.  It is up to the caregiver 
to develop the skill of assessing the infant’s current level of excitation and predicting the 
direction in which it might go.  From the start, the infant has the capacity to regulate the 
stimulus input as well (see, e.g., Brazelton, Koslowski & Main, 1974; Fogel, 1982; Stern, 
1977, 1974).  The infant will stop feeding when it has been fed an amount sufficient to 
trigger certain physiologic changes.  It can produce orienting behaviors toward a 
stimulating person or thing, and it can withdraw or turn away from it in favor of 
something else.  Its bodily actions – physical exertions like postural tensing, arm-flapping 
or kicking, as well as oral self-comfort, self-clasping or rocking – can provide a certain 
amount of self-stimulation to raise arousal in the absence of other stimulation or lower 
arousal by competing with other stimulation.  Finally, its facial expressions and body 
activity can serve as signals to the caretaker that the caretaker uses to gauge level of 
arousal (e.g., Beebe & Stern, 1977).   
 Dynamic systems theory provides a useful perspective on the dyad members’ 
regulation of arousal (e.g., Beebe, Jaffe, Lachmann, Feldstein, Crown & Jasnow, 2000; 
Brazelton, Koslowski & Main, 1974; Tronick, Cohn & Shea, 1986): both the mother and 
infant potentially possess the tools for both self-regulation and mutual regulation.  The 
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system itself is dynamic, in that the system can remain stable while flexibly handling the 
variety of self-regulatory and mutual-regulatory strategies of the members, given the 
predispositions of the members as well as the vagaries and exigencies of changing real-
life circumstances.  This systems view has been commonly held by infant researchers 
over the years, i.e., that the parent and child form a system in which “each partner is 
viewed as having separate competencies which affect the other’s behavior and as 
initiating and reinforcing the behavior of the other” (Emde, 1980, p. 89). 
 According to Stern (1985), a newborn infant possesses the cognitive apparatus 
necessary to form a rudimentary sense of self and other.  Environmental interactions in 
the postnatal period produce perceptions, sensory and motor reactions, memories and 
other cognitions, and postnatal infants are able to detect and remember features of their 
sensory experiences and to categorize the patterns it observes.  Stern identifies “affect” as 
part of these infants’ engagements with the real world; by the age of two months, the 
infant has felt many internal affective experiences, “joy, interest and distress, and perhaps 
surprise and anger (1985, p. 89)”.  Eventually the infant also comes to understand that 
others have their own agencies, physical boundaries, affective experiences and histories.  
By age seven-to-nine months, the infant clearly orients his attachment behavior toward 
the caretaker, generally expects the caretaker to be a source of regulating stimulation and 
anticipates the caregiver’s contingent sensory stimulation, and is often readily engaged in 
ongoing, “chained” and even synchronized interactions.  Such infants also desire to share 
their focus of attention, intentions, and affective states.   
 Stern identifies “affective sharing” as a way in which one dyadic partner’s affect 
is transmitted to the other.  For example, an infant encountering highly stimulating toy 
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looks toward the mother, ostensibly “to see what [he] should feel, to get a second 
appraisal to help resolve their uncertainty (1985, p. 132)”.  If the mother smiles, the 
infant approaches the toy.  If the mother shows a fearful expression, the infant retreats 
from the toy.  This infant did not simply alter his arousal in a reflexive or conditioned 
response to the mother’s facial expression.  Rather, the infant perceived the mother’s 
affective state as qualitatively relevant to his own and thus adopted the mother’s affect.  
Stern interprets the infant’s turn toward the mother not simply as attachment behavior but 
as a bid to the mother to help him decide what affect to feel.   
 b. Beebe and Lachmann  
 It has been observed that, from birth onward, an infant’s behavior has the effect of 
stimulating his caretakers into engaging interactions.  Such reciprocal exchanges take 
place even on a moment-to-moment basis.  By age ten days, a mother can count on 
consistent eye-to-eye contact as the baby experiences such interactions with regularity.  
By four weeks, the baby will provide cues such that the mother will know when she can 
prolong the baby’s attentiveness to playful interactions.  Over time, the mother and baby 
extend the duration of such ongoing contacts until, by three months, they have become 
reciprocal conversational “games” (Stern, 1977).  These sorts of face-to-face social 
exchanges between mother and infant have been analyzed extensively by infant 
researchers using time-series analysis to assess the facial or vocal synchrony in the dyad 
(e.g., Isabella, Belsky, & von Eye, 1989).   
 These studies all found robust evidence that bi-directional regulation indeed takes 
place, i.e., that both mother and infant take their expressive cues from one another, as 
reflected in the facial-visual changes of both the mother and the baby (Beebe, 1982; 
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Beebe & Stern, 1977; Cohn & Tronick, 1988; Stern, 1971).  Moreover, each partner is 
shown to be extremely sensitive to the durations of the other’s behavior, and each tracks 
and matches the behavior of the other on a moment-to-moment basis (Beebe, Jaffe, 
Feldstein, Mays & Alson, 1985; Jaffe, Beebe, Feldstein, Crown & Jasnow, 2001).  The 
timing of the dyad’s vocal interactions likewise reflects bi-directional regulation in this 
same closely monitored way (Beebe, Jaffe, Lachmann, Feldstein, Crown & Jasnow, 
2000; Jaffe, Beebe, Feldstein, Crown & Jasnow, 2001).  Young babies were thus shown 
to be capable of anticipatory processing of sensory information such that they can predict 
new stimuli as part of a series, i.e., the infants had the ability to automatically extract 
from such temporal sequences data about the nature of the serial pattern (Haith, Hazan & 
Goodman, 1988).   
 Beebe and Lachmann (2001) infer that the ways in which the dyad coordinates to 
synchronize the timing and the dynamic envelope of such behaviors “provides each a 
behavioral basis for knowing and entering into the partner’s perception, temporal world, 
and feeling state” (p. 111) (see Beebe, Jaffe, Feldstein, Mays & Alson, 1985).  In this 
view, the tendency for one dyadic partner to match the behavior of the other leads that 
partner to feel the same as the other.  Ekman (1983) found that voluntary movement of 
facial muscles in imitation of affects produced the autonomic states associated with those 
affects.  Beebe and Lachmann cite this study to support their belief that it is this very act 
of matching that generates the corresponding affective state.  It must be noted, however, 
that in their book (2001) they use the term “affect” to include any feeling state.  Indeed, 
in their definition of arousal and affect, they state that they use affect to mean the 
outward display associated with any given arousal state.  In contrast to Stern, they do not 
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explicitly attribute to young infants affect states such as anger, sadness, or joy, much less 
assert that the infant can read, understand and replicate internally such affects when it 
observes them in the mother. 
 Beebe has used recent studies which microanalyze face-to-face mother-infant 
interactions to support a link she identified between the level of dyadic vocal turn-taking 
coordination and the infant’s attachment classification.  Researchers have shown that 
there exists a turn-taking pattern in mother-infant spoken interaction similar to that of 
adult interaction, where “switching-pauses” mark the boundaries of the turn exchange.  
Such pauses are “coordinated” when each partner pauses for a similar duration before the 
other speaks (see Beebe, Alson, Jaffe, Feldstein & Crown, 1988).  Beebe used an infant’s 
turn-taking coordination as a surrogate for the infant’s level of comfort with mutual-
regulation strategies generally.  Given such an assumption, one might expect high vocal 
coordination by the infant to be a sign of a resistant pattern, i.e., the high focus on mutual 
regulation strategies indicates previous success with mutual regulation as compared with 
self-regulation.  By the same token, low vocal coordination by the infant might be a sign 
of an avoidant pattern because the low focus on mutual regulation strategies indicates 
poor success with mutual regulation as compared with self-regulation strategies.  Such 
hypotheses would mirror the assumptions underlying the attachment classifications 
themselves, i.e., that a preponderance of attachment (i.e., mutual regulation) strategies 
over exploratory (i.e., self-regulation) strategies define the resistant style, and the 
opposite balance defines the avoidant style. 
 It would reasonably follow that a midrange level of coordination would encourage 
both attachment and exploratory sets of behavior, i.e., equal facility with self-regulation 
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and mutual-regulation strategies.  One could argue that a secure child would have 
comfort with the widest assortment of regulatory tools and would thus experience fewer 
highly disregulated episodes, as compared to infants that lean on attachment/mutual-
regulation or exploratory/self-regulation (see also Warner, Malloy, Schneider, Knoth & 
Wilder, 1987).  Beebe and Lachmann (2001) refer to a number of studies which bear out 
this “curvilinear prediction of attachment” (e.g., Belsky, Rovine & Taylor, 1984; Isabella 
& Belsky, 1991; Malatesta, Culver, Tesman & Shepard, 1989).   
 Beebe’s data not only supports the idea that midrange levels of attunement are to 
be found in secure dyads, but that high infant monitoring and tracking of the mother 
implies the resistant infant’s development of high instrumental social effectiveness at the 
expense of self-regulation.  It is this skewing of regulation skills that accounts for the 
resistant child’s vigilance and preoccupation with the mother’s displays and behaviors 
(Jaffe, Beebe, Feldstein, Crown & Jasnow, 2001).  By contrast, low monitoring and 
tracking of the mother is characteristic of a child whose mother did not allow herself to 
be regulated by the child, but whose mismatches, intrusions and efforts to control the 
infant have left the infant with little instrumental effectiveness.  Thus, these avoidant 
infants have been found to tune-out mother’s gestures, to initiate fewer of their own 
interactions, and to instead implement mostly self-regulation strategies (Tronick, 1989).   
 As a transition to the next chapter on representations, it would be useful to 
highlight a point made by Joseph Lichtenberg (1983) about the relationship between 
affects and representations, which point harkens back to Brenner’s (1983) definition of 
affect as comprised of sensation and representation.  Lichtenberg noted that inherent in 
certain affects is the concept of (i) self-as-agent (ii) reacting in a particular way (iii) to a 
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present, psychically meaningful object.  Love, anger, cruelty, concern, gratitude and envy 
are good examples of such affects.  In order for it to be said that the child experiences 
such affects, the child must be able to make and integrate the requisite representations of 
the self, the object and the meaningful, directed act.  Lichtenberg contrasts two “cruel” 
behaviors in the following example: 
A nine-month-old boy crawls across the room, grabs a toy out of the grasp 
of another infant, and pushes the other child down in the process.  This 
action may appear cruel, but it is not psychically so in its meaning.  The 
infant’s goal is the toy, his assertiveness probably lacks both a 
representation of the self as director of the effort and a representation of 
the other infant as a person to whom something “cruel” has occurred.  [By 
contrast,] the symbolically oriented cruelty of the older toddler involves 
the self represented as agent, acting to relieve situationally triggered, pent-
up frustration and anger through the perpetration of a cruel act (1983, 
p.65, citing Parens, 1979). 
 
In essence, Lichtenberg argued that some infant behaviors seem to be behavioral 
antecedents of affective experiences.  That they appear to be manifestations of affects 
themselves helps to draw the parents into emotionally connected relationships with their 
children.  Nonetheless, the infant cannot be considered to have experienced the affect 
itself until it develops the capacity to represent psychically the intentions or desires 
directed from the self toward an object.  There is still much debate about the nature and 
timing of the birth and integration of such representational capacities. 
B. Representations 
 In the last section, the terms “arousal” and “affect” were discussed to explore their 
physiologic and psychic origins, and to present theoretical hypotheses regarding the role 
of arousal and affect in the infant’s and the dyad’s psycho-physiological regulatory 
system.  In complex organisms, the regulation of arousal requires more than simple 
stimulus-response reflexes to effect a rich variety of interactions with the environment.  
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The more that stimulus-response-outcome data can be processed in a complex and 
organized way, the more likely the organism can meet its changing needs from a 
potentially changing environment.  When such data can be stored over time, and when 
various abstractions and inferences about it can also be stored, then the organism can 
potentially form flexibly organized strategies to adapt to changing environmental 
conditions.  As adaptive strategies are formed, data about the organism in interaction with 
environment must be represented in the “mind” of the organism.  At such a point, the 
organism can be said to form mental models of reality as it experiences it.   
 This dissertation focuses on a particular class of enactments.  When analytically-
influenced theorists want to understand what it is that gets enacted – what internal models 
or schemas the patient seeks to actualize in the transference – many conclude that such 
schemas are formed out of some amalgam of the patient’s past sensations, wishes, 
fantasies and experiences with important others.  Such intrapsychic and interpersonal 
experiences are processed, abstracted and stored in the individual’s memory as 
“representations”.  If provocative enactments are to be viewed as the patient’s attempt to 
actualize a particular sort of internal model or schema, then the origin and the 
development of these internal models must be understood.   
All views of the theorists reviewed in this section support the idea that early 
representations can impact the way individuals meets their intrapsychic needs in later life.  
These theorists all view representations as the means by which the individual stores not 
just affective experiences and strategies to regulate those affects but evaluations of the 
individual’s own success and failures in fulfilling his intrapsychic needs and wishes.  
Each theoretical approach has a somewhat different view specifically of what those 
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individual needs are; in addition, each approach emphasizes and elaborates upon different 
attributes of the representations: attributes of the individual, of the dyad partner, and of 
the interaction itself.  Early in the history of psychoanalysis, Freud posited that the excess 
of endogenous libidinal and aggressive energic forces gave rise to mental representations 
of these energies and of the successful discharge of the energies.  Although the 
generation of such energies was biologically determined, the representations of self and 
objects were tempered to some extent by the individual’s real attempts to utilize others in 
the environment to regulate those energies.  Hartmann, Klein, Jacobson and Kernberg 
took this point of view, and went on to elaborate upon the contents of self- and object 
representations and to theorize about the mechanisms by which representations develop; 
though Freud did not deny the role of real caretaking experiences in his theory of 
representations, these subsequent analytic theorists explored in more depth the way the 
real relationship impacted the development of representations.  Sandler, Fairbairn, Kohut 
and Bowlby, all erstwhile Freudians, more or less rejected the idea that the individual’s 
primary motive forces were libidinal and aggressive energies.  Nonetheless, they did not 
reject the idea that there existed primary motive forces; these theorists chose to 
recharacterized these internal forces as the individual’s instinctive need for “safety”, 
“object-seeking”, “selfobject” functions, and “proximity-seeking and exploration”, 
respectively.  In their view, the motive forces still required a caretaking other to help 
regulate them, and the caretaking played an important role in shaping the individual’s 
representations.  Sandler and Bowlby also elaborated upon aspects of the representational 
world that can be called “cognitive”: Sandler emphasized that the importance of the “role 
relationship” in the representation, i.e., of the contents of scenarios played out between 
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the individual and an other to meet the individual’s goals.  Bowlby, and later infant 
researchers such as Dan Stern and Beatrice Beebe, emphasized that individuals form 
expectancies about the outcomes of potential dyadic interactions based on past dyadic 
successes and failures; he noted that such expectancies are also important parts of a 
representation.   
1. Endogenous events, environmental responses: Psychoanalytic views of representations 
 a. Freud 
 According to classical psychoanalytic theory, caretakers serve a primary psychic 
purpose for the individual is that they help to discharge the individual’s drive tension.  
The individual’s motivation for cathecting the object is heightened by the individual’s 
state of internal tension which is patterned by the parent.  Only insofar as the infant has 
had repeated caregiving experiences that yield satisfaction will the infant cathect the 
mother as an object (Freud, 1926).  As previously described, libido creates the psychic 
wish for discharge.  Actual discharge experiences are stored as memories of perceptions 
that have been associated with such excitations and their means of discharge.  The 
psychic apparatus will then attempt to reinvoke the satisfying experience when that 
specific excitation returns.  Thus the activity of the drives causes the mind to generate 
representations of such experiences of drive tension and the associated means of drive 
discharge (see 1900). 
   However, from the outset, psychoanalysis was a psychology of conflict: Freud’s 
theories focused on the crucial role played by intrapsychic conflicts as determinants of 
the particular qualities of drive derivatives.  The individual could not always act upon 
drive-derived wishes.  Sometimes the sexual drives competed with one another.  But 
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more often, libido was in conflict with other forces that related somehow to social reality.  
This social reality was at various times described as the external circumstances and/or 
morals and ethics that comprise “dominant mass of ideas constituting the ego (i.e., 
conscious ideas) (1895), “organic sexual repression” (1905, 1906), the self-preservative 
ego instincts (1905), reality factors (1911b), and “the self-respect of the ego” (1914).  In 
some form of another, classical theory always assumed that social reality was represented 
in some part of the ego.  In 1911, Freud described the emergence over time of particular 
ego functions – perception, cognition, memory, reality testing (akin to Hartmann’s 
“primary ego apparatus” (1939)) – that help the organism postpone drive discharge until 
an appropriate object is available.  Frustrations experienced in the course of such 
postponement helped form the part of the ego that operated according to the reality 
principle (1911b).  In Freudian theory circa 1911, the personal, veridical qualities of 
those caregivers who served as objects were of relatively little consequence as compared 
with the individual’s perception of the object, as influenced by the internal climate of the 
individual. 
 In On Narcissism (1914), Freud described the existence of an “ego ideal” that 
constantly watched and measured the activity of the ego.  The ego ideal arose from the 
“critical influence” of parents, of teachers and trainers, and of public opinion.  However, 
Freud did not attempt to explicate the specific mechanism by which the moral values and 
other qualities of these important others are internalized.  Starting in Mourning and 
Melancholia (1917), Freud presented a theory of structure formation in which real object 
losses led to the identifications that help comprise the ego and superego.  He described 
how, in the normal course of adult life, the real slights or disappointments by an object 
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could sometimes lead to decathexis and the subsequent formation of cathexes to different 
objects.  However, when such new cathexis would be too conflictual or where energy 
otherwise could not be bound to the object, the initial decathexis is followed by a 
withdrawal of libido into the ego.  Such withdrawal somehow creates an identification by 
the ego with the abandoned object: “The narcissistic identification with the object then 
becomes a substitute for the erotic cathexis, the result of which is that in spite of the 
conflict with the loved person, the love-relation need not be given up (p. 587).”  Freud 
implied that such loss was the basis for the normal identifications that take place in the 
course of child development. 
 Freud later elaborated that this form of identification can be triggered by the loss 
not just of the genital love object, but also of any one of the pregenital part objects – the 
uterine environment, breast, feces, etc. (1923).  This series of losses culminates in the 
oedipal crisis, i.e., the threat of loss of the genital object.  The healthy resolution of all 
these crises of loss could only be effected by the child’s renunciation of the cathected 
object of sexual aims.  All of these losses come to bear on the creation of the superego.  
The internalization resulting from effective resolution of the oedipal crisis would give 
rise to the superego in its mature form.  Only when the whole object has been effectively 
internalized is the child is able to fantasize and imagine the values and images of his 
parents.  These internal imagoes are only then able aid the ego in the channeling of drive 
energies in the way that external objects formerly did (1940).  The superego as an internal 
representation of the object thus serves the same function as the real genital object.  (It is 
important to emphasize that the representation is not that of the veridical, real object, but 
rather the real object filtered through the child’s own excitement, his wish to maintain a 
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precious body part, etc.)  Freud made efforts at various times to discount the importance 
of the real parent-child relationship by asserting that the severity of one’s superego has 
little to do with actual severe behavior by the object.  Such severity is proportional to 
one’s constitutional level of libido and aggression as kindled by the object.  
Constitutionally-produced severe anger existed because the outward discharge of anger 
was blocked by erotic fixation and external difficulties (1930), and thus the accumulation 
of anger is a measure of the strength of the defense used against the object renunciation 
necessary to resolve the oedipal crisis (1933).    
 b. Hartmann 
 Hartmann’s contributions to classical theories about representations are included 
here for two reasons.  First, Hartmann’s focus on the ego’s orientation to reality 
highlighted the analytic community’s growing interest in the role of “real object” 
experiences in the formation of object representations.  Second, Hartmann was one of the 
first analytic theorists to identify the “self” as a distinct component of the individual’s 
representational world.  As mentioned in Section A, Hartmann believed that the ego’s 
connection to reality was biologically determined: the ego existed from birth and, to some 
degree, functioned outside of the life of the instinctual drives (though it is almost 
immediately pulled into conflict with the drives).  In essence, the infant was born with 
ego apparatus that was innately capable of processing and representing reality.  
Moreover, the primary challenge of the organism is its adaptation to, and collaboration 
with, a larger ecological system, of which the social environment is an important part 
(1939, 1956).  Hartmann also referred to the way parents can pass on their distorted 
pictures of reality to their children via parental control of pleasure and pain (1956).  In 
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1950, Hartmann actively undertook to revise Freud’s 1914 model of narcissism to 
accommodate it to Freud’s 1923 structural theory.  Hartmann understood narcissism to be 
the libidinal cathexis of the “self” rather than of the ego.  In this work, Hartmann 
identified the self (i.e., a self in interaction with objects) as a coherent representation of 
its own, a distinct psychic construction growing out of the individual’s experience in 
much the same way as object representations do.    
 c. Klein 
 Melanie Klein was another analytic theorist who sought to find a place in the 
development of representations for both fantastic object images as well as the real traits 
of the object.  She introduced the idea that the individual’s representational world is a 
product of the continual interaction of innate object images with real-world object 
experiences.  According to Freud, drives produced tension; the first instances of 
gratification left memories traces that the unconscious used at some later point in psychic 
development to generate fantasies and impulses to achieve future satisfaction.  By 
contrast, Melanie Klein proposed that actual experiences of stimulation and gratification 
did not produce the first internal object images; rather, at birth the drive system produced 
a priori images of the outside world.  In other words, early object representations are 
inherently a part of the drive system itself (1930).  Klein’s belief was an outgrowth of the 
idea that the human psyche inherently contained specific memory traces and images that 
were not based on the individual’s actual life experiences.  Rather, these a priori images 
were part mankind’s phylogenetic inheritance (see Freud, 1912; Jung, 1954).  In her 
view, the death drive (among its various manifestations) naturally projected its 
destructiveness outward at birth, giving rise to the internal representation of a bad object.  
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The infant could then have an object onto which it could subsequently channel some of 
its destructive energy.  Likewise, libido is naturally projected outward at birth, creating a 
good object, at which loving impulses could subsequently be directed (1932).  These 
innate self- and-object representations were comprised of images of part objects (e.g. 
body parts) as well as of whole objects, along with representations of the phantasied self-
object relationships.  Perceptions of real-life part and whole objects were necessarily 
colored by the projection onto them of the a priori images (1932).   
 In 1946, Klein elaborated by saying that the excitations of the death instinct are 
innately experienced as attacks by something foreign, apart from any specific 
mechanisms of projection and reintrojection.  However, the physical tensions and 
discomforts resulting from the frustration of bodily needs are also experienced as attacks 
by this same foreign force.  Such sensations are “felt as fear of annihilation (death) and 
takes the form of fear of persecution.... [Attaching] itself at once to an object, ...  it is 
experienced as the fear of an uncontrollable overpowering object” (1946, p. 4).  Thus, the 
child’s psychic life is characterized by a very real dread of the bad objects destroying, 
devouring, mutilating or poisoning him (Klein, 1930).  By the same token, pleasurable 
sensations such as comfort and security are also felt to come from external forces, i.e., the 
good object (1952).   
 At some points in Klein’s writing she asserted that the child's fear of his early 
objects is simply proportionate to the frequency and magnitude of endogenous aggressive 
drive activation.  The particular nature or flavor of these objects in phantasies is likewise 
specific to the child’s own instinctual constitution (1933).  However, there are other 
points in Klein’s writing where she also emphasized that real others in the infant's 
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external world are constantly internalized merely by the child’s contact with the real 
world.  Moreover, all of the child’s real world experiences and situations are internalized, 
not just those in interaction with people.  Internal objects can thus be established in a 
reality-based way as well, where these imagoes can then also be projected out onto 
external figures (1935).  The child's internal world thus "consists of innumerable objects 
taken into the ego, corresponding partly to the multitude of varying aspects, good and 
bad, in which the parents appeared to the child's unconscious mind." (1940, p. 301).  
 Klein suggested various interactions among the reality-based imagoes and the 
drive-generated ones, including cycles of projection and reintrojection, in the evolution of 
representations over time.  For example, reality-based introjects, once formed, can then 
be distorted through the child's projection of drive impulses onto them.  At their core, 
these object images contain features of the real mother and father, but grossly distorted 
into figures of an "incredible or phantastic character" (1933, p. 268).  Alternatively, early, 
harsh, punitive drive-generated imagoes derived from the child’s destructive impulses 
might be overlaid or blended with subsequently-arising reality-based imagoes of the real 
parents that are benign because the parents’ real behavior toward the child was kind and 
benevolent.   
In any case, in the healthy development of the psyche, the severity of harsh early 
objects is ameliorated by the perception and internalization of later kinder images of real 
caregivers.  According to Klein, the cycle of projection and introjection of objects has 
caused their internal representations to develop.  In this way, the simple, split internal 
world is gradually transformed by reality into a less polarized, more complex and 
nuanced one.  However, if interactions with real-world objects merely confirm the 
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infant’s early experience of the object world as polarized (i.e., persecutory versus 
idealized), the projective and introjective interaction with the real world will simply 
reinforce the primitive split quality of the internal objects.  In this case, the internal 
objects will not evolve and integrate, but will instead retain their polarized quality as the 
child develops.  Though the basic premises of her theories do not seem to require this, 
Klein showed a tendency to view bad representations as endogenous and good 
representations as exogenous.  As Freud did, Klein focused on internal, constitutional 
sources of unpleasure, whereas real others in her theories typically served as positive 
forces that can ameliorate internal bad feelings.  Klein seemed to minimize the 
pathogenic significance of parental anxiety, ambivalence, and character pathology (see 
Mitchell, 1981). 
 d. Jacobson and Kernberg 
   As compared to the other analytic theorists discussed thus far, Edith Jacobson and 
(later) Otto Kernberg created a much more central role for the evolution of distinct self- 
and object representations in the development of psychic structure.  The child’s actual 
frustrating and disappointing experiences with caretakers also serve a comparatively 
more important function in Jacobson’s and Kernberg’s view of the development of 
representations, and these theorists went further to identify distinct developmental stages.  
Jacobson posited a crucial distinction between two drive derivatives produced by parental 
failures: a mother who does not respond adequately to infant needs “frustrates” the infant, 
in that the infant experiences a great deal of undischarged libidinal tension.  But in 
addition, such an infant is also “disappointed” (1946), i.e., the failure also kindles 
aggressive energies against the object.  It is this latter aggressively-tinged reaction to 
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parental failure that creates in the infant the desire to expel the object or get away from it, 
and inevitably to devalue it.  As Klein had emphasized, Jacobson believed that real object 
experiences interact with drives to create and modify object representations.  In accord 
with Hartmann, Jacobson also conceived of a “self representation” distinct from the ego, 
as an idea of oneself that could be cathected in varying degrees and the content of which 
is shaped by experiences and memories of real interactions with others. 
 Jacobson described the normal development of introjects, and ego and superego, 
as taking place in a number of stages which closely parallel Mahler’s developmental 
stages (Mahler & Furer, 1968; Mahler, Pine & Bergman, 1975): (i) starting at birth there 
is an autistic phase in which the ego and the libidinal and aggressive drives are all 
undifferentiated, and where self- and object representations are similarly fused; (ii) there 
follows a symbiotic phase in which pleasurable caretaking experiences lead to the 
emergence of the libidinal drive (see discussion of Kernberg’s theory in Section A), and 
to libidinal investment in this not-yet-differentiated ego structure; (iii) a separation/ 
individuation phase follows in which the child begins to distinguish the self from the 
outside world and in which self- and object representations begin to separate and cohere 
into two distinct entities.  To the extent that harsh disappointments take place at this time, 
refusion defenses will be activated: libidinally-invested (“good”) self- and object images 
will be merged into one idealized self-object entity experienced as a wished-for but 
unattainable goal, and aggressively-invested (“bad”) self- and object images will be 
merged into a second devalued entity to hold the hated qualities of self and other 
(Jacobson, 1964).  Thus, some splitting is normative to this stage of ego development 
(Kernberg, 1966).  
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 Such polarization at first results from the immature early ego’s simple incapacity 
to understand and contextualize good and bad feeling states.  Later, however, such 
polarization reflects a more energetic defensive effort to split off and deny the infant-
caretaker failures and the associated representations.  The goal of this effort is to stanch 
the generalization of destructive (i.e., aggressive) anxiety generated by such failures and 
to protect the valued, positive introjects that comprise the ego core from potential 
devaluation (Kernberg, 1980, 1975).  Disappointing real experiences will make the child 
desire to recapture yearned-for symbiotic experiences, and he will introject images of 
relationships between the good self and object.  At the same time, denial and projection 
of bad representations helps the child keep painful feelings out of consciousness.  
Kernberg refers to the bad representations characteristic of this stage of development as 
“sadistic superego forerunners”. 
 According to Kernberg, when the child matures in a healthy way, his cognitive 
and physical abilities expand and the nature of his real interactions with his caretakers 
will become increasingly contingent and variable.  Good and bad self images will 
integrate, and good and bad object images will integrate.  Such integration is reminiscent 
of Klein’s theory that perceptions of real-world interactions will ameliorate polarized 
early endogenous object images.  As these representations become more realistic and 
complex, the child’s ideal self- and object images become more realistic and “higher 
level”.  These ideal images follow on the one hand from the child’s aspirations to achieve 
greater instrumentality, but on the other hand these aspirations are tempered by the 
growing reality-based awareness of his own abilities and limitations.   
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 Nonetheless, the motive behind such integration and maturation of representations 
still springs from the child’s archaic hope that he might instrumentally attain an ideal 
symbiotic (i.e., merged) level of connection with the mother (Jacobson, 1954; Kernberg, 
1966).  It is out of the child’s efforts to reconstitute this symbiotic relationship that a 
more benign fusion of ideal self- and object representations (including unrealistic, 
magical and omnipotent properties of the parents) takes place.  From this fusion is 
formed the “ego ideal”.  At the same time, the child comes to devalue and reject those 
aspects of caregiver interactions that are disappointing, and in this way autonomy is 
fostered and the ongoing process of differentiation of self from objects progresses.  As 
part of those identifications that result from successful resolution of oedipal conflicts, the 
ego ideal is incorporated into a mature superego, an entity clearly separate from the ego.  
In this mature superego, the harshness of the early sadistic superego forerunners is 
neutralized by the addition of the ego ideal.  Once the sadistic superego forerunners and 
the ego ideal successfully integrate, the realistic demands and prohibitions of the 
caretakers can be internalized (Jacobson, 1964).  
 As Klein did, Kernberg noted that the development of object representations is 
greatly impacted by abnormally disregulating real-world infant-caregiver experiences.  In 
such cases, sadistic superego forerunners cannot be ameliorated because tempering real-
world experiences are absent.  Rather, these harsh introjects continue to be reinforced by 
high levels of experienced frustration and disappointment.  As a consequence, the harsh 
introjects are either incorporated into the superego in a more segregated, split-off way or 
they are reprojected through the creation and preservation of “bad” external imagos.  
Through such projective means, self images can remain all-good, and good object images 
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remain pristine, perfect and idealized, unmodified by what in the normal course of 
development would be the accommodation of “integratable”, non-overwhelming levels of 
frustration and disappointment.  Such normal gradual accommodation would in turn 
allow the child to develop an ego ideal realistically adapted to parental goals and 
demands.   
 Kernberg (1993) also described how disregulating object experiences can lead to 
development of self representations peculiar to narcissistic pathology.  Such 
representations are formed out of a defensive fusion of the “real self” with ideal self- and 
object representations.  The child forms this fused product to help his overwhelmed 
immature ego defend against “an intolerable reality in the interpersonal realm....  In their 
fantasies, these patients identify themselves with their own ideal self images in order to 
deny normal dependency on external objects and on the internalized representations of 
the external objects (1975, p. 231).”  Kernberg clearly implies that in such cases (i) the 
child has formed a strong association between his own dependency needs and frustrating/ 
disappointing outcomes, (ii) the child has clearly identified the caretaker as the source of 
the frustration/disappointment, and (iii) the resultant aggression experienced by the child 
is so overwhelming that the child’s nascent ego cannot effectively regulate it alone.   
 e. Sandler 
 Joseph Sandler’s study of the individual’s representational world not only 
questioned the primacy of drive as a motivator, but also gave more emphasis to the roles 
played by the parties to the relationship, as distinct from the self- and object 
representations themselves.  In the tradition of ego psychology, Sandler’s early view of 
representations based them squarely in the domain of innate cognitive (i.e., ego) 
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processes (e.g., Sandler & Rosenblatt, 1962).  Accordingly, representations enabled the 
child to perceive and organize various drive-related sensations so that the sensations 
would have meaning.  However, Sandler also tried to make a place in his psychoanalytic 
model for human motives other than drive, e.g., the need for safety (1960; Sandler & 
Joffe, 1968).  By 1978, Sandler’s own theory of motivation explicitly stated that drive 
was only one out of several possible sources of impulses or wishes.  In this theory, wishes 
could be kindled by drive energy but wishes could also be generated directly by 
endogenous processes other than drives and even by purely exogenous real-world 
interactions.  Most important to this theory, every wish is comprised of a self 
representation, an object representation and a role relationship, i.e., a representation of 
the interaction of self with object.  Thus, object relations encompassed much more than 
the by-products of the drive system.  Sandler explicitly rejected the primacy of 
gratification-seeking aims as motivators; rather, all wishes have relational components, 
and so the search for objects and the search for gratification is inextricably intertwined in 
the representational system (Sandler & Sandler, 1978). 
 Sandler formulated his own model of the development of the representations.  In 
this model, infants start out being able to experience pleasure and displeasure states.  
They also possess the sensory, cognitive and motor apparatus necessary to engage and 
respond to real objects.  Sandler (citing Trevarthan, 1977) referred to the complex 
coordinated interaction and dialogues between infant and caretaker as evidence of an 
“innate intersubjectivity”.  At the outset, pleasure and displeasure states are represented 
in the infant’s mind as simple split objects that Sandler called the “primary affective 
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objects”.  At this stage, the infant will attempt to maintain and prolong his relationship to 
this 
constellation of pleasure, well-being and feelings of safety [i.e., the 
primary pleasurable affective object].  Simultaneously, he will attempt to 
obliterate from his experience the other major primary affective object, 
i.e., unpleasure and pain.  [T]he child does not initially try to get rid of 
feelings of unpleasure by projecting them into the ‘external’ world, but 
rather [he] simply tries to make them disappear (Sandler & Sandler, 1978, 
pp. 287-288). 
 
Sandler drew an analogy between the relation of self to these split objects and the 
classical view of the movement from primary narcissism to object relatedness (e.g., 
Freud, 1914) where, in the course of object cathexis, departure from the primary 
pleasurable relationship sometimes gives rise to the infant’s vigorous attempt to recover 
that primary relationship.  Part of this vigorous attempt to return to a state of certain 
pleasure is the wish to obliterate all painful feelings.  This latter destructive wish 
mobilizes all the infant’s resources to this end, including the infant’s aggression.   
 As development progresses, the infant links his repeated experiences of a 
particular caretaker with this pre-existing primary affective object.  After later refinement 
of boundaries between self and object, the child will still attempt to restore his 
relationship to the earlier pleasurable affective states by recruiting his caretaker to this 
end.  These “return to pleasure” wishes are incorporated into the interactive behavior 
patterns and dialogues which have developed over time between infant and caretaker.  In 
this way, what were once more primitive wishes evolve to contain the representation of 
the interaction or dialogue between self and object, as well as the self- and object images 
themselves.  Sandler pointed out that after a certain point in development, this 
relationship can be recreated as a wholly internal dialogue in the child’s conscious or 
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unconscious fantasy life.  This ongoing desire to regain the good object and obliterate the 
bad object will lead to “the striving toward actualization” that Sandler identified as the 
motivation behind enactments, will be discussed in the Section C.   
 f. Fairbairn 
 The British Object Relations school began in the 1920s out of the discomfort of 
some with the perceived overemphasis in the psychoanalytic canon of the individual’s 
psychic life; this school noted a corresponding underemphasis of the real needs of the 
child for the caretaker and of the real qualities of the caretaking relationship.  Some in 
this school felt that what had been taken for primary motives (libidinal and aggressive 
drives) were in fact by-products of the impact on the individual of failed caretaking.  Of 
all the theorists presented thus far, W. R. D. Fairbairn had most definitively rejected the 
Freudian concept of drive.  For Fairbairn, representations did not simply loom large in an 
otherwise drive-based theory, as they did for Klein and Jacobson.  He did not even see 
the drives as part of a larger model of motivation, as did Sandler and Bowlby.  To 
Fairbairn, drives and other instinct systems did not merely organize quickly around 
attachment and attachment figures, as Bowlby would claim.  Rather, there existed no 
primary sexual and aggressive drives at all in Fairbairn’s theories.  The primary human 
motivation was fundamentally “object-seeking” (1941).  All forms of gratification existed 
merely as “signpost[s] to the object” (1952), i.e., modes or techniques of dealing with the 
object.  “The real libidinal aim is the establishment of satisfactory relationships with 
objects” (1946, p. 146), so, for example, Fairbairn felt that all oedipal difficulties were 
rooted in underlying ambivalence to mother stemming from depressive period conflicts.  
In fact, in Fairbairn’s view, all instincts exist solely to cause infants to seek real objects 
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(1941), and in this sense he can be considered to be part of Bowlby’s lineage.  Given 
Fairbairn’s view of human motivation, it stands to reason that his theoretical model must 
require that objects somehow be represented internally from birth.   
 Fairbairn also rejected Freud’s structural model, and replaced it with a model of 
internal structure in which the development of representations relied primarily on the 
quality of parental caregiving, specifically identifying two discrete representational 
categories of bad-object experiences – one for an overstimulating object and one for an 
understimulating object.  In Fairbairn’s model, the only internal structure is his version of 
the “ego”, a form of self representation or sense of self.  This ego can exist in various 
possible states of fragmentation, where each fragment has an associated object 
representation.  Fairbairn’s last view of the development of internal objects (1951) held 
that the first object to be internalized is the “pre-ambivalent object”.  Very early in 
infancy, the ego exists in its original undifferentiated, unsplit state, and is completely 
directed toward actual real-world experiences.  Fairbairn called this original ego the 
“central ego”.  However, ambivalence quickly arises in the ego when it inevitably senses 
that unsatisfying as well as satisfying experiences are to be associated with this original 
internal object image.  According to Fairbairn, the child’s desire to maintain object 
relatedness is paramount, so that “if a child’s parents are bad objects, he cannot reject 
them ... for he cannot do without them.  [I]f they neglect him, his need for them is 
[merely] increased” (1951, p. 111).  Thus, the existence of unsatisfying aspects of the 
caregivers – their intrusiveness, emotional absence, or unpredictability – pose a great 
dilemma for the child.  He cannot do without parental connections, yet aspects of his 
experience with them can be very painful.   
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 Therefore, as a defensive measure to preserve the illusion of the infant’s 
connection to good real-world parents, the original object image splits into three objects: 
two bad and one good (1943).  Real experiences with caregivers are thus placed into 
discrete categories and their representations dissociated from one another.  The enticing, 
over-exciting (overstimulating) qualities of caregiver interactions cohere into a bad 
internal “exciting object”.  The depriving or frustrating (understimulating) qualities of 
caregiver interactions cohere into a bad internal “rejecting object”.  Correspondingly, 
pieces of the outer-directed original ego split off and turn inward to cathect to the 
exciting and to the rejecting internal objects, and these internal object relationships.  
These split-off ego pieces are called the “libidinal ego” and the “anti-libidinal ego”, 
respectively; however, these internal object relationships are repressed.  After this 
splitting, there still remains a nucleus of the original object from which all the 
unsatisfying elements have been split off, and so it exists only as an “ideal object”, and 
the central ego is cathected to it.  This good object is not subject to repression in its 
association with real-world caregivers (1951).  Though the function of this tripartite ego, 
good aspects of the caregiver stay conscious, while the bad aspects are repressed.   
 The libidinal ego is comprised of the child’s self experiences of unfulfilled 
longing (e.g., due to unrealized promises and enticements), to the extent that real 
situations of such longing for union were too painful (i.e., produced one sort of 
disregulation) and shameful to maintain in consciousness.  In the anti-libidinal ego there 
accumulates all the rage and destructiveness generated in the child by frustrating 
caretaker interactions, to the extent that the real frustrating experiences were too painful 
(producing another sort of disregulation) to keep in consciousness.  According to 
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Fairbairn, the anti-libidinal ego does not merely represent hateful feelings but goes so far 
as to actually identify with the caretaker’s depriving or intrusive qualities.  Some of the 
anti-libidinal ego’s rage is focused on the exciting object and the possibility of fulfilling 
connectedness it holds out.  The balance of its rage is directed at the libidinal ego because 
of the latter’s naive belief in the promises of the caregiver and continued desire to 
establish an intimate connection with her.  Such rage gets channeled in the form of 
“internal attacks”.  Fairbairn used this concept of internal attacks to explain self-
punishing or otherwise self-destructive behavior characteristic in psychopathology 
(1941). 
 g. Kohut 
 Although the earlier self psychology theories of Heinz Kohut (1971) can be 
construed as an overlay to classical drive theory, his later theories (1977) rejected the 
primacy of drives as motivating mechanisms in much the same way as Fairbairn did.  
Kohut stressed that manifestations of drive are “disintegration” products that appear as 
secondary byproducts only in pathological circumstances, i.e., as a result of frustration of 
healthy narcissistic needs.  In his central focus on the development of the “self”, he 
expanded his conception of self to include not only self representations but a collection of 
developing ego-like functions.  (In this sense, Kohut treated the self in the same structural 
way as Fairbairn’s does his concept of ego.)  For the self to develop in a healthy way, the 
child needs a sufficient level of empathic responsiveness from others in the environment.  
Such others serve as “selfobjects”, i.e., they introduce and perform self-functions for the 
child that the child will eventually internalize and perform autonomously.  In effect, the 
child’s self takes in the adult’s feeling-state experience of the child.  The child also takes 
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in the adult’s matured self-functions when the child observes the adult functioning in 
interaction with the world. 
 In Kohut’s view of the development of the self, the child’s need for selfobject 
relationships emerge in terms of three distinct selfobject functions.  These functions on 
the part of the caregiver are, in the normal course of development, internalized as part of 
the child’s self representation.  One aspect of the self coheres around the very young 
child’s fantasied sense of omnipotence and grandiosity, as manifested in his need to 
display his evolving capacities and to be admired for them.  Such fantasies become 
connected with a “mirroring selfobject”, someone who recognizes and values the child’s 
unique talents, capacities and personal qualities, and has regard for the child’s vigorous, 
expansive and grandiose states of mind.  The caregiver must also support interactions 
where the child’s desire to idealize the caregiver can be fostered.  This second selfobject 
function, the “idealizing selfobject”, stems from the child’s need to feel linked to and 
cared for by an ideal, all-powerful other, and requires the child’s involvement with others 
“to whom the child can look up and with whom he can merge as an image of calmness, 
infallibility and omnipotence” (Kohut & Wolf, 1978, p. 414).  Kohut (1984) later 
identified “alterego selfobject” experiences which evoke in the child a sense of essential 
sameness with the other.  Wolf (1988) described this function as related to the fantasy of 
the imaginary companion.  This selfobject function is important in the child’s attainment 
of skills and a sense of competence.   
 According to self psychology theory, the early, more fantastic mirroring and 
idealizing self states must be allowed to transform slowly.  This transformation takes 
place through the child’s exposure to reality and to the ordinary gradual disillusionments 
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and disappointments of the child in himself and in the caregiver.  Real experiences 
transform the images of the self from primitive and extreme to complex and moderate, 
and a slow internalization of the selfobject relationship takes place.  Part of these real 
experiences are the inevitable incremental failures over time of caregivers to mirror the 
child or permit idealization.  In this way, Kohut’s theory is reminiscent of Kernberg’s 
description of the gradual integration of polarized self- and object representations.  
According to Kohut (1971), a healthy, mature self will consist of two poles 
corresponding to the mirroring and idealized selfobject categories of experience, 
reflecting the individual’s (i) ambitiousness and assertiveness, and (ii) strongly held 
ideals and values, respectively, where at least one healthily developed pole is necessary 
for a well-functioning self. 
 Kohut’s theory of psychopathology holds that inadequate selfobject functioning 
of caregivers gives rise to the child’s representation of a self that can only perform that 
selfobject function in a weak or fragmented way.  As a result, effective assertiveness or 
affective self-regulation will be impaired, and may continue to be impaired into 
adulthood.  Such an individual will maintain a heightened need in adult life for the 
missing selfobject function, and because of the heightened need, central life activities 
may be driven by his desire, for example, to be admired or to be linked to an idealized 
other.  Such a person will also experience any future breakdowns in responsiveness of 
new selfobjects as a “retraumatization”, i.e., as a repetition of early selfobject failures 
along with the severe affective reactions elicited by these early failures.  The individual 
may react to contemporary selfobject failures with catastrophic despair or with a storm of 
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narcissistic rage, abnormal affects that Kohut believed to result from a fragmentation of 
the self engendered by the failure.   
 Self psychologists have pointed out that selfobject failure also leads to a particular 
form of vertical splitting, similar in operation to Guntrip’s schizoid dilemma (1969) and 
Winnicott’s true-self/false-self division (1960).  This split results from the conflict 
between the child’s desire to manifest the needs and qualities of the “true” nuclear self 
and the child’s desire to comply with the perceived needs and attitudes of the caretakers.  
The “false self” maintains a bond with the caregiver by virtue of the child’s adaptation to 
the caregiver’s own selfobject needs (i.e., the caregiver’s grandiosity or neediness).  This 
“false self” representation may contain loving as well as empowered affects.  The “true 
self” representation may exist as an isolated, empty, unsupported state, and contain 
depressed and lonely affects. 
 It is worth highlighting one important theme running throughout self psychology 
theory.  Common to all these three selfobject functions is the selfobject’s ongoing 
attunement to people’s affective states, and the selfobject’s ability to contain the child’s 
affects, validate the child’s subjective experience, uniqueness and creative potential, and 
by doing so restore the child’s weakened sense of self (Bacal & Newman, 1991).  In this 
way, there is considerable conceptual overlap of selfobject function with Winnicott’s 
“holding environment” (e.g., 1969) and Bion’s “containing” function (1962).  All these 
theorist’s emphasize the importance of the real parent-child relationship in the formation 
of the varieties of self representations.  Kohut pointed to the chronic failure of empathy as 
the major source of selfobject failure, and implicated in disorders of the self “specific 
pathogenic personality of the parent(s) and specific pathogenic features of the atmosphere 
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in which the child grows up” (1977, p. 187).  As mentioned, Kohut eventually rejected 
drive-based explanations for psychopathology.  He posited that only a weak or 
fragmented self would become preoccupied with pleasure-seeking or the discharge of 
aggression, and that oedipal conflicts invariably had their origin in earlier disorders of the 
self caused by chronic preoedipal selfobject failures.  Kohut still viewed enactments in 
real life or in the therapeutic situation as many analytic or relational therapists would, i.e., 
as the patient’s inadvertent attempts to recruit others to reanimate a stalled developmental 
process.  Kohut might have added that the patient is attempting to recruit the enactment 
partners as the fantasied selfobjects they lacked in reality at a crucial developmental 
stage. 
2. Emphasis on expectancies: Attachment theory and infant research 
 a. Bowlby and Internal Working Models 
 Bowlby’s view of the representational world is based on the ethological 
perspective that has so influenced his theories generally.  Bowlby laid out this view in 
Attachment (1969).  He noted that organisms of all levels of complexity are able to create 
and recruit systems to regulate their behavior, where such systems achieve a level of 
stability for a given period of time.  In the simplest organisms such systems exist as 
“fixed action patterns”.  In more complex organisms there exist various subsystems in 
complex, hierarchical relationships.  At the highest level of complexity, the organism’s 
behaviors may be “goal-corrected”, i.e., through the use of real-time feedback gained by 
monitoring information about itself and the environment.  While goal-corrected systems 
are stable, they are more flexible than fixed action patterns, and these systems can 
maintain their integrity in the face of a wider range of environmental experiences.  
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However, as Bowlby noted, such systems can be more easily diverted from their 
“optimal” path, and he would probably have said that what we call psychopathology is 
caused by the impairment of goal-corrected systems such that these systems remain 
adapted to one specific environment, and cannot readapt when the organism later faces a 
different environment. 
 Bowlby emphasized that organism-regulating systems can become more adaptive 
if goal-correction is not merely based on real-time data but also based on accurate 
predictions about likely future events.  To make such predictions, organisms must be able 
to store and process not just single bits of data but serial streams of longitudinal 
information.  Only when such storage takes place can the organism detect patterns in the 
data and make predictions and even causal hypotheses about future outcomes.  In 
essence, the organism must form an Internal Working Model (IWM) to represent itself 
and its past experiences in interaction with the environment.  With such an internal 
representation, the organism can assess – internally and ahead of time – the likely 
outcomes that would be contingent on the behavioral choices available.  Most important, 
such models of self and environment must be constantly revised to be most accurate.  If 
for some reason real changes in self and environment leave the existing internal models 
less functional, the accuracy of the organism’s predictions suffers, and thus the stability 
of the larger organism-regulating system will suffer as well.   
 Attachment motives have primacy in Bowlby’s theories, and so models of the 
organism’s experience of itself in interaction with attachment figures must be created as 
soon as the infant has the capacity to store and process the relevant data about self, other 
and self-other interactions (1973).  Such models must necessarily begin to form in early 
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infancy.  According to Bowlby, caregivers who are able to work with and not impinge 
upon both the child’s attachment and the child’s exploration expressions will foster in the 
child a sense of self as valued by the other and as successfully self-reliant.  By contrast, if 
the caregiver impedes the child’s bids to attach or explore, the child will mentally 
represent himself as unworthy (associated with avoidant attachment style) and/or 
incompetent (associated with resistant attachment style).   
 In 1980, Bowlby further elaborated on two mechanisms by which IWMs become 
static and resistant to experiential revision: (1) Successful interactional patterns inevitably 
become repeated, automatic and relatively fixed; these fixed versions of the IWMs are 
then recruited as modules in higher-level systems.  After such incorporation, these 
underlying component models become less accessible to awareness because the organism 
has turned its conscious attention to the higher-level systems; (2) The child itself is 
always part of larger, superordinate organisms or systems, the mother-infant dyad 
comprising one such system.  Systemic expectancies change more slowly when two or 
more organisms must communicate and coordinate their perceptions and assessments 
regarding self and other.  These inefficiencies of coordination will invariably lead to 
distortions in the infant’s information processing.  To Bowlby, the most problematic 
inefficiency occurs when one or both members of a dyad defensively exclude information 
from awareness; specifically, information associated with painful, shameful or anxiety-
producing interpersonal situations tends to be excluded from IWMs.  Bowlby’s review of 
a number of studies, discussed in Separation (1972), suggests his belief that IMWs 
cohere into two, horizontally split models: (i) a conscious model of the caregiver as 
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“good”, where painful interactions are caused by “bad” aspects of the self, and (ii) an 
unconscious model containing the hated or disappointing qualities of the caregiver. 
 Bowlby (1972) also discussed the manner in which IWMs and associated 
attachment patterns can be transmitted intergenerationally.  Subsequent studies have 
found a significant correlation between the child’s attachment status and the mother’s 
adult attachment classification as measured by the Adult Attachment Interview (George, 
Kaplan & Main, 1985; Main & Goldwyn, 1991).  For example, three-quarters of pregnant 
mothers with dismissing or preoccupied adult attachment styles will give birth to children 
who at age one will respond to their mothers in an insecure way when tested in the 
Strange Situation (Fonagy, Steele & Steele, 1991; Steele, Steele & Fonagy, 1995; see 
also Haft & Slade, 1989; Main, Kaplan & Cassidy, 1985; van IJzendoorn, 1995).   
It is thought that parents transmit their own IWM to their child via their level of 
caregiving sensitivity.  As Fonagy et al. (1995) described, the parents’ attachment-related 
experiences are embodied within their own childhood IWMs.  As a result, such IWMs 
help define the representation of the child in the parents’ adult mind, and in such IWMs 
are stored particular levels of caregiving sensitivity associated with particular parent-
child scenarios.  These researchers described another link between parental IWMs and 
caregiving sensitivity: parents of insecurely attached children might have their own 
representations of certain emotions as highly dangerous or uncontainable.  IWMs were 
transmitted because perception of their child’s affects kindled the parents’ IWMs 
involving those affects, and as a result some parents may be made too anxious and 
defensive to respond to their child in a sensitive manner.  The child then perceives and 
internalizes the mother’s anxious, warding-off reaction to his own signals and to the 
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feeling states associated with the signals.  By contract, a securely attached mother is more 
likely to reflect to her infant her understanding of the cause of the infant’s distress, her 
appreciation of the infant’s affective state, and her own ability to cope with and master 
affective experiences.  In effect, such a mother will be able to act as a “container” of 
those internal experiences of the child that the child cannot yet manage.  When the 
mother cannot contain such feelings herself, she is apt to defend against them in ways 
that do not make her own experiences understandable to the child.  She is thus unable to 
make similar feelings of the child understandable to the child.  Her level of reflective 
functioning will be transmitted to the child.  (The reflective function literature will be 
explored further in Section D.) 
 b. Stern and RIGs 
 As discussed in Section B, Stern views interactions between caregiver and infant 
as very rich in cognitive and affective content for both participants, and this mental 
content is easily communicated and exchanged.  Stern’s model of the development of 
representations (1985) does not involve a unifying instinctual force to organize a certain 
class of innate cognitions, as Bowlby’s attachment theory does.  For Stern, the building 
blocks of the representations are memories of bits of real-life experiences stored in 
“episodic” memory.  At first, such storage is chaotic, ranging from trivial events with no 
remarkable affective content to the more psychologically meaningful.  Such basic-unit 
episodes exist as associated “clumps” of “sensations, perceptions, actions, thoughts, 
affects, and goals, which occur in some temporal, physical and causal relationship” (p. 
95) such that they seem coherent to the infant.  Once the episode is formed and stored, it 
exists as an indivisible unit.  As Bowlby also concluded, the infant has the capacity to 
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store several episodes, or a series of episodes.  The infant also has the capacity to make 
some assessment of the episodes such that it can associate them and place them in one 
category (based on “detectable similarities and only minor differences”, p. 95).  The 
infant thereupon forms an overarching generalized episode by, in effect, averaging the 
separate episodes belonging to the category.   
Once the infant has generated a higher-level, abstracted representation as a 
prototype, he is able to form expectations and make predictions when he enters into a 
new episode belonging to that category.  Future episodes in that category impact the 
average, so that the generalized representation is like a running average that is weighted 
in some way by the recency of the event or some other cognitive bias (see Stern, 1988: 
heightened affect may give the episode added weight).  Real-world events and the 
expectancies associated with prototypical episodes can thus be organized and reorganized 
in a fluid and dynamic fashion.  Once a generalized representation of the category is 
formed, specific new episodes not sensed as materially dissimilar to the prototype are no 
longer stored as episodes.  Rather, “memory is failure driven, in that the specific episode 
is only [memorable] to the extent that it violates the expectations of the generalized 
episode” (p. 96).  Such deviant episodes are either stored alone as a specific episode (and 
put in long-term memory if the event is significant enough), or they may be grouped with 
other similar experiences in the future and abstracted in the form of another generalized 
categorical representation.  Implicit in this theory is that violations of expectations are 
more salient to the infant than fulfilled expectations.   
Stern’s focused upon those episodes involving interactive experiences and their 
abstracted representations, which he called Representations of Interactions Generalized or 
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RIGs.  Stern suggested that because interpersonal experiences are so developmentally 
crucial, the ability to abstract and represent them in this way must appear sometime in 
early infancy – certainly by two to three months of age.  RIGs form the basic unit of 
representation for the “core self”.  The remainder of Stern’s developmental theory of 
representations is as follows: 
Somehow, the different invariants of self-experience are integrated: the 
self who acts, the self who feels, and the self who has unique perceptions 
about the self’s own body and actions all get assembled.  Similarly, the 
mother who plays, the one who soothes, and the ones that are perceived 
when the infant is happy and distressed all get disentangled and sorted.  
“Islands of consistency” somehow form and coalesce.  And it is the 
dynamic nature of episodic memory using RIGs as a basic memory unit 
that makes it happen....  It is presumably in this way that the major 
different self-invariant of agency, coherence, [continuity] and affectivity 
become sufficiently integrated [that all together] provide the infant with a 
unified sense of a core self (p. 98). 
 
At this point in development, Stern also asserted that somehow the infant can distinguish 
the subjective/self aspect and the objective/other aspect of its experience with a self-
regulating other, and that there exists no initial merged state of self- and object 
representations.  Rather, changes in self-experience that take place in regulating 
interactions are clearly experienced by the infant as part of the self.  Stern asserted that it 
is somehow the variety of interactions that permits the infant to identify what qualities of 
the interactive experience belong to whom.   
 In Stern’s system, each of the many different self/dyad-regulating relationships 
with the same person will have its own distinctive RIG.  At a certain point in Stern’s 
description, a RIG is no longer a passive prototypical memory, but somehow becomes 
something that can be activated.  When different RIGs are activated, the infant re-
experiences some of the feelings that are RIG subcomponents.  This re-experience takes 
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place by virtue of the invocation of the RIG itself, and all of the RIG’s attributes will 
come into awareness.  Part of the RIG experience is that of being in the presence of a 
self-regulating other.  Stern called this component of the RIG the “evoked companion”, 
i.e., the abstracted representation of the other.  Evoked companions can also be called 
into active memory during episodes experienced when the infant is alone but when 
historically similar episodes involved the presence of a self-regulating other.  Finally, 
Stern stated that the RIG can be conceptualized as the basic building block from which 
IWMs are constructed, although he did not explore the processes involved in such higher-
level organization.  Thus RIGs themselves exist in Stern’s model as fragmented packages 
of (i) self, (ii) other, and (iii) cognitive/affective expectancy, all based on abstracted real-
life experiences. 
 c. Beebe and Lachmann and the three principles of salience 
 While they do not espouse an overarching developmental theory of 
representations as some psychoanalysts have, Beebe and Lachmann have used infant 
research data to illuminate the mechanisms by which internalization takes place.  They 
describe three principles which govern the process by which information about real-life 
experiences becomes salient to the infant, such that the infant will know to identify, 
extract and store this data.  Simply stated: (i) serial events are stored and analyzed such 
that patterns are detected and expectancies are formed, and in this way ongoing 
regulations are represented; (ii) in addition, the counterparts of these expectancies, i.e., 
their disruption and repair, are also salient and meaningful events that are represented; 
and (iii) important real-world events are examined and stored by virtue of their existence 
as heightened affective moments.  
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 In a manner similar to Stern, Beebe and Lachmann see the building blocks of self- 
and object representations to be units of persistent, organized classifications of an 
expected interactive sequence.  These building blocks are much like RIGs, but it is the 
information relating to the interactive sequence that constitutes the core of the 
representation.  As do Bowlby and Stern, Beebe and Lachmann emphasizes the 
importance of the infant’s ability to recognize temporal and categorical patterns – 
especially contingent interactions – and to form predictive models based on abstractions 
of such real-life experiences.  It is commonly accepted among developmental psychology 
researchers that the ability to discriminate common elements of a set or series is not a 
higher-order cognitive skill that emerges later in development.  Rather, this ability is part 
of the fundamental apparatus that humans and other animals utilize very early in life so 
that the young organism may effectively map and interact with its physical environment 
(see, e.g., Shields & Rovee-Collier, 1992; Younger & Gotlieb, 1988).  Beebe and 
Lachmann use this empirical conclusion as support for their principle of ongoing 
regulations: “[I]n the same way that infants categorize faces, shapes, colors and animals, 
they also form schemas or categories of interpersonal interactions (see Beebe & 
Lachmann, 1988a, 1988b; Beebe & Stern, 1977; Stern, 1985)” (Beebe & Lachmann, 
2001, p. 149).   
The infant’s formation of expectancies about dyadic interactions and outcomes is 
a key feature of the principle of ongoing regulations.  Reflecting a dynamic systems 
perspective, Beebe and Lachmann point out that organization is a property of the infant-
caretaker system as much as it is a property of the infant’s intrapsychic system.  There are 
many instances in which each dyadic partner influences the other in real time and thus 
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actively contributes to the regulation of the dyadic unit.  For example, there exist many 
shared rules for the regulation of joint action in the first year of life.  As discussed in 
Section B, Beebe’s work has focused on face-to-face reciprocal exchanges between 
mother and infant.  In these exchanges Beebe showed that the partners have the potential 
to be highly synchronized in their facial or vocal gestures.  In explaining how mothers 
and infants achieve such a high degree of synchronization, Beebe and Lachmann 
proposed that the distinct features of these face-to-face serial exchanges – the temporal, 
spatial, sensory and affective qualities – are perceived as salient by the infant, who then 
analyzes, abstracts and represents them.   
As part of this abstraction and representation process, the infant generates an 
expectation that he will receive a particular kind of response from his partner.  For 
example, an infant “will represent the temporal pattern, such as rate, rhythm and serial 
order of both partners; the pattern of movement of the two partners in space such as 
approach-approach or approach-withdrawal; and interactive regulation of facial affective 
patterns” (2001, p. 153).  Beebe and Lachmann describe two broad interactive patterns 
that can be discerned in these synchronized dyadic interactions: (1) “mirroring” - in this 
case, the infant and dyad move in affective unity, and the infant will represent the 
expectation of being matched by, and being able to match, the quality and trajectory of 
the affective displays of the partner.  Here, the dyadic unit is stably regulated and the 
individuals involved are also well regulated intrapsychically; (2) “chase and dodge” - in 
this interaction, the mother repeatedly attempts to engage the infant and the infant 
produces predictable responses.  However, in this case, the predictable responses of the 
infant are avoidance responses, indicating that while the dyad itself is stably regulated, 
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the mother’s gestures seem to overarouse the infant such that the infant must produce 
offsetting destimulating responses.   
 According to the second principle of salience – the principle of disruption and 
repair – interaction patterns are also organized by violations of expected synchrony and 
the infant’s ensuing efforts to resolve those breaches.  It has been stated that young 
infants have the ability to discriminate common elements of a set or series and to form 
categories.  Part and parcel of the process of discrimination is the ability to determine 
when a new stimulus does not fall into a preexisting category or temporal series.  Even 
very young infants have been show to be able to discriminate all sorts of stimuli.  Beebe 
and Lachmann go on to distinguish schema-altering “disruptions” from those violations 
of expectancy that are “mild” and not disruptive of a well-regulated state: “[S]light 
variations on expected themes are necessary to prevent habituation.  Mild violations of 
expectancy in the optimal range ... can produce positive excitement” (p. 161), implying 
that violations of expectancy become salient only when the violations pass some 
threshold of severity.  In other words, surprises are arousing, but some can be too 
arousing.  Beebe and Lachmann also assert that “repair” experiences are salient in the 
same way as the disregulating violations of expectancy that precede them are salient.  
They emphasize that the repair of disjunctions is a ubiquitous interactive skill for infants 
as well as for mothers.   
 Finally, the third principle of salience states that heightened affect moments as 
experienced by the infant will be salient in the formation of representations.  A 
heightened affective moment is defined as the “full display of any facial or vocal pattern, 
such as a cry face or a fully opened ‘gape smile’ ... accompanied by heightened bodily 
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arousal” (p. 170).  Explicitly following Fred Pine (1981) but echoing the sentiments of 
many of the analytic theorists reviewed, Beebe and Lachmann believe that affectively 
charged moments are central in the organization of memories.  However, the third 
principle of salience states that such affectively charged moments are organizing only if 
they capture the essence of similar though less intense moments, and thus “[their] 
organizing power ... derives from both the infant’s capacity to categorize and expect 
similar experiences, and from the impact of the heightened moment itself.” (p. 170).   
Beebe and Lachmann carve out an exception: such moments need not be prototypical if 
they are “traumatic”, i.e., where arousal is increased to a traumatically high level. 
 Although there is much variance among the theories of representations discussed 
in the entirety of this section, they all have in common the idea that representations arise 
out of the affectively charged intersection of internal motives with external environment.  
Freud’s theories all presumed that the vicissitudes of endogenous energic forces, and 
their resultant affects, gave rise to mental representations of those forces in their 
disregulated state, as well as solutions for their reregulation, which solutions involved an 
object of some sort.  Later drive theorists elaborated upon the mechanisms by which the 
drives and their related fantasies, in interaction with environment, gave rise to the 
contents of the individual’s representations of self and of objects in an affectively 
meaningful context.  Sandler emphasized that representations of self, object and affect 
must also have associated representations of role relationships – a sequence of 
interactions of self and other that will have affect-regulating consequences.  Bowlby 
pointed out that representations must necessarily contain expectancies regarding various 
outcomes of self-in-interaction-with-other, where such expectancies are based on 
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successes and failures of affect regulation experienced in real interactions with 
caretakers.  Taking all these theories into account, one might reasonably view the 
contents of any given transference scenario to be comprised of an agglomeration of 
representations of (i) self, (ii) object, (iii) arousal state and its concomitant affect, (iv) 
role relationships, and (v) expectancies about the various arousal- and affect-regulating 
outcomes possible in the enactment of the transference scenario. 
C. Transference and Enactments 
 Section B described how internalized patterns of self-object interactions contain 
affective and cognitive components, and how these patterns begin to cohere as a way to 
represent the regulation of the infant’s level of arousal, and later, as the infant’s cognitive 
abilities grow, to represent the level and quality of affective experiences.  All strategies, 
techniques, heuristics and fantasies related to the individual and to the dyad that 
developed as part of this regulatory system are stored as part of the representations, and 
as Bowlby described, cohere to comprise a model that can be used to explain and make 
predictions about a particular environmental context.  As development proceeds, the 
child’s capacities change, and as he continues to interact with real-world others, his 
representations may incorporate and be shaped by new reality experiences.  On the other 
hand, the child may to some extent remain adapted to an environment that no longer 
exists.  When older children or adults feel fear, loss, anxiety, overarousal, etc., they 
recruit one of their internal models of regulation, and attempt to implement the strategy 
represented by applying it to themselves and some fantasied other or real person who 
seems suitable to be cast into the role of object or attachment figure.  It can be said that 
the implementation of this kind of internal model is a manifestation of transference and 
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that an enactment consists of the way the transference and countertransference play out in 
the dyad. 
1. Definitions of transference and enactment 
 Freud remarked upon the phenomenon of transference early in his writing.  In his 
quest for clinical recovery of patients’ repressed wishes or memories, he noted that there 
arose obstacles to such recovery that were not caused by anxiety-producing or shame-
inducing repressive forces.  Sometimes an external obstacle arose  
[i]f the patient is frightened at finding that she is transferring on to the 
figure of the physician the distressing ideas which arise from the content 
of the analysis.... Transference onto the physician takes place through a 
false connection. [However, we clinicians can work with this 
“transference resistance”] if we make up our mind that this new symptom 
that has been produced on the old model must be treated in the same way 
as the old symptoms [i.e., by making] the obstacle conscious to the patient 
(Breuer & Freud, 1895, pp. 302-304). 
 
Thus in 1895, Freud did not believe that work with transference was central to the 
analytic task.  However, he did claim that neurotic symptoms arose out of a memory of a 
relationship, which memory was reactivated in the clinical setting.  He characterized this 
transference as pathogenic, and felt that the effort to bring this old relationship to 
consciousness would help vitiate its effect.  To this end, Freud advocated the application 
of the cathartic method with which he was experimenting at the time: the patient had to 
recall old memories while in an affectively charged state.   
In 1905, Freud described transferences as 
new editions or facsimiles of the impulses and fantasies which are aroused 
and made conscious during ... analysis; [they are distinct] in that they 
replace some earlier person by the person of the physician ... by taking 
advantage of some real peculiarity in the physician’s person or 
circumstances and attaching themselves to that.” (p. 116). 
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In this description, Freud implied that the old interpersonal models contained 
representations of self and other in some interpersonal configuration, and that it was 
simply the perception of some particular real information about the analyst that triggered 
the activation of these old models.  However, the “earlier person” to whom Freud referred 
in the above passage was an internalized cathected object, and the transference was 
specifically an “erotic transference” consisting of a defensive displacement onto the 
therapist of some aspects of an early relationship in which sexual impulses were 
frustrated.  Later, Freud noted the defensive aspects of the displacement inherent in all 
transferences, not just erotic (e.g., 1915).  He explained that analytic exploration had 
brought the patient closer to consciousness of the repressed impulses.  The patient then 
manifested transference as a compromise formation: it was an attempt to gratify impulses 
with the therapist while at the same time manifesting a defense to avoid consciousness of 
the identity of the true object of the impulses, if not of the nature of the impulses 
themselves. 
 As discussed in Section B, there is stored in the mind of the patient 
representational models that are used to orient to, to process, and to predict real-world 
events.  One particular sort of model is comprised of a self image, an image of an other, 
and some representation of a self-other interaction, including sensations, cognitions and 
affects associated with the interaction.  It is this self-other model that can be considered 
the “original” in transference phenomena that is subsequently “transferred” to someone 
else.  In the transference, the patient applies a particular self-other model, identifying 
himself in the moment with the qualities of the self representation, identifying some 
particular other person with the qualities of the “other” representation, and filtering 
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contemporaneous real-world events through the lens of that model’s cognitive and 
affective component mechanisms.  It can also be said that the application of this model is 
generally ego-syntonic: cognitions and behavior seem to the patient to be plausible and 
appropriate (Fenichel, 1945; Greenacre, 1950). 
 This definition of transference might indeed apply to every real-world interaction, 
because most human interactions can potentially be viewed as flowing from internal 
prototypes.  As Stolorow and colleagues described, transference is an expression of the 
continuing influence of “organizing principles and imagery that crystallized out of the 
patient’s early formative experiences” (Stolorow et al., 1987, p. 36).  The patient 
assimilates, in a Piagetian sense, the therapeutic relationship into this coherent 
representational system: what is perceived in the outside world is incorporated into the 
internal world without changing the structure of that internal world, but potentially at the 
cost of distorting the external perceptions to fit.  This definition might be termed the 
“broad definition” of transference (see McLaughlin, 1991, 1981).   
However, the addition of one more component to the definition may render it 
more clinically useful.  In transferences seen as problematic by therapists, the real 
patient-therapist situation is viewed too narrowly by the patient, i.e., it is “subject to 
interpretations other than the one the patient has reached” (Gill, 1982, p. 117).  In such 
cases, the therapist must decide whether the internal model applied by the patient is or is 
not well-adapted to contemporaneous real-world data, given the problems presented by 
the patient, i.e., whether assimilation takes place to such a degree it that impairs the 
patient’s adaptive functioning.  The application of the patient’s problematic inner models 
may connote some weakened ego functioning, in the sense that the ability to perform an 
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accurate assessment of real-world data (reality testing) seems impaired.  Such impairment 
may imply the existence and activation of more primitive (or lower-level) defenses 
against awareness of particular painful feelings and beliefs.  Defenses such as these may 
be at the root of the “problems in living” for which the patient has sought help.  
Transferences that are manifested in ways that are poorly adapted to contemporaneous 
real-world data and that impair the patient’s life functioning are a particular subset of 
transferences; they might be termed “problematic transferences”5, the transferences with 
which the therapist must work to help bring about improvements in the patient’s life. 
 Although the term “enactment” has been used in a variety of ways, it usually 
connotes some joint product of two people, e.g., the patient and the therapist.  By 
contrast, “transference” usually describes the way a single person (the patient) transferred 
cathexis from an old object to the therapist.  However, it is difficult to identify if, and at 
what point, the therapist impacts the particular manifestation of the transference.  It may 
be a specious distinction to term some enactments “patient-induced” and others “analyst-
induced” (see Ellman, 1998).  It may be more useful simply to say that an enactment is a 
co-construction comprised of the manifestation of transference in a dyadic context along 
with the response of the other person or entity; as with transference, there might exist a 
subset of enactments that can be considered “problematic”.  By contrast, McLaughlin 
(1991) proposed that “enactment” be used to refer to those situations in which patient and 
therapist each identify the events in the session as the consequence of the behavior of the 
                                                 
5 See Westen and Gabbard (2002), distinguishing among three kinds of transference 
phenomena: “(1) important because they reflect the patient’s ways of responding in kinds 
of relationship that in the past have been problematic…; (2) important because they are 
essential to the patient’s ability and willingness to talk freely with the analyst; or (3) 
unimportant relative to the other things that could be the focus of the hour” (p. 121). 
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other.  However, it is hard to make a meaningful distinction between this situation and 
one in which the therapist has not yet detected or come to understand fully the 
manifestation of the transference; for example, the therapist may at first construe her own 
feelings and behavior as influenced by extra-clinical events, or by the therapist’s own 
dynamics, without having any clear feeling about the patient’s contribution.  Nonetheless, 
in all these scenarios, the patient is still trying to actualize the transference and has some 
impact on the therapist’s feelings and communications, regardless of how the therapist 
consciously processes the impact.   
 Alternatively, Chused (1991) reserved the term enactment for those situations in 
which the patient has “a conviction about the accuracy of his or her perceptions and 
behaves so as to induce behavior in the analyst that supports this conviction” (p. 94).  
That is, a countertransference reaction is necessary before the transference manifestation 
can be called an enactment.  However, it may be argued that any behavior on the part of 
the analyst can support the patient’s abovementioned conviction; the behavior does not 
have to rise to the level of the analyst’s manifestation of projective identification.  The 
patient’s representational world can come alive in the analytic setting in ways that 
involves the therapist’s real behavior without the therapist necessarily manifesting 
“countertransference” reactions.  Thus, at any given time, an enactment will reflect “the 
influence of the patient’s subjectivity (conscious and unconscious), the analyst’s 
subjectivity, the influence of the patient’s ‘pulls’ on the analyst’s behavior and vice versa, 
and the complex interaction of these processes that we often describe as 
‘intersubjectivity’” (Westen & Gabbard, 2002, p. 119).   
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2. Activation of transference 
 What is it that triggers the activation of any given internal model as transference?  
A common observation about the analytic setting is that it tends to foster the regressive 
revival of the past in the present.  But what specifically induces this transferential 
revival?  The narrowest theory, as implied by Freud’s earliest formulations, would hold 
that the activation of the transference model contains a defensive displacement of 
cathexes.  In other words, the scenario embodied in the model is conflictual to the extent 
that the identity of the original real-life source of the introjected “object” properties must 
be kept out of consciousness.  Substitution of someone else in the object role allows the 
patient to implement the model in an otherwise intact fashion for impulse gratification.  
In this view, real-life damming of libido (i.e., the lack of available opportunity for sexual 
discharge) causes transference (see, e.g., Freud 1913b, 1915).  Such damming would 
automatically cause the patient to “search” for displacement objects.   
 However, Freud also implied that the exploration of the patient’s psychic world 
that takes place in the session activates the repressed material, because the more the 
analyst points the patient’s attention toward that material, the more it threatens to break 
through to consciousness (1915).  In such a case, transference takes place when the libido 
pressure overcomes the combined strength of the ego to produce other defenses and the 
strength of the super-ego to energize the ego (see Loewenstein, 1969).  The analyst gets 
substituted because patients identified “some real peculiarity in the physician’s person or 
circumstances and attach themselves to that”.  In other words, the analyst is a convenient 
target present at the time when the patient’s impulses are stirred up.   
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 During the period of 1910 to 1920, Freud emphasized how the enactment has an 
entirely unconscious quality to the patient, and is evident as a “repetition compulsion”:  
the patient remembers nothing of what is forgotten and repressed, [but] he 
expresses it in action.  He reproduces it not in his memory but in his 
behavior...without of course knowing that he is repeating it... [At last, the 
analyst] understands that it is his way of remembering.... The greater the 
resistance, the more extensively acting out (repetition) will be substituted 
for remembering (1913b, p. 150).  
 
However, Boesky (1982) took exception to Freud’s assertion that action and 
remembering cannot take place simultaneously, stating that Freud’s definition of acting 
out was too anchored to the therapeutic task of removing repressions – a task linked to 
Freud’s topographic model.  Boesky cited Loewald (1971), Weiss (1942) and Sandler 
(1970) to support his view that acting out and remembering are not necessarily mutually 
exclusive.  But as Boesky also emphasized, there exists no well accepted explanation for 
why a patient shifts at any given time into enactment as a way of expressing or resolving 
conflict, as opposed to thinking, speaking directly or delaying.  
 Steven Ellman (1998) presented one way to understand those factors that trigger 
shifts in transference paradigms.  He stated that enactments occurred when “analytic 
trust” has either been disrupted or has not yet been firmly established.  Ellman defined 
analytic trust as the patient’s realistic view that the analyst understands the patient’s 
subjective world: “This understanding is communicated not only in intellectual terms but 
also by the analyst feeling the intensity of the patient’s responses and being able to 
communicate this to the patient” (p. 187).  Such attunement and communications by the 
analyst create the experience of holding and containment, such that the patient can 
tolerate the experience and disclosure of his own subjective states on a consistent basis.  
When such tolerance is achieved, the patient can then be said to have developed a sense 
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of trust in the analytic situation.  As Ellman described it, it is this trust which allows the 
analyst to help the patient to understand characterological transference responses.  In 
other words, the patient must experience sufficient holding and containment before the 
patient can benefit from any transference interpretations.  According to Ellman, 
premature interpretation always either disrupts the patient or creates compliance.   From a 
more “representational” perspective, it might be said that the analyst’s production of an 
early interpretation is tantamount to a break in the existing internal model pattern – the 
expectancy of mirroring and empathic attunement – and would cause the shift in affective 
state that accompanies the broken expectancy, and perhaps trigger a shift in the 
transference paradigm.   
 Finally, as Westen and Gabbard (2002) point out, it is an oversimplification to say 
that a patient has a single transference to the analyst.  Rather, there will likely be many 
transferences over the course of treatment – manifested in a serial fashion – each 
reflecting different relational paradigms and different material activated by the 
vicissitudes of real-life events as well as the various aspects of the therapist’s own inner 
world: “most contemporary analysts now take a multifaceted view of transference, 
recognizing that the construct of an all-consuming transference neurosis can be limiting” 
(p. 106, citing Cooper, 1987).  It is implicit in the changing nature of transferences as 
they unfold over time, that they operate in a parallel fashion as well: the implementation 
of a given internal model can be viewed as serving a defensive function, i.e., to avoid the 
conscious re-experience of other models that are active on a less conscious level.  Merton 
Gill (1982) proposed two broad categories of resistance in relation to transference: (i) 
resistance to the transference (including resistance to conscious awareness of it), and (ii) 
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resistance to the resolution of the transference.  Working toward the resolution of a 
transference may imply the exploration of an associated, but defended-against, alternative 
internal model.  The origins and contents of the “defending” models may be fully 
conscious – e.g., self in interaction with good mother – but the implementation of this 
model in the transference may serve the function of keeping a more anxiety-producing 
model out of awareness – e.g., self in interaction with a disregulating mother.  In such a 
case, one might speculate that the consciously accessible model is the one that had been 
the “best-regulating” relational paradigm in childhood.  So, for example, an avoidant 
child is likely to apply avoidant-styled internal models in new interpersonal settings.  
Other potential models are associated with expectations of disregulation and discomfort, 
and the experiential substrates of these are more likely to be kept out of consciousness.  
Thus, the avoidant-dismissing adult patient may attempt to win approval and benign good 
will from the analyst by presenting an independent, cheerful, and compliant demeanor.  
This “best-regulating” transference is associated with pleasant conscious affects for the 
patient, but may serve as a defense against other “worse-case” scenarios, e.g., the 
experience of self as needy or ill-tempered, and the object as abandoning or 
angry/overstimulating.   
 This discussion of enactments as shifting applications of different internal models 
thus far depicts the patient as a somewhat passive, reactive recipient of environmental 
signals, ready to apply alternative models if the desired environmental expectancies are 
not fulfilled.  By contrast, in Joseph Sandler’s discussion of enactments (e.g., 1976), he 
emphasized the patient’s very clear and active desire to impose the modeled object 
relationship through the patient’s “unconscious attempts to manipulate or to provoke 
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situations with other which are a concealed repetition of earlier experiences and 
relationships” (1976, p. 30), including all attempts to do so with the therapist: 
I believe such manipulation to be an important part of object relationships 
in general, and [specifically of] the ‘scanning’ of objects in the process of 
object choice.  In the transference ... the patient attempts to prod the 
analyst into behaving in a particular way and unconsciously scans and 
adapts to his perceptions of the analyst’s reaction (pp. 30-31). 
 
Sandler explicitly rejected the primacy of the displacement-of-cathexes theory of 
transference.  Rather, drive impulses are expressed in unconscious images or fantasies “in 
which both self and object in interaction have come to be represented in particular roles” 
(p. 32).  Sandler emphasized that there are, in fact, plenty of internal models that have 
incorporated role-relationships that have nothing to do with drive discharge, and that any 
of these could serve as the basis for an enactment.  Recall that Sandler viewed every wish 
as having self and object component-representations as well as an interaction (i.e., role) 
component (Sandler & Sandler, 1978).  The patient attempts to actualize these roles by 
trying to enact them with the therapist.   
 In his definition of projective identification, Thomas Ogden (1979) captured quite 
well the potential impact of such “active” efforts by the patient to impose the schematic 
object relationship on the therapeutic dyad.  Ogden identified the inciting fantasies and 
pressuring behaviors of the patient as the eliciting cause of the therapist’s reactions that 
mirror the patient’s.  Yet Ogden emphasized that the therapist’s responses are not 
“transplanted” but are his own “elicited feelings ... under pressure from ... a different 
personality system with different strengths and weaknesses” (p. 360).  This is one way to 
describe the feelings and behaviors evoked in the analyst by the patient.  It is important to 
emphasize, however, that an enactment in the clinical setting does not start when the 
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therapist’s feelings are stirred by the patient’s projective defenses.  The very act of 
presenting for treatment connotes a certain type of enactment6; should the therapist 
somehow provide the data during the course of treatment that violates the patient’s 
expectations, the patient might apply a different internal model and attempt to enact a 
scenario that appears starkly different from the enactment that preceded it.  At such a 
point, it might be less accurate to say that an enactment has begun than to say that a new 
enactment has begun. 
3. Unreflectiveness and action versus reflectiveness and speech 
 One aspect of transference that has been of special interest is the sudden loss of 
the patient’s reflective capacity in some enactments.  Freud gave the example of his 
female patient’s sudden, explosive manifestation of “transference love” after the patient 
had passed many sessions in a much more well-balanced, reality-attuned fashion (1915).  
What had shifted such that the patient seemed to have suddenly lost a great deal of her 
reflective capacity and reality-testing?   It seemed as though the internal model she used 
was suddenly abandoned, and the new model featured not only a different set of affects 
but a different set of cognitive capacities as well.  Can the ego apparatus parameters 
really vary so greatly from internal model to internal model, such that one model has its 
own set of defenses and the next model has another set of defenses?  A related question 
may be asked: why can some transferences be expressed in “speakable” feelings, but 
                                                 
6 Presenting for treatment tends to evoke “a set of highly specific wishes, fears, affects, 
and cognitive constructions, including expectations about helping relationships, doctors, 
confiding intimate material, confiding shameful material, and so on.  Every early contact 
the patient has with the analyst – the initial referral, the first telephone contact, the way 
the analyst greets the patient in the waiting room – will be processed in light of these 
wishes, fears and expectations” (Westen & Gabbard, 2002, p. 123). 
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others be expressed through action only?  Does the emphasis on action in a given 
enactment automatically connote the loss of reflectivity? 
 In defining “acting out”, Phyllis Greenacre (1950) identified an impaired 
utilization of speech and the resultant privileged role for action (i.e., non-verbal behavior) 
in the manifestations of transference scenarios.  She described in acting-out patients “a 
largely unconscious belief in the magic of action” (p. 21).  Greenacre suggested that such 
a belief was caused by a disturbance in the relation of action to speech and verbalized 
thought, and that such problems arose most often from severe caretaking disturbances in 
the second year.  Such patients seemed to her to use speech frequently for the purpose of 
motor discharge of tension or for exhibitionistic purposes rather than to effect genuine 
communication.  The interesting implication here is that the impairment in the relational 
uses of speech, i.e., to create a meeting of the minds between self and other, may have 
been caused by the failure of the environment to support such connecting uses of speech 
in early development.  Loewald (1970) also described the implications of the patient’s 
use of reflective speech over action in a relational context: 
Giving words to feelings is not simply a delay of gratification ... but it is a 
kind of gratification by verbal action, by establishing communicative links 
between psychic elements and levels, both within the patient himself 
(intrapsychic communication) and between the patient and the analyst (p. 
56). 
 
  Kleinian theorists have noted the connection between the caregiver’s ability to 
contain the child’s affects and the ability of the caregiver and child to stay attuned 
through speech.  Melanie Klein described the mechanism of projective identification 
which takes place in the movement from the paranoid-schizoid to the depressive position.  
Simply stated, when the child begins to perceive that good and bad aspects of the object 
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are integrating, some aspect of the self is felt by the child to be dangerous or threatening 
to the ego, e.g., the child’s hatred toward the object.  The child desires to rid himself of 
this part of the self, and does so by projecting it into the good object, a safer place to 
locate such impulses.  Bion (1962) implied that the child initially projects in this way in 
the hope that the caregiver will “modify” or metabolize these bad feelings, such that the 
mother will make his own experience more tolerable and understandable to himself. 
 Bion pointed out that these exchanges of affects and representations comprised a 
primitive method of communication that was a forerunner of thinking.  The mother could 
respond to the child’s affects and projections in one of two ways.  She could be receptive 
to the infant’s state of mind and allow it to be evoked in her, such that she could then 
metabolize the projection into a form that the child was capable of reintrojecting.  In this 
way the child’s original sensory or somatic experience is transformed into a meaningful 
mental representation by the mother, which the child in turn can use for thought or store 
in memory.  On the other hand, the mother could be hostile to the child’s state of mind 
and thus resistant to the child’s attempted projections.  In such a case, the child’s feelings 
are not made more understandable or digestible by the mother.  Instead, the mother 
“hands back” to the child his feelings in their raw unshaped state.  Because the mother 
returns the child feelings back to him in this painful way, the mother is construed by the 
child as the origin of such feelings, and the child seeks to sever its connections with the 
mother’s mind by attacking the links to the mother.  As Bion (1959) described, healthy 
projective identification in development can be impaired either by the mother’s inability 
to serve as a repository for the projections or by the constitutionally-derived hatred and 
envy of the child that blocks his ability take in the metabolized product from the mother.   
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 Attacks on linking can be manifested as the child’s hatred or rejection of verbal 
communication or as his attacks on verbal thought itself, and therefore such attacks on 
linking may account for the predominance of unreflective action (rather than speech) in 
certain enactments.  It follows that if the caregiver is not effective as a container, the 
infant is left to interpret its own uncontainable experience with the question 
“What is something?” and not the question “Why is something?” because 
“why” has ... been split off.  Problems, the solution of which depends upon 
an awareness of causation, cannot therefore be stated, let alone solved.... It 
follows [in adulthood] that there is never any question as to why the 
patient or the analyst is there, or why something is said or done or felt, nor 
can there be any question of attempting to alter the causes of some state of 
mind (Bion, 1959, p. 102). 
 
Thus the adult patient whose feeling-states were poorly contained in childhood might 
experience some contemporary psychic phenomenon with awareness that it is mental in 
origin but may only be able to describe it or treat it as something concrete or physical.  
 As presented in the discussion above, Bion had posited a somewhat Vygotskian 
model of the development of representations and of thinking itself.  The child at first has 
feelings he cannot express symbolically all by himself.  He can only live them in front of 
his caregiver.  The caregiver has the opportunity to advance the child’s cognitive capacity 
by processing cognitively the child’s sensory-somatic experience and, when the child has 
entered the appropriate proximal zone, by giving the formed cognition back to him in a 
way he can understand, store and use.  Another way to describe this is that the mother 
resonates with the child’s visceral experience of arousal, and feeds it back to the child 
with various words and schemas attached to it.  In this way, the caregiver takes sensation, 
adds ideas, and creates the first representations of “affect” in the child’s mind (see 
Brenner’s definition of affect in Section A).  Similarly, Stolorow et al. (1987b) cite 
 96
Krystal’s (1974, 1975) theories of affect development to support their idea that the 
parent’s empathically attuned verbal articulation of the child’s feeling-states helps the 
child form and identify his own affective states.  Furthermore, these researchers say that 
such attunement helps the child integrate his affect states into “cognitive-affective 
schemata”, i.e., basic representational building blocks that come together and organize 
into the “self”. 
 The theme of the caretaker’s metabolism of the child’s visceral experience has 
been taken up in the literature that explores reflective function.  These researchers have 
identified a crucial role in the development of the child’s representational capacity of 
mental processes called “reflective function” or “mentalizing”.  This function is defined 
as an individual’s capacity to “understand the merely representational nature of their own 
(and others’) thinking” (Main, 1991, p. 128).  The child must necessarily possess this 
mental ability if he is to be capable of “step[ping] beyond the immediate reality of 
experience and grasp the distinction between appearance and reality, and between 
immediate experience and the mental state that might underlie it” (Fonagy et al., 1996, p. 
249). 7  In brief, if the child is to develop this ability, the parent must possess this capacity 
                                                 
7 Fonagy and associates have noted that the child’s capacity to mentalize does not 
become well established until the fourth or fifth year (Gopnick, 1993).  At that point in 
development, mental states themselves begin to be experienced by the child as 
representations, where inner and outer reality are perceived as “linked” rather than either 
completely identical or totally dissociated (as were characteristic of earlier, more 
primitive modes of psychic reality) (see Fonagy et al., 1995; Fonagy & Target, 1996, 
1998).  These researchers have hypothesized that the child’s mentalizing ability develops 
when a mentalizing caregiver reflects on the child’s mental states in the context of playful 
interactions.  In play, the caregiver introduces reality into the child’s pretend ideas and 
feelings by suggesting alternative ideas and feelings that exist outside the child’s mind at 
the time.  The caregiver can also show that one’s “serious” inner reality may be distorted 
by playing with it, creating for the child mental experience that combines pretending and 
reality.   
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first and must convey it to the child in the parent’s communications about the child’s and 
the parent’s own feeling states (Fonagy et al., 1991; Fonagy et al., 1994). 
 It is worth noting that Bion’s “containing” function can be viewed as the nexus of 
affective attunement and mentalization.  To adequately contain, the caregiver must be 
able to tolerate expressions of her child’s inner states so that she can freely resonate with 
the child’s visceral experience and convey this resonance back to the child.  Just as 
important, containment requires that the caregiver imbue her resonant affects with 
reasonably complex adult cognitions, including her adult theory of affect and her theory 
of mind itself, and present this version of the child’s experience back to the child.  
Parents are likely to transmit their own level of reflective capacities to their child (see 
Steele, Fonagy et al., 1995).  A parent may have focal anxieties related to particular 
feeling-states of her own or about particular internal experiences as she perceives in the 
child.  When the parent perceives such experiences of the child, the experiences will be 
disturbing and unacceptable to the parent.  The parent will not be able to reflect on the 
child‘s feeling-states and her metabolization of them will be impeded.  Consequently, the 
child will also experience these feeling-states as disturbing, unacceptable and perhaps 
overwhelming.  As is relevant to the earlier discussion of transference mechanisms, such 
a child’s reflective functioning may break down when such feeling-states arise: the 
particular feeling-state may trigger a switch from a reflective self-other model to a non-
reflective model of which the particular feeling-state is a component.  Should such an 
internal model persist unaltered into adulthood, the return of the feeling-state in the 
analytic session may be accompanied by a similar switch from a reflective self-other 
model to a non-reflective self-other model. 
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 It may also be the case that some parents have low reflective capacities generally 
with regard to the child as a result of particular defensive attributions about forming 
mental connections with the child.  So, for example, a narcissistic mother may interpret 
the child’s inner experiences only in terms of how they impact the mother.  The idea of 
forming tender empathic connections to her child (or to anyone) may carry unconscious 
association of angry or shameful feelings.  From a self psychology perspective, such a 
child would be left without an awareness of his own mind and with a true-self/false-self 
vertically split where the true self is felt to be impoverished, unsupported and alone.  In 
this case, the mother’s self-preoccupations would cause the child’s true self to experience 
its unmetabolized introjects as alien and externally imposed.  Such a child may self-
regulate by schizoid or magical means, but may be vulnerable to breakdowns in 
functioning around issues of separation, autonomy, and self-regulation, or the 
management of aggression (Coates, 1998).  In such a case, symptoms will tend not to be 
symbolic expressions of conflict but rather repetitive enactments involving introjects felt 
to be unmetabolizable or alien in their impinging or impenetrably remote qualities 
(Britton, 1992). 
D. “Aggressive” and “Sadomasochistic” Enactments 
Section C’s discussion elaborated upon the idea that enactments arise out of the 
individual’s manifestation of an internal model of arousal and affect regulation.  
Although the mechanisms or triggers implicated in transference shifts are not commonly 
agreed upon, the internal models involving dyadic regulation seem to be comprised of 
self- and object representations, some memory of interaction and/or abstracted strategy of 
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interaction, and a set of expectancies regarding arousal trajectories and affective 
outcomes.   
The second half of this dissertation will explore the possibility that some internal 
models that have successfully regulated arousal and affect incorporate dyadic exchanges 
which involve the experience of painful or “negative” feelings.  In other words, there 
exist some “best regulating” models which require the kindling of painful or negative 
emotions in one or both dyad members as the means by which the regulating interaction 
is precipitated.  Enactments based on such internal models may appear to involve 
expressions of “sadistic”, “masochistic” or “aggressive” impulses by the individual.  The 
literature to be reviewed in this section explores the theoretical underpinnings of 
aggressive or sadomasochistic impulses and enactments; it is a rich and extensive 
literature that offers several distinct lenses through which to view the behaviors thought 
to be based on aggressive or sadomasochistic impulses.  Most of this literature considers 
the goal of aggressive impulses and acts to be punitive or destructive in nature, or to be 
the manifestation of a desire for power and control; however, some theorists have 
acknowledged that aggressive gestures may sometimes serve to connect or reconnect the 
actor to an important other. 
1. Freud and the classical view 
 Freud struggled for many years to find a place for sadism, masochism and 
aggression in his evolving theory of the sexual instincts as the basis for most if not all 
psychic motivation.  Such aggressive impulses were the second set of mental phenomena 
that Freud had trouble accounting for, the first being the restrictive, “ethical” forces of the 
ego (as discussed in Section B).  However, Freud had always asserted that the ego had a 
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clear, central role in producing socially functional compromise formations owing to the 
ego’s ability to effect repression.  Freud similarly acknowledged that aggression was a 
part of psychic life, but he was not satisfied with his efforts to incorporate it into his 
scheme of sexual instincts and repression.  He eventually attributed aggressive impulses 
to a second primordial drive that was distinct from the sexual instincts.  But even at the 
outset, Freud seemed to have implicitly associated sadism with the desire to effect human 
connectedness and distinguished it from the impulse to destroy.   
 Freud first grappled with these topics in Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality 
(1905), wherein he defined the perversions of sadism and masochism as the desire to 
inflict and receive pain, respectively.  Their phylogenetic roots were, for Freud, easy to 
detect: 
The sexuality of most male human beings contains an element of 
aggressiveness – a desire to subjugate; the biological significance of it 
seems to lie in the need for overcoming the resistance of the sexual object 
by means other than the process of wooing (pp. 157-158).  
 
Thus, sadism develops as an aggressive component of the sexual instinct.  In that same 
work, Freud described muscular activity as a form of sexual excitement, and thus 
established the link between sexual excitement and adversariality: “An inclination to 
physical struggles with some one particular person, just as in later years an inclination to 
verbal disputes [here Freud’s footnote referred to the ubiquity of quarrelling between 
lovers], is a convincing sign that object-choice has fallen on him” (p. 203).  Nonetheless, 
Freud made the following comment, which he let stand in 1910, but deleted in 1915: 
“[T]he impulses of cruelty arise from sources which are in fact independent of sexuality, 
but which may be united with it at an early stage owing to [a cross-connection] near their 
points of origin” (p. 193).   
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 At about this same time, Freud also connected the experiences of anal eroticity 
with the desire to manifest self-will.  Implicitly in Three Essays and explicitly in a 
lengthy footnote to Character and Anal Eroticism (1908), Freud described the universal 
process of toilet training as kindling what can be thought of as a universal conflict: the 
desire to experience the pleasure of defecation on demand, in opposition to the desire to 
express self-will (i.e., by not defecating until one feels like doing so).  Freud explained 
that feces can be a symbol of something bad – such that withholding it would avoid 
shame and disgust in the withholder – or a symbol of something good, such that the 
withholder retains a valued part of the self rather than losing it.  In later writings, Freud 
placed greater emphasis upon the positive, creative meanings of defecation as compared 
to the shameful meanings (see, e.g., 1918, and 1917b, where Freud described the child’s 
feces as “a part of his body which he will give up only on persuasion by someone he 
loves” (p. 130)).  
 Another line of Freud’s thought described aggression as a compromise formation 
produced by a particular object choice.  In Freud’s 1911 account of the etiology of 
paranoia, he posited the existence of a developmental stage, narcissism, during which 
stage libido was cathected to the ego.  This stage took place after auto-eroticism, where 
the sexual instincts each sought satisfaction via body parts, but before object-choice, 
where an object became cathected for reproductive purposes under the primacy of the 
genitals.  Should narcissism-stage “fixations” remain, then later experiences of object 
decathexis would rekindle expressions of the immature object choice characteristic of the 
narcissistic stage – an object bearing a similarity to the ego, i.e., a homosexual object 
choice.  The dammed-up libido would emerge at the fixation point causing a “return of 
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the repressed” in the form of homosexual impulses (“I love him”), which impulses are 
then troubling to the ego.  Freud described many defensive transformations of 
homosexual desire: reaction-formation (“I hate him”), followed by projection (“He hates 
me”), which would result in paranoid beliefs about that homosexual object.  Thus, in 
paranoia, aggression existed as a kind of reaction formation. 
 In The Disposition to Obsessional Neurosis (1913), Freud introduced his concept 
of “pre-genital organization” to expand his theory about fixation.  Rather than the sexual 
instincts all being active in the child simultaneously, Freud argued that one particular set 
of component instincts is dominant in each stage.  In this article, Freud explicitly 
described only one such stage, the “sadistic anal-erotic” sexual organization; in his 
description, Freud characterized the desire to express self-will as “sadism”.  Freud did not 
attempt to find the origin of this impulse in a specific part of the body as he did in Three 
Essays, and it is generally not clear what kind of instinct he considered sadism to be.8  
Freud attributed the obsessional patient’s “hatred” to her regression to the sadistic anal-
erotic stage.  This stage featured active and passive aims (but not yet separated out into 
“male” and “female” aims): 
Activity is supplied by the common instinct of mastery, which we will call 
sadism when we find it in the service of the sexual function; and even in 
fully developed normal sexual life it has important subsidiary services to 
perform.  The passive trend is fed by anal eroticism... (p. 322). 
 
Freud described anally-fixated women who have regressed because they have lost their 
genital function (i.e., they are not having sex): they are “quarrelsome, vexatious and 
overbearing, petty and stingy” (p. 323).  Because the anal stage seemed to be the first that 
                                                 
8 However, by 1915, Freud would include the drive for mastery among other “ego 
instincts” that serve self-preservation and the reality principle, and so by implication, the 
sexual mastery purpose of sadism was not primary (1915a). 
 103
featured an associated object choice, Freud offered the assertion that “in the order of 
development, hate is the precursor to love” (p. 325).  As Freud later stated, “the opposing 
pairs of instincts are developed to an approximately equal extent” (1915c).   
 In 1918, Freud first discussed how the two anal-stage forces could contaminate 
one another, and how sadism might be redirected by repressive ego forces: 
Under the influence of this sadism, the affectionate significance of feces 
gave place to an offensive one.  A sense of guilt, the presence of which 
points to developmental processes in a sphere other than the sexual one, 
[plays] a part in the transformation of ... sadism into masochism (p. 302). 
 
Freud repeated this point in A Child is Being Beaten (1919), in which he analyzed the 
beating fantasy of a girl.  This fantasy consisted of her watching a man beat another child, 
and Freud interpreted it to be a defensive expression of the girl’s incestuous love for her 
father (“My father loves only me, and not the other child, for he is beating it”).  In this 
case, Freud determined that genital desires had been repressed, and regressive anal-
sadistic ones had returned.  However, eventual development of a sense of moral guilt in 
the girl could transform this fantasy into one where she herself is being beaten by her 
father.  The beating then would represent a punishment both for forbidden genital love 
and for the regressive sadistic substitute for that love.   
Freud went on to state that masochism was not primary, but rather it was always 
“sadism which has been turned round upon the self” (p. 194) by the ego in the ego’s 
effort to effect further repression.  Freud also posited that such beating fantasies in boys 
derive from a similar incestuous attachment to the father.  However, for boys it is the 
expression of some primarily feminine attitude, i.e. a passive attitude (as opposed to an 
active/sadistic impulse in girls), which triggers a chain of defensive transformations of 
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the impulse.9  Freud concluded by remarking that “instincts with a passive aim must be 
taken for granted as existing, especially among women.  But passivity is not the whole of 
masochism.  The characteristic of unpleasure belongs to it as well – a bewildering 
accompaniment to an instinct” (1919, p. 194).  Freud’s bewilderment over the 
manifestation of unpleasure in the expression what he characterized as a libidinal impulse 
helped lead him to posit the death instinct in 1920 as the second drive and to reject his 
characterization of the ego as a set of autonomously energic “drives”.   
 In Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920), Freud stated his puzzlement more 
plainly: “how can the sadistic instinct, whose aim is to injure the object, be derived from 
Eros, the preserver of life?” (p. 54).  He explored the applicability of the pleasure 
principle in the compulsion to repeat (as discussed in Section B on transference).  Freud 
recognized that his patients had reenacted many painful scenarios in the transference.  
Loss of love, shameful failures, and impeded sexual strivings were all revived in a vivid 
and affectively intense way.  Freud concluded that even though this compulsion is 
recruited by the ego in service of repression, there is something singular about the 
compulsion to repeat such that it overrides the pleasure principle.  Freud likewise 
identified certain traumatic dreams that more likely reflected the compulsion to repeat 
than the desire for wish fulfillments.  Freud proposed the existence of an instinct which 
existed as a force that impelled the “restor[ation of] an earlier state of things ... a kind of 
organic elasticity, or ... the expression of the inertia inherent in organic life” (p. 45) – the 
psychological equivalent of entropy, where organismic structures disintegrate and return 
                                                 
9  Freud noted that where such fantasies occurred, “the sadistic component was able for 
constitutional reasons to develop prematurely and in isolation” (p. 189) a portentous 
observation upon which Freud did not elaborate, although he identified clear fixation at 
the sadistic anal stage as the result. 
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to their lower-level organizational states.  According to Freud, this “death instinct” 
operated initially on the ego, suggesting the existence of a primary form of masochism.  
When it is directed by the action of narcissistic libido away from the ego and toward 
some object, it is manifested secondarily as sadism. 
 It was in The Ego and the Id (1923) that Freud first explicitly stated that the two 
instincts can be “fused”, e.g., when the death instinct is organized by Eros and turned 
outward toward the external world.  In this case, the ego would harness the death instinct 
for self-preservative purposes (and thus outwardly manifest the instinct as the 
“destructive instinct, instinct for mastery, or will to power” (1924)).  In fact, the death 
drive can only be governed by the pleasure principle if it is fused with libido.  Freud 
described the sadistic component of the sexual instinct as example of “a serviceable 
instinctive fusion”.  Freud went on to describe all the defensive transformations of love to 
hate as the result of instinct fusion.  Freud speculated that regression to the anal stage was 
the result of a defusion of these instincts.  In essence, “fusion” simply referred to the 
alignment or combination of libido and aggression through some as-yet-undefined means, 
such that Freud could provide explanations for aggressive phenomena that he had trouble 
explaining before.   
 In The Economic Problem of Masochism (1924), Freud stated that remaining 
fused instincts not turned outward as sadism remained as “original erotogenic 
masochism” with the ego as object.  This masochism is manifested in all the 
developmental stages: fear of being eaten, wish to be beaten, fear of castration, and 
finally (in women) the “situation of being copulated with and of giving birth” (p. 165).  In 
this way, Freud suggested some developmental progression of aggression that paralleled 
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the pregenital libidinal stages.  Freud went on to call the painful force wielded by the 
superego against the ego (i.e., guilt) “moral masochism”.  Because the superego was 
formed out of the desexualized introjects of the first objects (the parents) upon resolution 
of the oedipal complex, the superego retained the parents’ “essential features ... their 
strength, their severity, their inclination to supervise and to punish” (p. 167).  Freud 
implied that the defusion that causes regression to the anal stage left a greater amount of 
death instinct in a freed-up state.  This free aggression is then absorbed by the superego, 
giving it a more harsh and cruel quality in anal stage regression.   
Freud’s view of aggression did not change much from this point forward.  His 
view of the source of the death drive or the aggressive drive was much more vague as 
compared to the identified sources of the libidinal instincts.  Freud never attempted to 
flesh out the “fusion” process.  In fact, Freud used the German word mischung, which can 
connote either a vague admixture of the two drives or their combination in the synthesis 
of some new third thing (Brenner, 1982).  In effect, Freud had implied that if some 
mental phenomenon has an aggressive quality, the aggressive drive must be active, and if 
the aggression is self-directed then it must have become “de-fused”.  By calling 
aggression a drive, Freud implied that its aims can be subject to vicissitudes similar to 
those of the sexual instincts, and took some tentative steps in so explicating. 
 Hartmann, Kris and Loewenstein (1949) undertook to elaborate a bit more on the 
properties of the aggressive drive.  They noted first that the aims of this drive vary 
because discharge can be accomplished in a number of ways.  They noted that pursuit of 
some of the aims of the aggressive drive may threaten the object, whereupon reality-
based ego defenses would be implemented.  However, these authors suggested that 
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pleasure and unpleasure resulted from the discharge and accumulation of aggression in 
the same way that it did for libido, and therefore both libido and aggression operate 
according to the pleasure principle.  They described the cathexis of both drives in one 
object as a conflict, as distinct from a fusion, but they remarked that “little is known 
about the conditions of fusion and defusion” (p. 69).   
 These authors also asserted that aggressive energy can be neutralized by the ego 
in the same way that libido can be.  In such cases, unfused aggression “does not lead to 
self-destruction but supplies ego and superego with motor power and equips particularly 
the ego for its function in action” (p. 71).  It is such neutralization of free aggression in 
the defensive operations of the ego that led to mental integration, superego formation, 
mastery of the environment, and the development of motility and use of the body and of 
tools.  These authors gauged “ego strength” by the extent to which the ego had the 
capacity to neutralize primary aggression rather than to experience it as masochistic.  
Brenner’s (1982) view of the operation of the aggressive drive did not vary substantially 
from this position, except insofar as he rejected the existence of an organically-based 
“death drive” as the foundation of aggression, as many other analysts had done by that 
point in time.   
 Clearly, the modern trend in classical theory is to treat aggression as much like 
libido as possible, and to this extent, enactments involving aggression are understood and 
worked with by the classical psychoanalyst as enactments involving libido are: 
aggression is a drive that is continuously active as libido is; it operates according to the 
pleasure principle; the individual’s wishes for gratification of aggressive impulses, along 
with their attendant anxieties and other affects and their the habitual ego and superego 
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responses, are formed in childhood and are subsequently manifested as compromise 
formations in relations with new objects.  The patient’s wishes to discharge his 
aggressive impulses will be manifested in some way with the analyst to the extent that the 
patient cathects the analyst as a new object (see Brenner, 1982). 
2. “Relational” drive theorists: the role of experience and fantasy 
 Melanie Klein had never questioned that the aggressive drive existed in the 
individual at birth.  However, in her work with children, she had the opportunity to 
consider the ways in which parental influences impacted the expression of the child’s 
drive derivatives.  Klein’s theories reflected her desire to account for the impact of such 
real-life object experiences as well as the impact of innate, drive-generated phantasy on 
the representations stored by the child.  At some periods in her writing, she seemed to 
emphasize the impact of real frustrations caused by dyadic interactions (1935), but at 
other periods she minimized this impact in comparison to the reality-distorting effects of 
powerful early imagoes and their projections (e.g., 1933).   
 The conflicts that were salient in Klein’s theories were those inherent in the 
child’s aggressive aims, i.e., how to discharge aggression in a way that does not arouse 
great anxiety or dread on the part of the child.  For Klein, the drive and the internal 
representation are born simultaneously, and therefore conflicts can all be framed in terms 
of the child’s feelings toward its internal benevolent and persecutory objects.  Simple 
paranoid-schizoid conflicts revolve around (i) loving and idealizing fantasies involving 
the good object, (ii) fearful and destructive fantasies involving the bad object, and (iii) the 
potential for one object to blot out the other, and the related anxieties.  Depressive-period 
conflicts stemmed from the dawning realization that the real-world correlates of the split 
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internal objects resided in one and the same person, and that the appearance of either 
object might be somehow be contingent of the child’s behavior.  Klein associated 
“depressive anxiety” with the growing knowledge that the good object might be impacted 
by the child’s desire to destroy the bad object.  Such anxiety gives rise to guilt and a 
desire to initiate the repair or reactivation of the good object. 
 The level of constitutional aggression and/or environmental frustration 
determined how well the child can transform these early polarized imagoes into more 
realistic, integrated representations.  Moderate aggression and frustration would allow the 
child to learn that the bad object is perhaps not malevolent but merely inconsistent or 
fallible.  The child must also come to feel that the good object is repairable by the child.  
Helpful in this regard are both a favorable constitutional proportion of libido to 
aggression in the child, as well as the parent’s ability to tolerate both the child’s 
aggression and his reparative efforts (1939, 1940).  However, high aggression and 
frustration will maintain paranoid-schizoid fears and may give rise to envy.  Envy can be 
defined as the child’s impulse to destroy or spoil the good object, where this good object 
merely kindles the child’s longing but whom the child feels no power to maintain.  Such 
envy may trigger a retreat into paranoid-schizoid splitting (1957).   
 The child can also deal with depressive anxiety by devaluing the importance of 
the parent as a good object, for example, by turning to other people or inanimate objects 
and dealing with them as if they were all equivalent to mother.  Klein termed this 
seemingly avoidant attachment behavior the “manic defense” (see Segal, 1973).  Through 
such means the child could gain a sense of power over its object world and a respite from 
its helpless, ungratifying dependence on mother.  This defense might serve to tide over 
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the child until the child can use reparative processes successfully; however, its chronic 
use will interfere with the development of normal object relations.  One form of the 
manic defense, “manic reparation”, describes the child’s focus of reparative efforts 
toward targets other than the primary caretakers; in such a case, the child would possess 
no guilty feelings because she would view these targets as damaged by someone else.  
Such reparations could convey a devaluing or superior attitude toward their target, and 
would not serve to effect progressive development of internal objects as normal 
reparative efforts would. 
 A Kleinian’s approach to enactments would be theoretically the same as a 
classical analyst’s.  For a Kleinian, the wishes for gratification of aggressive impulses 
and their affective associations would be framed in the language reflecting the specific 
nature of the crises faced in the transitions from paranoid-schizoid to depressive positions 
in childhood.  Thus, the aggressive content of enactments, as well as splitting and 
projective defenses, would always be salient because this data would highlight the nature 
of the representations involved in the patient’s problematic object relations.  Sadism may 
be viewed in this light as the expression of destructive wishes toward a bad object.  
Sadistic attacks might also represent an envious attack on the wholesome but unavailable 
qualities of the good object.  Subtle devaluation of the other may indicate the manic 
defense.  Masochism might be one mode of coping with depressive anxiety and guilt, 
with the idea that self-punishment would have a reparative effect and lead to the return of 
the good object. 
   Kernberg is another drive theorist who, like Klein, attempted to integrate an 
object-relations focus with more classical views of psychic structure and defense.  
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Kernberg emphasized the effect of early experience on drive derivatives and the 
development of ego and superego.  He went one step further than Klein, however, in that 
he rejected Klein’s theory of endogenous drive-derived phantasy.  In the Jacobson/ 
Kernberg theoretical view, representations are all based on the operation of the primary 
autonomous function of the ego (e.g., perception, signal processing, memory).  As noted 
in Section B, drives in Kernberg’s model do not seem to operate as primary; rather, 
drives serve to lend affective color ex post to a given representation of a child’s 
interaction with its environment.  In this view, a regulating, satisfying dyadic interaction 
yields a positive valence because such an interaction discharges libido.  However, a 
disregulating, frustrating dyadic interaction yields a negative valence not because libido 
accumulates (yielding “frustration”) but because “disappointment” comes about, i.e., 
aggressive energies are channeled outward at the object; discharge of aggression is per se 
unpleasurable (whereas Hartmann, Brenner and even Klein describe it as pleasurable 
drive discharge).  Kernberg’s view, simply stated, is that relational frustration causes 
aggression: “Affects are the primary motivational system [in that] they are at the center of 
[all the] gratifying and frustrating events the infant experiences” (1993, p. 235).  Though 
he stated that aggressive expression is secondary to unsatisfactory relational experiences, 
Kernberg maintained that the strength and magnitude of the aggressive response is in part 
constitutionally determined. 
 In the Jacobson/Kernberg model, as in Klein’s, reality-based experiences with a 
regulating other cause primitive, split representations to become more integrated and 
complex, and less affectively intense.  Good, libido-releasing experiences in real-life 
would soften the effect of disappointing, aggression-releasing experiences.  Thus the 
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Kernbergian analyst is sensitive to the intensity of the expression of libido and especially 
to a predominance of aggression in the transference as an indication of the level of 
character organization of the patient.  For example, sudden, intense bursts of affect-laden 
transference expressed early on in the treatment might indicate the activation of a more 
primitive, polarized representational constellation inherent in borderline pathology.  This 
indication would be especially strong if a variety of contradictory, strongly affective 
transferences are enacted sequentially but experienced by the patient in a vertically split 
or dissociated way.   
 The development of representations by accretions of self-other-affect units that 
Kernberg described is very similar to that suggested by infant-research-based theorists 
(e.g., Bowlby, Stern, and Beebe).  For Kernberg, such representations are based on actual 
experiences and are aggregated and averaged to the extent that defensive processes do not 
keep the sub-models separate.  Thus, masochistic enactments would represent the 
patient’s almost literal implementation of a scenario abstracted from repeated exchanges 
where the caretaker actually injured the patient as a child, either physically or 
narcissistically by neglect or devaluation.  Sadistic enactments would likewise represent a 
preemptive-strike to head off an attack from a sadistic or devaluing other.  The moral 
masochism (or sadism) that may be evident in harsh superego forerunners represents 
concrete fragments of punitive parenting episodes introjected as a child.  Sadism may 
also be evident in certain patients whose pathological grandiose selves are infused with 
aggression in a way that is ego-syntonic; these patients strive to avoid the reemergence of 
more painful, weak, or dependent self- and object representations.  
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3. “Object relations” theorists: object-seeking as the primary motive 
 Section B described the views of several theorists who did not construe sexual 
gratification to be the primary motivating influence in psychic life (e.g., Sandler, 
Fairbairn, Kohut, and Bowlby).  Rather, they viewed the mind as developing primarily 
with a view toward achieving satisfying relations with objects.  It is not surprising that 
these theorists would also reject gratification of aggressive impulses as a primary 
motivator, instead characterizing aggression as the set of innate responses or 
“breakdown-products” resulting from the failure of the caretaker to meet the child’s 
needs.   
 Fairbairn’s early theories worked within the Kleinian construct that described 
movement from the paranoid-schizoid to the depressive positions and the conflicts typical 
of each stage.  However, according to Fairbairn, aggression toward objects was always 
elicited by frustration and never directed by the child at real-life objects without 
provocation.  As Fairbairn stated (1941), depressive position conflicts revolve around the 
child’s first important dilemma: how to love the object without destroying it by hate.  
Fairbairn elaborated on the various ways in which, for defensive purposes, the good 
object would be internalized or externalized while the bad object would be internalized or 
externalized.  Thus, for example, externalization of the bad object while internalizing the 
good object would give rise to a paranoid object relation and consequent paranoid 
transferences that may feature sadistic attacks on the other.  Likewise, externalization of 
the good object while internalizing the bad object would give rise to a hysterical object 
relation.  Such individuals might present as hypochondriacal or masochistic, where the 
other’s goodness would be necessary to cure them or save them from themselves. 
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 Fairbairn’s later explication of the tripartite “ego” as a representational model 
created three quite interesting categories of the self’s orientation to object: satisfying 
(central ego), longing (libidinal ego), and rage and destructiveness (antilibidinal ego).  He 
also adapted the tripartite ego to his earlier internalizing-externalizing matrix.  In a 
normal relational orientation, only the central ego configuration is conscious.  This 
configuration might describe the original transference of the typical neurotic patient on 
first presentation for analysis: the analyst has good properties and the patient is allied 
with the analyst’s goodness (although return of repressed bad objects may have somehow 
caused the presenting problem).  So long as the therapeutic dyad is attuned, no change in 
transference will result.  However, a misattunement or break in empathy with the analyst 
might trigger the activation of another transference scenario. 
 Fairbairn described a defensive relational paradigm that accounted for certain 
forms of “acting out” or antisocial behavior: the antilibidinal ego (but not the antilibidinal 
object) could break through repression into consciousness as a way to localize the origin 
of the child’s (or patient’s) bad feeling while preserving his conscious view of the parent 
as good.  Thus the patient’s sadistic or masochistic acting out, in or out of therapy, might 
be his way of enacting the antilibidinal role to preserve the analyst’s (or fantasied 
parent’s) goodness after the analyst had activated the antilibidinal object, on some level 
unconscious to the patient.  On the other hand, the patient might identify something in the 
analyst with the weakness or dependence that is characteristic of the libidinal ego, and 
thus sadistically attack the analyst.  One can also imagine masochistic scenarios in which 
the libidinal ego broke through to consciousness: the patient might engage in enactments 
identifying the analyst with the sadism of the antilibidinal ego or with the libidinal object.  
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Such enactments would eventuate frustrating outcomes for the patient or lead to the 
patient’s superego attack on the analyst for raising the patient’s expectations and then 
failing him.  In Fairbairn’s system, all such enactments are the patient’s way to defend 
against the most terrifying truth: that the patient’s parents really were bad, not his own 
libidinal or antilibidinal ego. 
 As Fairbairn did, the self psychologists would likewise reject the notion of 
primary intrinsic aggressive activity: “The primary psychological configuration ... does 
not contain destructive rage but unalloyed assertiveness” (Kohut, 1977, p. 119).  Self 
theorists regard the transformation of basic assertiveness into the expression of rageful or 
destructive aggression to be a by-product of the instability or fragmentation of self 
experience.  Such disturbance is ultimately due to a real-life disruption of the selfobject 
relationship.  When the self is in such a state, either as an original state early in 
childhood, or later in adult regression or adult pathology, it is unable to mobilize effective 
assertiveness.  This kind of assertiveness can only be produced by a self that feels both 
effective and allied with another.  In the absence of such self stability, the self can only 
respond to relational disruption with “narcissistic rage” (Kohut, 1972).  The goal of such 
rage is to forestall further self disintegration channeling the associated anxiety outwardly 
via the destructive retaliation against the injuring other.  Such rage can be viewed as a 
sort of omnipotent reaction formation against the painful shame, helplessness and 
emptiness that resulted from dependence on the failing selfobject (Kohut, 1977; 
Morrison, 1989).  These painful affects are felt to be intolerable, and the defensive 
explosion of rage serves to wipe them from consciousness. 
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 There are a number of manifestations of what superficially may be described as 
sadism, masochism or aggression in the selfobject transference.  The first manifestation 
occurs when the patient has perceived some selfobject failure by the analyst.  This failure 
may yield anger, sadism or devaluation on the part of the patient toward the analyst, 
which can all be viewed as expressions of narcissistic rage.  Such aggression may be 
overtly expressed in an immediate effort by the patient to shore up his self-esteem, or it 
may be projected into the analyst and first detected by the analyst as an “unexplainable” 
countertransference.  Self psychologists regard such projective identification as a sign 
that the patient needs to break his mental link with the unempathic object he has just 
encountered in the analyst, but that the analyst has not yet become consciously aware of 
this need (Bacal, 1987).  Likewise, self psychologists view the “negative therapeutic 
reaction” to be a result of the patient’s protracted experiences of misattunement by the 
analyst with the patient’s selfobject needs (Brandchaft, 1983).  Expressions of sexualized 
sadomasochism are thought to represent a sexualization of the patient’s merger needs 
with a fragmented idealized selfobject.  In such cases, the whole selfobject has been 
fragmented into, e.g., rejecting components or grandiose components as a result of 
frustrating early experiences, and the patient lives out particular representational 
scenarios involving these fragmented selfobjects (Kohut, 1977). 
 Self theorists might view another type of “aggression” in the transference as the 
manifestation of the patient’s bid to be mirrored by the analyst.  The analyst may 
experience the patient as behaving in a controlling, omnipotent, sabotaging, exploitive, 
callous or “narcissistic” way, e.g., by not acknowledging the analyst as a having a 
subjective presence or consciousness.  Such patient behaviors may make the analyst 
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angry, but nonetheless cannot be considered to be expressions of aggression by the 
patient.  Rather, these behaviors are experienced by the analyst as narcissistic injuries of 
his own, and the anger the analyst feels is his own narcissistic rage.  To the extent that the 
analyst has selfobject needs, the patient has the capacity to frustrate and thereby injure 
the analyst in the sometimes ruthless pursuit of the patient’s own selfobject needs: “[T]he 
therapist is unconsciously sustained by a variety of reactions of his patient to his 
responsiveness.  Specific selfobject needs of the therapist [consist in the way he] expects 
his patients to behave as a result of his ministrations” (Bacal & Newman, 1991).  As 
Steve Ellman pointed out, issues of narcissistic disequilibrium in the analyst are always 
present.  It is never possible for the analyst to wish nothing for himself within the analytic 
relationship.  At the very least, the analyst wishes to be helpful to the patient, and the 
patient always has the capacity to frustrate this wish (Ellman, 1998). 
  Sheldon Bach has made some important observations that relate to theories of 
Kohut (e.g., 1971) and Kernberg (e.g., 1975).  It will be recalled that Kohut and Kernberg 
both emphasized the role of archaic, polarized self- and object representations in the 
etiology of narcissistic disorders (although Kernberg paid special attention to the 
developing internal interplay of these imagoes and the resultant pathological structure 
formation).  Because of particular real-life experiences with objects, such primitive split 
representations do not evolve in the mind of the child.  Rather, they stay static because 
they are reinforced by confirmatory disregulating interactions with others (i.e., the split 
models accurately represent and predict the child’s real environment).   
 In Sadomasochistic Object Relations (1994), Bach discussed the meaning of 
sadomasochistic sexual acting out as the expression of these primitive polarized 
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representations.  As Kohut and Kernberg did, Bach emphasized the activity of idealized 
or omnipotent self- and object representations in the psychic lives of his narcissistically 
disordered patients.  For the most part, Bach understands sexual sadism as an effort to 
identify with an omnipotent other and perhaps to externalize the powerless aspects of 
self.  However, Bach blurred somewhat the goals or expectations (destruction versus 
connection) that are usually associated with the sadistic enactment.  In some of Bach’s 
cases, the sadist desires to discharge his accumulated rage and thereby to destroy 
someone that the sadist implicitly associates with some early frustrating other.  In other 
cases, the sadist wants to make his partner love the sadist or at least to produce some part-
object gratification for the sadist after symbolically capturing the partner.  Here, the 
sadist seems to associates the other with some envied unattainable good object that the 
sadist did not formerly have the power to maintain.  In such cases, the sadistic fantasy 
“glues both participants together” (p. 8).  In his discussion of sadistic sexual acting out, 
Bach focused primarily on the mirroring selfobject function of the sadist’s partner, i.e., 
the fantasied destruction of the partner helps to address a defect in the sadist’s omnipotent 
identifications. (Bach does not use self-psychology terminology, however.)  In his 
discussion of masochistic sexual acting out, Bach focused more on the engagement 
expectancies of the fantasy, i.e., that in the masochistic enactment the otherwise absent 
object has been successfully engaged by the masochist.  However, Bach never 
specifically claims that masochism is characterized by the desire to engage the other and 
sadism by the desire to destroy the other. 
Bach does say that it is important to distinguish two levels of pathology in 
sadomasochism.  The less pathological form arises in the context of a relational 
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connection with parents, where “the parents condemn the behavior but recognize the 
child as a separate entity” (p. 5).  Bach associates this sadomasochism with “neurotic 
perversions”.   By contrast, the more severe sadomasochism takes place in the context of 
relational disconnection, i.e., selfobject failure: “parental nonrecognition, emotional 
absence, or a lack of mutual pleasure between parent and child force the child to flee to 
[sadomasochism] in an effort to deny the loss and to buttress a failing sense of self” (p. 
5).  Although Bach only associates the latter form of sadomasochism with loss, there is 
loss experienced in both forms: in the neurotic form there is contingent loss of the whole-
object, while in the narcissistic form there is loss of the selfobject.  Elsewhere in his 
article, Bach makes a more vague paradoxical statement that sadomasochistic relations 
exist both as a defense against awareness of loss and as an attempt to repair loss.10   
4. John Bowlby and Joseph Lichtenberg 
 In describing his approach to psychotherapy, Bowlby acknowledged the 
importance of the patient’s real relationship with caregivers as a child.  He also 
                                                 
10 In his article, Bach repeatedly refers to character types, i.e., as “the sadist” and “the 
masochist”, thereby bestowing a “syndrome” or characterological predisposition one 
person.  In employing such one-person perspectives, however, Bach shifts the focus away 
from the particular interactive sequences of events that comprise the two-person system 
that “the sadist” and “the masochist” jointly create – how they meet, how they engage 
one another, what the moment-by-moment transactions are that make their system stable 
as opposed to disregulating.  Bach does note that people “oscillate” between sadism and 
masochism because of the instability of the narcissistic position: “one moment the patient 
is sunk in masochistic surrender to the idealized lover ..., whereas the next moment she is 
sadistically manipulating the same lover ... for the pleasure of sexualized power” (p. 10).  
Bach might say that such oscillation reflects alternating identifications within one 
representation or perhaps even alternating between two different internal models.  What 
is missing in this perspective is a more micro-level examination of the painful or 
provocative transaction itself as the currency by which the partners regulate one another.  
Such exploration might help explain, for example, the commonly observed sadistic 
expressions of the self-identified masochist, and the masochistic willingness of the sadist 
to match up with someone who can so expertly provoke his sadism.   
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emphasized the crucial fundamental task of building the patient’s trust gradually over 
time by means of the analyst’s enduring empathic stance.  This approach, as he himself 
stated (1988), has much in common with the British Object Relations school (Fairbairn, 
Winnicott, Guntrip), the Interpersonalists and the self psychologists.  What may 
distinguish Bowlby from the members of these groups are (i) his comparably greater 
emphasis on representational models as literal reproductions of actual parenting 
interactions, and (ii) his focus on the pathogenic role of separation, especially separations 
taking place in the second through fourth year of life.   
 For Bowlby, the patient’s self-other representations do not contain exaggerations 
based on infusion of fantasies or innate drive dispositions, nor do they contain significant 
distortions that might result from the child’s immature ego apparatus.  Rather, inner 
models, and their enactments in the therapy, accurately reflect actual parent child-
transactions or alternatively may convey what the child has been repeatedly told by 
parents.  In the transference, patients may adopt either the child or parent role in the 
representation.  Aggression, sadism, and anger by the patient in the transference may 
represent accurate replications of the angry or sadistic treatment of the child by the 
parent.  Such aggression may also be the direct expression toward the therapist of the 
patient’s lingering, unextinguished resentment toward parental victimization, 
exploitation, frustration or neglect.  Bowlby might also explain sadistic and masochistic 
enactments by the patient as manifestations of the child’s role in the family as assigned 
by the parents, e.g., the child is bad, incapable, unworthy or is otherwise the cause of the 
family problems, or is the embodiment of some transferential feeling of the parent toward 
the parent’s spouse or other relative later displaced onto the child. 
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 Arising out of his emphasis of the primacy of the attachment system, Bowlby 
regarded separation anxiety as a “basic human disposition” that is integral to the 
organized system of attachment-related instincts (1980).  Separation anxiety is evoked by 
the perceived potential for pain or danger inherent in the child’s separation from the 
protective, caregiving attachment figure.  Bowlby noted the immediate and frequently 
prolonged pathological impact of mother-child separations, e.g., separations resulting 
from the mother’s hospitalization.  Such incidents give rise to anxiety and anger, a period 
of grief and mourning, and subsequent suppression of attachment behaviors.  Bowlby 
pointed out that a pattern of parental threats to the child to abandon or withdraw love 
from the child as a means of coercion could have an impact on the child tantamount to 
actual physical or emotional separation (1988).  In adult treatment, Bowlby would 
recommend that the therapist examine the patient’s history closely for evidence of one or 
more periods of threatened or actual physical or emotional unavailability of an important 
attachment figure.   
 Where such actual incidents are found in the patient’s past, Bowlby would expect 
there to be left a characterological residue of the resultant suppression of attachment 
behaviors.  Patients with significant separation incidents or other attachment disruption 
may show one of four deviant patterns of attachment behavior as adults: anxious 
attachment (i.e., preoccupied), compulsive self-reliance, compulsive caregiving, and 
emotional detachment (1978).   Such interpersonal styles might be evident in the 
transference at the outset of treatment.  However, all these styles exist as a defense of the 
underlying anger and anxiety over what the child perceived as a frustration of his need 
for ongoing care and parental availability.  Physical separation of patient and analyst 
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(e.g., vacation, illness or other scheduled or unscheduled breaks) or the therapist’s 
perceived emotional unavailability may trigger irruption into the transference of the anger 
at the original failing caregiver displaced onto the therapist. 
 Joseph Lichtenberg, a theorist who has worked to incorporate infant research 
discoveries into analytic theory, proposed that there exist five discrete motivational 
systems (1989) from which transferences evolve, where each system develops from an 
“innate program in response to a basic need” (1993, p. 23) and each involves particular 
affects.  At any given moment, motives from one of the following systems will dominate 
the foreground of self-experience: (i) psychic regulation of physiologic requirements, (ii) 
the need for attachment and affiliation, (iii) the need for exploration and assertion, (iv) 
the need for sensual enjoyment and sexual excitement, and (v) the need to react 
aversively.  These systems seem to encompass Bowlby’s two antithetical instinct groups 
(attachment and exploration) as well as the two drives (sexual and aggressive instincts).  
For the purposes of this section, I will only discuss Lichtenberg’s view of the fifth 
motivational system, the aversive motive. 
 In Psychoanalysis and Motivation (1989), Lichtenberg defined the aversive 
system.  In doing so, he distinguished the assertion/exploration motive from aggression, 
citing Stechler’s (e.g., 1985, 1987) proposition that assertion and aggression have 
different biopsychosocial origins, serve different functions, and are affectively distinct.  
Accordingly, the assertive system is activated by a great variety of environmental stimuli, 
especially where the child has some contingent impact on the stimuli.  The associated 
affects are positive ones: interest, excitement, and joy.  By contrast, the aggressive 
system is activated by stimuli the child determines to be threatening to his integrity and 
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thus induces distress.  Lichtenberg preferred to use the term “aversion” rather than 
”aggression”: withdrawal and flight responses are included in this system in addition to 
the actively antagonistic responses that in the most intense emergency applications are 
expressed as attack modes aimed at destroying the source of the threat.   
 Lichtenberg emphasized that parents must support and encourage aversive 
responses in interaction with the child.  Such encouragement is crucial in the healthy 
development of this motivational system: 
[T]he caregiver must be able to suspend “empathy” ... and engage in 
meaningful controversy.  Furthermore, the caregiver must empathically 
accept that it is to the child’s advantage for the child to suspend the 
empathic linkage to the caregivers in order to formulate his or her own 
agenda, and even at times to have a vigorously aversive reaction to 
interference with that agenda (1989, p. 174). 
 
 Lichtenberg found in early infancy the manifestation of the aversive motive in the 
infant’s crying (a “vigorous protest”) and its excited arm-flapping and head-turning, or its 
withdrawal into sleep (in his example, a response to a cloth dropped over the face of a 
three-week-old), and ubiquitously, gaze aversion.  Lichtenberg deemed the stimuli that 
elicited these responses in his examples “straight-forwardly noxious or frustrating”.  As 
he stated, “we can easily sense empathically that for infants these experiences violate the 
pattern of recurrent, predictable exchanges between mother and infant from which infants 
derive pleasure in intimacy and ... competence” (p. 176).  Lichtenberg called such 
aversion responses “ineffectual” because they “do little in themselves either to put 
matters right or to protect against the offending source ... with the exception of some 
reduction in overall tension through crying, infantile fussiness, rocking and head-
banging”.  Accordingly, the primary constructive force of the innate patterns of the 
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aversive system in early infancy is restricted to their success as signals that evoke 
remedial responses from caregivers.  
 In Lichtenberg’s discussion of the aversive motive in the later infancy and toddler 
period, he described a 10-month-old who, wearing “a look of mild anger”, gave his 
wagon a vigorous push after it became stuck on the carpet.  To Lichtenberg, the child had 
been implementing his exploratory/assertive motives, the expression of which then 
became impeded; this impedance gave rise to the aversive motive.  “The [aversion] to the 
dystonic state and the accompanying angry feeling often heightens vigor in overcoming 
the blockage.  The infant learns...that his anger becomes instrumental” (p. 183).  
Eventually, the child will use the aversive motive to learn to “engage in and regulate 
controversy”.  Using a Parens (1979) vignette in which two 13-month-olds tussled over a 
purse they both wanted to possess, Lichtenberg described how one of the mothers 
intervened to resolve the conflict effectively, and he discussed what the children learned 
about conflict resolution as a result.  Lichtenberg called this mother’s intervention the 
optimal way for the child to learn deal with controversy; this positive pattern of 
resolution will not be established if the child’s own distress elicits pain or abuse from the 
parent, or if the child otherwise experiences a narcissistic injury as a result.  Though he 
asserted that a one-year-old is engaged in the process of “learning the instrumental power 
of anger, learning aversive responses to danger, and learning to engage in and resolve 
controversy” (p. 188), Lichtenberg did not explore the process by which the early 
aversive mechanisms develop, organize and reorganize in a way to enable such learning 
to take place in an older child.  Nonetheless, Lichtenberg emphasized that adversarial 
relationships with parents are not merely unavoidable but essentially serve a positive 
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purpose: to help the child develop his adversariality in a way that will help him function 
effectively in the future. 
 
In the introduction to this dissertation, I identified two possible motive forces that 
engender provocative enactments: the desire to destroy or devalue another, and the desire 
to repair a connection.  The above survey of the various theories of aggression in 
enactments provides strong explanatory support for the first view of provocative 
enactments.  Some theoretical approaches may emphasize the role of aggression as a 
drive, a primary energic force which can be channeled and shaped by one’s ego 
functions; others view aggression more as a by-product of frustration – frustration of the 
need for a particular kind of object or object relationship, or for some set of selfobject 
functions.  There are also divergent beliefs about the role of fantasy versus real 
experience in the genesis of aggression: some theorists emphasize that the level of an 
individual’s aggression is constitutionally-determined and that the expression of 
aggression will be determined by the intersection of the individual’s fantasy life and ego 
resources; other theorists emphasize that the level of aggression will be directly 
proportional to the quantity and magnitude of real experiences of disregulation and 
frustration.  Still other theorists find ways to blend these two views together.   
Nonetheless, these views tend to focus mostly on the destructive function of 
aggression.  Very little of the literature surveyed accounts for the role of aggression in the 
service of forming or restoring affect-regulating connections with others.  It is true that 
Freud did note the nexus of relational expressions of aggression with object choice, 
though his theoretical explanations of sadomasochistic phenomena seemed to shift over 
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time; classical theorists would likely view the expression of aggression for such purposes 
as evidence that the aggression has been changed into something else: drive “fusion” 
takes place, or aggression is somehow transformed by the ego into a life force that serves 
the ego’s interests.  However, it is difficult to find in the literature much elaborated 
discussion of the role of unpleasant arousal experiences and negative affect as the 
“currency” that is exchanged in well-regulating dyadic transactions.   In the next half of 
this dissertation, case material will be presented which will illustrate provocative 
enactments in their function as regulators of underarousal and loss, in addition to the 
traditionally accepted function of provocative enactments as the patient’s means to 
devalue or destroy an object connection.   
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III. CASE PRESENTATION AND THEORETICAL DISCUSSION 
The proposal I advance in this dissertation is that provocative enactments can be 
viewed as regulators of arousal and affect.  This view suggests that provocative 
transference scenarios are triggered when the patient apprehends or actually experiences 
a state of physiological underarousal.  The underarousal is cognized as the loss of a 
stimulating and well-regulating other – in essence, the loss of a good object – and the 
actualization of the provocative transference scenario represents the actor’s attempt to 
reregulate, i.e., to increase the stimulation coming from the other, thus staving off the 
experience of object loss.  This formulation not only underscores the strong connection 
between states of physiological arousal and the formation of representational systems in 
early life, but also emphasizes the continuing and central role of arousal in the 
manifestation of transference in adulthood.  The perspective suggested in this dissertation 
may be underrepresented in the set of theoretical explanations of the origin and function 
of enactments upon which clinicians commonly draw.  The theory presented herein may 
also suggest some useful clinical approaches to a particular subset of “aggressive” 
transference phenomena that will be discussed in a later section of this dissertation.   
Part II of this dissertation reviewed literature relevant to a discussion of the origin 
and function of provocative enactments.  Such a survey is by necessity a broad one, 
covering a range of psychoanalytic and experimentally-based theories pertaining to (i) 
physiological arousal, the relationship of arousal to affect, and the development of 
systems to regulate arousal and affect, including their cognitive sequelae; (ii) the nature 
and development of representational systems; (iii) the origin and function of transference 
phenomena; and (iv) the scope of the term “aggression”, the origin of aggression, the 
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internal mechanisms associated with it, and the role of aggression in the formation and 
function of representations, transference and enactments. 
In Part III, a clinical case will be presented in order to explicate the view of 
provocative enactments as regulators of arousal and affect as a way of augmenting the 
theoretical discussion.  The clinical presentation will begin with a case description, 
specifically highlighting manifestations of the patient’s provocative gestures, his related 
thoughts and feelings, his expectations regarding the thoughts and feelings of others, and 
the therapist’s own countertransference.  The case material will be followed by an 
application of traditional theories to account for those provocative scenarios that the 
patient attempted to enact, and the clinical interventions implied by such theories.  An 
alternative theoretical view will then be elaborated upon and applied as a way of 
understanding the same clinical phenomena.  A discussion of the clinical implications 
will follow. 
A. Clinical Case Summary 
Cuadli is a single, gay male undergraduate who was born in India and immigrated 
to the U.S. from Ahmedabad to attend college.  He is about 5’ 6” tall and slight of build.  
When he presented for intake, his hair was cut in an almost shoulder-length 1970s style, 
and he was dressed neatly in a stylish, contemporary way; his manner was described by 
his initial interviewer as “demure”.  He was twenty years old when he first presented for 
treatment in the fall of 1999 for three intake sessions, and was seen by the author in 
psychotherapy once weekly for the next year and a half – forty five psychotherapy 
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sessions in total11.  He had no prior experience with psychotherapy (likewise, the author 
had no previous experience as a psychotherapist), but Cuadli felt impelled to seek 
treatment to address his acute “depression, emptiness and loneliness”. He reported feeling 
fatigued, that his mood was quite volatile, and that he was spending a great deal of time 
in bed.  He also said that he was “feeling empty about [him]self”, that he was “worth 
nothing”, that he was a “torture for his parents”, and that he will “end up a nobody”: 
“maybe there will be an incident in school, and I would have to drop out of school 
somehow; I would make some mistake eventually, drop out and be seen as a loser; maybe 
life would be over.”   
He reported great discomfort among other people, especially in public places.  He 
imagined that strangers harbored critical or hostile thoughts about him, so much so that 
he felt considerable anxiety, for example, riding the bus, subway or elevator: “You can’t 
escape the attention of the people looking at you. [What do you think they’re thinking 
about?]12 ‘Who is he? Why is he wearing that? I hate that.’…Like [they’re thinking] 
whether I’m dressed nice.  That I’m ugly, I haven’t shaved.  Small details, like my 
shoelaces are too old.  It’s probably imaginary, but I’m still bothered by it.”  On those 
occasions when he had visited bars or coffeehouses in the West Village or Chelsea area, 
Cuadli believed the other patrons were looking at him and thinking either hostile or 
sexually predatory thoughts, so much so that he would become too anxious to stay.    
                                                 
11 It should be noted that these sessions were not electronically recorded, and as such, 
session transcripts do not exist.  Quotations and other data cited here are taken from the 
author’s process notes that were based on session notes and composed after the sessions 
had taken place. 
12 Bracketed italicized text will be used in extended quotes to indicate the therapist’s 
remarks to the patient. 
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Cuadli also spoke about never having had any successful relationships, but rather 
he felt that they typically ended up unhappy and unsuccessful, in that he had been used or 
exploited in them, and as a result he felt quite wary and untrusting of potential partners.  
During the intake, he also described a variety of suicidal or otherwise self-destructive 
thoughts and fantasies, e.g., that someone will push him in front of a train, or that he will 
jump from a bridge or the Empire State Building.  He reported that such thoughts had 
started to come to him in early adolescence.  For the most part, such thoughts seemed to 
be fleeting fantasies; he denied forming any coherent plans.  However, Cuadli did 
mention some potentially self-destructive current behaviors, e.g., intentionally jaywalking 
in busy places, and walking down dark streets late at night.   
Cuadli’s father worked in the banking/finance industry and his mother is a 
homemaker.  He has two older sisters, and as a child Cuadli admired their artistic and 
musical talents and felt they shared a special warmth and closeness with him.  Indeed, he 
spent a great deal of time with them when he was small.  However, as an adult he is more 
ambivalent about them.  He reported feeling anxious and frightened when they would 
make pointedly homophobic comments in his presence during his adolescence and feared 
they would reject him if they knew about his sexual orientation.  Cuadli described his 
father as a “mysterious” figure and as having a vague and disconnected presence in his 
life nowadays, although Cuadli felt very close and warmly toward him as a young child.  
Cuadli described his mother as “depressive”, uncommunicative and uncaring during his 
childhood.  Cuadli’s later descriptions of his contemporary interactions with his mother 
indicated that she was chronically and actively critical and rejecting of him in ways that 
pained Cuadli deeply. 
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Cuadli described himself as a shy and lonely child with few social contacts 
outside his family.  He referred to a period when his family moved once a year for three 
years requiring a change of schools for him each time.  Cuadli was saddened to have to 
leave his schools, and he reportedly felt hesitant to make new connections at his new 
schools.  Cuadli made the decision to “come out” to his classmates in early adolescence, 
and he suffered severe humiliation and ostracism because such self-expression of his 
homosexual orientation was (according to him) highly aberrant in that social context at 
the time.  His depressive mood and self-destructive ideation seemed to have started 
around this same time, though it is not clear the extent to which this incident precipitated 
the mood and ideation changes or vice versa.  Cuadli did not come out to his family at 
that time, and only did so to his mother in a rather oblique way in 2001.  Cuadli reported 
great discomfort and anxiety when family members made homophobic comments, though 
they did not seem to focus specifically on gay people but rather spoke derisively about all 
sorts of people who are somehow “different”. 
Cuadli spoke about his past intimate relationships only vaguely.  In the early 
months of treatment, he gave the impression that what few intimate relationships he had 
were fleeting and more sexual than emotionally intimate in nature.  He conveyed that 
people were only attracted to him as a “boy toy” rather than interested in getting to know 
him as a person.  He spoke sadly about the friendships he had formed in California during 
his first year in the U. S., saying that most were short-lived, while the remaining few 
were strained as a result of his move to New York.  As part of the intake process, Cuadli 
was referred to a psychiatrist, who prescribed Paxil to treat the depressive symptoms.  
Owing to logistical difficulties on the part of the Psychological Center, Cuadli began 
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treatment in the Spring, 2000 semester, three months after the series of intake interviews.  
When Cuadli returned at that time to begin psychotherapy, he no longer reported starkly 
self-destructive fantasies.   
Cuadli typically behaved in a polite and agreeable way, and seemed loath to 
criticize me or to express verbally any disappointment or anger toward me.  As will be 
discussed later, he would sometimes use powerfully imagistic, sometimes violent, 
primary process language to describe his relational experiences and his self- and object 
representations.  At times there was a vagueness to his speech when he was anxious that 
seemed on first blush to indicate some fragmentation of thought.  Cuadli would later 
suggest that this way of communicating might be under his conscious control, and he 
acknowledged a purposeful use of vague speech as a way to remain opaque to others.  He 
would eventually acknowledge that he valued the opportunity to share with me his inner 
world in his characteristically imagistic way, saying that I was able to listen to him 
“without judgment” and without my thinking that this way of communicating was 
“stupid” or bizarre.  He also demonstrated an ability to modulate this way of 
communicating out in the real world.   
Cuadli often showed a desire to connect with others, but at the same time, he was 
reticent to make his needs plain or explicit.  This conflict featured prominently in many 
of the interpersonal interactions that were of concern to him.  When Cuadli needed care, 
attention or help from others, he often attempted to elicit it by adopting a passive or 
withdrawn attitude toward them, in the hope that others would somehow sense his need 
and be drawn to him.  For example, he recounted an incident at a coffee shop where he 
was left standing inside by the register, waiting to be seated.  Cuadli responded by 
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wandering around the coffee shop for five minutes until he was noticed and seated.  
While he felt impelled to behave this way, he simultaneously felt ashamed and 
embarrassed, believing that he appeared weird to others by wandering around.  He often 
feared that active assertion of his desire for others to fulfill his needs would be felt by 
others as an annoyance or imposition:  
“I feel like a jerk, because, like, if I want someone to do something with 
me, I feel like a jerk for asking, because maybe they don’t want to.  
 
[So you feel like a jerk for wanting something from them.]  
 
Like they don’t really want to do something with me, that I’m just 
wasting their time.  Like I forced them to come out for coffee, but it’s 
just for my pleasure…. And then I feel like hesitating, and so I don’t call 
up.”   
 
Often his fear of rejection would engender thoughts of extremely bad outcomes – 
outcomes that seemed out of proportion to the circumstances he faced.  For example, 
certain test scores of his were needed by the registrar, but Cuadli was loath to approach 
anyone in the registrar’s office.  He feared he would encounter a “grudgy or angry person 
who wouldn’t want to deal with me”; he also feared that by not going to the registrar’s 
office, he would have to drop out of school and end up being deported.  On another 
occasion, Cuadli was in a cab with his boyfriend, and the boyfriend and the driver began 
to argue over the boyfriend’s preferred route to travel.  Cuadli was terror stricken, 
anticipating that the argument would spiral out of control and that the driver would end 
up stabbing someone; to Cuadli, this was an example of what might happen when one 
attempted to assert oneself to others.  Because the assertion of his needs always produced 
anxiety, Cuadli preferred that others take the lead and guide his behavior.  However, 
there were also times when he also spoke of feeling exploited and intruded upon in 
 134
relationships.  As a result, I initially felt myself in a bind in the treatment: if I were too 
active with Cuadli, I risked intruding; if I were too deferent, I risked appearing unhelpful 
or uncaring.   
Early on, a pattern began which would recur over the course of treatment: a break 
in the sequence of weekly sessions would be followed by a gesture of withdrawal on 
Cuadli’s part.  Such gestures would typically lead me to feel stirred to reengage Cuadli, 
but after only a few sessions, there was something about these gestures that led me to 
suspect that he wanted me to feel stirred, though I could not specifically say what it was.  
As mentioned, treatment with Cuadli was unable to begin until three months after the 
initial intake.  In the first scheduled therapy session, Cuadli arrived twenty minutes late, 
saying that he forgot about the session; in that session he expressed his desire to be seen 
weekly.  The next week, Cuadli was thirty minutes late (again saying that he forgot), and 
in that session he repeatedly maintained that he really only wanted to come every other 
week – that once weekly was “too much”.  I replied, “If you want to come every other 
week, that’s fine… So you feel like once a week is too much.  Too much, how?”  Cuadli 
explained that his “life was not high right now” – that there was not much “content”, and 
implied that he would not have enough to talk about.  I was felt skeptical because he had 
a great deal to tell me in the intake sessions.  My further inquiries into his underlying 
feelings or how he imagined I would react to meeting less frequently produced little more 
than a simple repetition that he wanted to come in once every two weeks.   
I then shared my thought that “maybe when you say you’re not ready, you’re 
saying you’re not sure you feel ready for the prospect of coming in for therapy as a 
general matter”.  Cuadli replied, “Possibly…”, and then brought up the long break 
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between intake and the first therapy session, saying, “Intake was last year; now the 
therapy is this year,” implying that he had changed a bit as a person after three months.  I 
wondered aloud whether the long break made him think “‘What’s going one? Things start 
to go forward with the intake and then I have to sit around and wait for three months.’  
Like, we first get started and then the whole thing cuts off.”  He replied, “It’s like you 
brought out the ingredients in me to do therapy, about my family, and my 
childhood…these things were all brought out and then three months later they were 
pulled back in.”  He then stated that perhaps he had made a mistake, i.e., that this 
happened because he came in at the end of last semester, he came too early, and he 
should have come at the beginning of this semester.  He then stated again that he “would 
like to come every two weeks…. By the way, I stopped taking the Paxil.”  On inquiry, he 
explained that he did not like the side effects, so he decided to stop, and then said, “It was 
silly to make that decision without speaking to [the psychiatrist] because it could be 
dangerous.”  By this point, I was wondering whether he was saying certain things in 
order to get me to worry about him or to otherwise stir me to react. 
Although I responded to Cuadli in a relatively neutral way in this early session, I 
would later find myself responding to Cuadli’s passivity by making an active effort to 
maintain his goodwill and to keep him engaged in the treatment.  As mentioned, Cuadli 
would eventually be able to reflect on his passivity and withdrawal, and could discuss the 
problematic aspects of his hope to elicit care in this way, as manifested in the 
transference as well as in other areas of his life:  
“[I mean, it’s okay to have me want to chase after you here, because we 
can talk about it here and understand what it is you’re hoping to bring 
about.  But you know, in real life, putting people in the role of chasing 
you could be problematic.]   
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How can that be problematic?  
 
[Well, for example, I’m not sure it’s clear that people know that you 
want them to chase after you.... When you run away from people, they 
might feel like you don’t think their company is worthwhile.] 
 
 [Here Cuadli said that he had plenty of examples of that, giving one 
where he was invited to take a trip with someone, then became anxious 
that she would not like to spend the time with him; because he was 
anxious, he ended up not calling her back, and so she assumed he did not 
want to go.]  
 
[So how do you think people react when they see you shying away from 
them?]   
 
They will probably think that I don’t want to spend time with them and 
they avoid me.   
 
[So they end up acting in a way that you were afraid they would.]   
 
And I end up alone.” 
 
As mentioned, I thought I had detected a provocative quality to his passivity and 
withdrawal.  It appeared that he tried to lever his occasional expressions of enthusiasm 
for the treatment by subsequently withdrawing his enthusiasm.  I wondered whether such 
withdrawals represented his attempt to (re)connect with me through provocative means, 
i.e., to get me to reassure him that he was wanted, that I valued him and that I genuinely 
wanted to help him.  There were certainly times when Cuadli questioned whether I 
genuinely cared about him – especially at those times when he thought very poorly of 
himself – and he suspected that I was just acting as though I cared because that was part 
of “doing my job”.  Cuadli initially seemed to be much less conscious of the provocative 
aspects of his passivity and withdrawal.  After a few months, I had developed the hope 
that enactments such as these could be made fully conscious and understandable to 
Cuadli, despite his ambivalent feelings about actively engaging in the treatment. 
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The logistical issue about the frequency of the session was soon resolved.  In the 
following session, I expressed my concern that such infrequent meetings would make it 
difficult for us to know one another or to build a level of trust necessary for the therapy to 
be effective.  He replied, “Let me think about it… Would it be all right if I called you on 
Monday or Tuesday?”  Given that our appointments were on Thursdays, I said, “if you 
feel like calling me for an earlier session, you can always do that – the more notice you 
give me, the more likely I’ll have the time open – otherwise, we’ll meet two weeks from 
now.”  Cuadli did not call.  He came to the following session twenty minutes late, and 
started by saying that he wanted to discontinue treatment.  The motives he spoke about 
seemed vague, e.g., that “in the last few months [he’d] adjusted better to his 
environment”, and that he was not sure what the purpose of the therapy would be.   
Over the course of this session, I found myself speaking more, specifically making more 
interpretive comments, with the hope of engaging Cuadli in the treatment.  At one point 
Cuadli asked, “How would you label me?”, saying that he had been thinking about how 
others see him (although I wondered to myself whether he was also afraid I thought he 
was crazy, or had bad qualities).  I responded: 
“[That reminds me about times in the past when you asked me my 
opinion of something you’d said.  I wonder if you’re feeling like you’re 
wanting something more from me than I’m giving….  To answer your 
question, I think you’re a thoughtful and sensitive person, and that being 
close to people is very important to you.  But at the same time I think 
that close relationships have been painful for you in the past, and for 
that reason, you have two feelings about closeness: wanting to be close 
but also feeling that closeness is very risky.  I think this sense of risk is 
somehow connected to your concerns that others might not think well of 
you, or be actively thinking bad things about you.]” 
 
Cuadli agreed, but his subsequent response was mumbled and somewhat 
disjointed.  When I said I had trouble understanding him, Cuadli replied, “I was 
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mumbling.  I know.  I was being vague.  That’s why you couldn’t understand.”  I then 
attempted to respond to what I sensed he was being vague about, namely, what it was that 
Cuadli wanted from me:  
“[When I heard you say ‘I (Cuadli) don’t make an effort to…’ I thought 
of the times where I asked you to do something, and it seemed like you’d 
rather I did something for you, for me to make more of an effort to do 
something in service of you and the treatment.]   
 
I am subordinating.  That’s something I need to work on.  
 
[Like in the last session, where you said ‘Should I call you Monday or 
Tuesday?’, I felt like I responded by saying ‘well, you can call me if you 
feel like it’.  But I wonder if you would’ve wanted me to say, ‘Yes, call 
me Monday or Tuesday!’]   
 
Yes, I would’ve felt better if you had said that.”  
 
Cuadli then returned the focus to his feeling that, by wanting others to take action for 
him, he is subordinating himself to them.  He said, “Maybe that would be something to 
talk about if I come in next week.  I feel like I want to come in next week and talk about 
this.”  We arranged a time, and he let me know that he would write down the 
appointment “in a special section of my notebook that I always check,” from which 
statement I inferred that he wanted to show me his active investment of effort and 
engagement. 
Reflecting on my active response to Cuadli’s withdrawal, I realized how my 
activation led to a repair of the disconnection that Cuadli sensed.  Cuadli had described 
other events in his life involving a similar pattern of disconnection, acting out (especially 
by causing others to worry), and reconnection:  
(i) “One time, I ran away from home. Just for one day when I was 
four…. I don’t know how I was able to walk five miles with my sister’s 
sneakers on.  Finally, I got to this electronics store.  The clerk called my 
parents; my first and last name was on every piece of my clothes.  They 
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called every [common last name] in the phone book.  She contacted my 
parents.  They came to the store and picked me up. They were so 
worried and paranoid that day, driving all around to find me.  [Why did 
you run away?] My father had to take my sister somewhere; I was 
jealous he didn’t take me with my sister.  I remember screaming at my 
father that I hated him.  I don’t know why I said that…it’s a vague 
memory.” 
 
(ii) [Inquiry about starting school] “When school started, I was 
embarrassed.  I wet myself on the first day.  I was so anxious and 
nervous.  My mother drove me to school, and just after she left I said to 
myself, “Gosh. What will I do?”  Then I wet myself.  Someone had to 
take me to the bathroom to change my clothes.  After that it was hard to 
talk to my classmates.” 
 
(iii) [Several months into the treatment, Cuadli disclosed the existence of 
an intimate relationship with Noel, an antiques dealer in his fifties, 
which had begun months earlier.  Cuadli spoke vaguely but hopefully 
about this relationship (“maybe my soulmate”), but also described him 
as very jealous.  Cuadli subsequently described a “turning point” in his 
relationship with Noel:] “I went out with a friend last Saturday night.  
(Coyly) I assumed he was not interested in me.  I came home at 3:00 
a.m., and there were a lot of phone messages from my boyfriend – he 
was worried.  He was furious when I told him I’d be going out with this 
guy. You and I talked previously about him not trusting me.  So we had 
a three-hour conversation…we had a big argument...  [What was the 
turning point? Did you break up?]  No.  By arguing, we’re more honest.  
We’ve become closer.  I think so… I suppose so…”  Cuadli did not 
allude to any events which might possibly have precipitated his decision 
to go out with another man that night. 
 
In the last session before summer break, Cuadli spoke at length about his feelings 
that his relationship with his boyfriend was not going to work out.  I felt a strong urge to 
warn him not to preemptively precipitate a break-up with his boyfriend; in other words, I 
felt very stirred to rescue him.  Though I did not act, I did note to myself that I was more 
active in this session and that I spent more time reflecting his feelings than I usually do.  
Cuadli said pointedly that if his boyfriend stood him up that weekend or did not want to 
spend that weekend with him, “then that’s it.”  He felt strongly that his boyfriend never 
had an emotional connection to him but really only saw him as a “fuck buddy”.  Cuadli 
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then recounted an incident in which he was graphically propositioned in a take-out 
restaurant, and concluded “maybe I must look like a whore if that’s the kind of interest 
men have in me.”  However, at the very end of the session, he told me that perhaps he 
was being too negative and he did not think his boyfriend would stand him up after all; I 
subsequently wondered whether my activity in this session ameliorated some of Cuadli’s 
anxiety over our separation. 
Cuadli returned in September – after a two month break – in a dispirited state, 
expressing little confidence in the relationship with Noel, still maintaining that Noel was 
more interested in exploiting him sexually than in having a deep and committed 
relationship.  He spoke about himself in the most debasing terms I had heard thus far:  
that he was feeling like he had “no brain”, and that his mind was 
“empty of contents…like a piece of flesh sold to the supermarket…. I 
wish I could be sold like a piece of meat, at fifty cents a pound.  Then 
life would be easy.  I wouldn’t have to face problems or think of 
people’s feelings.  I’d rather be a piece of meat… A cow is alive, but a 
piece of meat is like, ‘let’s have steak’; the meat has no feelings and 
[doesn’t have to give] a response…. Men want a cheaper version of a 
blow-up doll; otherwise, there’s nothing that they want.  Okay, I’ll be a 
blow-up doll.  Eventually the air goes out of me…that’s the time limit 
and they can’t use me anymore.” 
 
Cuadli went on to say that if he needed “cold hard cash”, maybe he could go be a 
prostitute in Van Cortlandt Park:  “I thought that’d be a good idea.  I could make maybe 
$200 a night… Men are stupid… I know how much to ask for a BJ or role play…” 
Cuadli also showed some difficulty getting started in treatment again, e.g., by no-showing 
for his first two appointments.  Cuadli claimed that the appointments slipped his mind, 
but he also explicitly expressed ambivalence about the treatment.  I was not surprised by 
his ambivalence about reuniting with me in the face of the long break and the 
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deteriorating relationship with Noel.  Cuadli arrived on time for our next three sessions; 
however, I was twenty minutes late for the last of these (due to a subway problem).  The 
following week Cuadli no-showed.  The week after that he arrived on time, and said “I 
missed you on Friday” in a mumbled way when I met him in the waiting room.  In this 
session we discussed the problem Cuadli was having remembering to keep appointments 
of all sorts, and his hesitance to be more “responsible”, as he put it.  Cuadli eventually 
expressed his concern about disclosure of the contents of his inner life and the destructive 
effect it might have on others:  
“My relationship with my boyfriend is affecting the therapy… it’s not 
such a good relationship and maybe that affects this [treatment]….and 
basically the trouble is, men suck…all men suck.  
 
[So, I’m a man…you’re afraid that I’m going to fail you too.] 
 
 [No response; Cuadli appears quite anxious]  
 
[This is hard to talk about, to tell me this stuff.]  
 
It feels very uncomfortable.   
 
[What do you think’d happen if you told me what was on your mind?]  
 
A heart attack. 
 
[Like, ‘Ahhh!’ It’s that overwhelming, it’d give you a heart attack.]  
 
Not just me. You. My friends, my boyfriend, everyone around me.  
That’s why with everybody I’m so secretive.  I keep things to myself 
because deep down inside I’m stupid, I have low worth, I’m lazy, I have 
a low IQ, I’m just a stupid whore.  I project bad aspects of myself onto 
them. [?]  I feel that way, and then they feel that way.  
 
[And then…]  
 
They leave me. 
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During this semester, Cuadli also began to fall behind in his session payments 
($10 per session).  During a particular session, he put forward a number of reasons why it 
was difficult for him to pay: he was “poor right now”, he was too embarrassed to ask his 
parents for more money, all the while nervously giggling and covering his mouth.  I did 
not find these reasons completely credible, since he told me his parents were covering all 
his monthly expenses – a total of about $1200 per month; I also had the sense that he did 
not skimp on small luxuries, e.g., books, CDs, cable television, internet service, 
restaurants, bars, cafes, movies (although his boyfriend might have paid for some of 
these).  After exploring this with him, and expressing some skepticism, I asked him in a 
friendly but direct way if he was telling me that therapy was the least important of all 
these things.  Cuadli replied, laughingly, “but I want everything!”  Nonetheless, Cuadli 
called me before his next session to tell me that he would have to terminate because he 
could not afford to keep coming.   
In the next session, I wondered aloud whether Cuadli again wanted me to chase 
after him, to show that I cared enough to stop him from leaving the treatment.  I did not 
consider at the time how the course of his relationship with Noel may have affected his 
desire to act out in the treatment.   As it turns out, Cuadli broke up with Noel a few days 
later.  According to Cuadli, he and Noel had gone out, Cuadli wanted to accompany Noel 
home and spend the night with him, “but Noel said no, he was tired he wanted some time 
alone. And I was just, ‘Oh, okay.’ He’s older and wants solitude and I should 
compromise.” Cuadli talked about Noel wanting to take the “not-living-together 
approach” (this was the first that I had heard that Cuadli wanted to live with Noel) and he 
described how Noel is “not arguable…he doesn’t discuss things like that”.  I recalled a 
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phone conversation Cuadli had with his mother: “You wanted to talk to her, she didn’t, 
and you said, ‘Oh. Okay. Bye.’  In both these cases it seems like you were reaching out to 
the other person and they put up a wall.”  Cuadli agreed, “A wall so high you can’t see 
the top.”  
Two weeks after his break up, Cuadli came in looking noticeably different: not 
only had he cut his hair short, but he seemed more mature and confident in his bearing.  
He spoke about feeling more responsible and interested in the possibilities of a new 
relationship, saying that there were people out there who would value him more than 
Noel did and would want to spend more time with, and that he was “worth the 
attention… This time I’m going to be more picky.”  I commented that he seemed like a 
new Cuadli, and he agreed.  I asked how the old Cuadli was different from the new, and 
he replied, “The old Cuadli is involuntary, submissive, naïve, dominated, emotionally 
dependent, weak”, saying that he had stayed with Noel for as long as he did because he 
felt bad about himself and he depended on Noel for his own sense of worthiness. He 
continued, “The new Cuadli is not … weak and emotionally dependent.  From now on, I 
can be more independent.  Someone who has worth for some people.  I’m not going to be 
a cheap date, a cheap whore.”  It is also worth noting that immediately after his break up 
Cuadli began to make regular fee payments – we agreed he would bring double the fee 
($20) to each session to make up the missed payments. 
In another session soon afterward, his responses to me were short and vague, with 
a nebulous, “far away” quality.  At the time, his demeanor was rather silly and giggly.  
After conveying that I had trouble following what he was talking about, Cuadli replied 
that maybe he was being mysterious.  He conveyed this with a hint of pride.  He went on 
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to say that he thought others found him to be mysterious and unpredictable, but in a way 
that made him interesting and attractive to them, i.e., he felt his “mysteriousness” was 
enticing.  He certainly seemed to be in good spirits at that point and was clearly enjoying 
himself.  However, later in the session, he acknowledged feeling more disconnected from 
me: “Today I feel more like I want to withdraw.”  When I asked why, Cuadli told me he 
was anxious about Tony, a man he met on the internet whom he was supposed to meet in 
person; he was being mysterious with him as a way to make Cuadli seem more 
interesting to him: “It created a craving.  With Tony I used an aggressively mysterious 
strategy.  It worked…”  However, Cuadli denied that his vagueness in the session had 
anything to do with me; rather it was merely a “wave” of what was going on with Tony 
washing into the session.  I asked about another man about whom Cuadli had been very 
excited for several weeks and who Cuadli thought was almost certainly gay.  Cuadli now 
regarded that man dismissively: “I have no interest in him.  He’s too closed to come out.”  
It should be noted that Cuadli had neglected to bring payment to this session; it was the 
first time he had broken our payment agreement.   
During this first year of treatment, Cuadli had struggled with his ability to 
maintain “the right distance” from people, including Noel and me.  On the one hand, 
Cuadli expressed his desire for someone on whom he could rely for caring and 
nurturance.  At times his fantasies of a merger with a perfect caretaker seem to manifest 
in his interpersonal expectations in quite a primitive or childlike way.  Cuadli touched on 
such fantasies when he wished I would treat him for free, saying “I want everything!”  
On the other hand, he usually followed any explication of such fantasies with a complete 
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dismissal of them as “wrong”, “vain” or “selfish”.  Later in the treatment, Cuadli would 
paint a colorful picture of one such fantasy: 
“I would be in a featherful bed, in a nice bedroom, with scented 
potpourri.  There would be a delicious French course meal, there is a 
water fountain and beautiful furniture; there would be a beautiful 
creature feeding me. 
 
 [What does that feel like?]  
 
46 percent contentment.  
 
[46 percent contentment… so that makes 54 percent…]  
 
Insecurity…about my self confidence.  Then suddenly the beautiful 
creature – that would be Eric [a later boyfriend] – turns into a three-
headed monster, like on Buffy the Vampire Slayer.  The French dinner 
turns into two hundred maggots.  The beautiful castle turns into the 
haunted house on the hill….   
 
[How does that scenario relate to the hope of coming in for free?]   
 
The French bed is like the therapy and the tidal wave that comes to 
destroy it is me…No, wait.  The nice little chocolate town is the 
sweetness that is coming for free.  The tidal wave drinks up the 
chocolate town and melts it.  The tidal wave is the procedures of the 
Counseling Center.  The debt, the irresponsibility, came from the 
fantasy.  The fantasy led to me being an irresponsible person  
 
[So in a way, the tidal wave is you.]   
 
Like, the peaceful baby turns into the monstrous baby that eats up the 
town.” 
 
For most of his treatment, Cuadli would be quite vocal in his belief that his needs 
and values would be intensely repellant to others if Cuadli made them known.  Moreover, 
Cuadli was quite sensitive to any sign of personal rejection, and readily construed 
ambiguous or minor gestures as major rejections, at times to a degree that seemed bizarre 
or paranoid.  Once Cuadli detected rejection, his self-esteem would plummet and he 
would be filled with empty, worthless and helpless feelings.  Depressiveness and malaise 
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might then set in, or Cuadli might instead protect his self-esteem by devaluing his real or 
imagined rejectors in a high-handed and wholesale dismissal of them.  Most poignantly, 
Cuadli seemed to try to head off rejection by presenting himself as unassertive and 
compliant. 
Given that Cuadli’s expectations of people at times seemed childlike or primitive, 
and his self esteem quite fragile, his interactions with people were often risky or 
disappointing to him.  When Cuadli was around people, his anxiety could become very 
high.  His desire to withdraw might lead to lonely and fearful feelings.  On the whole, 
Cuadli preferred to be with people even while anxious, despite the fact that his conflicts 
about intimacy could give rise to some dystonic paranoid or masochistic fantasies (and 
sometimes enactments).  Thus, the sessions during the months prior to the breakup with 
Noel were filled with masochistic imagery about the relationship and with mildly 
devaluing remarks about Noel.  After the breakup, the devaluing remarks became much 
more intense while the masochistic ideation abated; however, Cuadli also felt ashamed 
and frustrated with himself for lacking the courage to end the relationship sooner.  
In that month or two following his breakup, there was quite a marked variability 
in Cuadli’s overt presentation from week to week.  One week he might behave in a 
confident, “empowered” way and speak dismissively of the vulnerable, needy parts of 
himself.  In the next he might present himself as weak, helpless and victimized.  In other 
sessions he would appear to be aloof, speaking in a vague, elusive way, and would 
interact with me in a sometimes seductive, sometimes child-like manner.  Regardless of 
his presentation in any given session, Cuadli seemed distinctly disconnected from the self 
experiences conveyed in the prior session.  Cuadli was conscious of this fragmentation of 
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his self experience, to the extent that he would describe himself as having a “chameleon”-
like personality, “almost like multiple personality but not quite”.   
In December 2000, Cuadli began a relationship with Eric, a writer in his early 
thirties.  In the last session before winter recess, Cuadli spoke proudly of the fact that this 
relationship was the first in which he felt equal to his partner rather than “subordinate” to 
him: “That’s totally new.  Each one thinks about the needs of the other.  In other 
relationships, I was always victimizing myself, like with that stupid old man [Noel] 
…putting myself into the weaker [role].”  However, Cuadli’s demeanor conveyed a good 
deal of anxiety and tension.  He would soon be facing a number of interpersonal 
challenges: modulating his hopes and fears in his new relationship over winter break, his 
feelings about a visit by his mother in three weeks, and the impending breaks in the 
continuity of treatment. 
The next session followed a week off – the clinic was closed Christmas week – 
and Cuadli denied any reaction to the break in treatment; he said he “was fine with it”.  
Cuadli spoke glowingly about Eric, saying he felt more open and communicative with 
him than he had with any previous partner: “I’m learning to be more vulnerable, to lean 
on someone other than myself…we seem to be compatible… we are able to talk to each 
other.” He said he usually expected someone to be secretive with his emotions, so being 
with Eric has given him some good feelings and raised Cuadli’s hope that they could be 
successful as partners.  However, the next week Cuadli told me that he and Eric were 
breaking up.  As it turned out, Cuadli had ended a phone conversation with Eric by 
saying “so what time are we getting together tomorrow?”, though they had not made a 
plan to do so up to that point.  Evidently, Eric declined to make a date for the next day.  
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Cuadli then became sure that his own expression of need was too pushy, and that in 
response Eric would want to reject Cuadli completely; the shame and self-loathing that 
was characteristic of the “old Cuadli” poured forth freely.  In this session, he explicitly 
said to me, “You’re probably thinking what a pitiful person … what a hopeless, sad 
excuse for a person I must be.”  However, Cuadli was amenable to the idea that he might 
be able to repair the situation with Eric by expressing some of his regret directly to him, 
rather than wait passively and silently for a rejection. 
Although they were romantically involved for the duration of the treatment, the 
extent of Cuadli and Eric’s commitment to one another was never entirely clear to me.  
Cuadli’s description of the relationship tended to swing between a zen-like sense of 
harmony with Eric on the one hand, and on the other a fear that Cuadli was taking too 
many risks by revealing himself and would eventually be rejected.  Beginning in 
February 2001, Cuadli began to voice concerns (i) that the connection between them was 
much less important to Eric than it was to him, worrying “Am I his steady one? Is he 
sleeping around?” (ii) that Eric was actively keeping Cuadli at arm’s length, and (iii) that 
the way Cuadli expressed his needs to Eric was certainly burdensome and “smothering” 
to Eric, and therefore Cuadli had caused Eric to be repelled; for example, Cuadli 
described an occasion where he took the initiative to invite Eric out on a Friday night 
(where Eric had usually taken the lead), and he and Eric ended up spending the whole 
weekend together.  Afterward Cuadli regretted his assertiveness, and could not stop 
himself from worrying that it was “too much”.  According to Cuadli, these worries often 
became “obsessions”, i.e., ruminative thoughts and fantasies.  At the end of February, 
Cuadli again expressed his desire to terminate treatment in order to save money, but it 
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was his most half-hearted attempt to date, and he decided against it midway though the 
session.  The next week, Cuadli told me that he had slept with another man, and he felt 
very ashamed and disgusted with himself, especially because he ended up catching crabs.  
But he also regretted that he was again adopting an approach to life that he considered 
“weak and irresponsible”. 
Cuadli’s attendance and payments had been good during November and 
December 2000; however, this changed after his return from winter recess in January.  
During this five-week period, there were actually two pre-negotiated missed sessions: not 
only when the clinic was closed Christmas week, but again two weeks later when 
Cuadli’s mother was in town.  After these two interruptions, there began a period of six 
weeks during which he no-showed for the first session, and came late for the rest.  He 
also “forgot” to bring payment for four out of these six sessions.  Though Cuadli never 
no-showed again, he continued to arrive late and missed payment about half the time 
through the remainder of treatment. 
The series of disconnections Cuadli experienced – the winter break interruptions, 
the departure of his mother, and the conflicts or misunderstandings with Eric which led 
Cuadli to question his future with him or expect rejection by him (“sometimes I think 
‘maybe next week he’ll disappear’”) – may have prompted Cuadli to resume his acting 
out around the frame.  His desire to avoid me may have been exacerbated by his 
acknowledged anger at me for “not giving him enough time”, that is, not allowing him to 
do a fifty-minute session when he came late.  Nonetheless, during this semester, Cuadli 
and I discussed more explicitly, how I might react to his showing me the “negative”, 
aggressive parts of him that he worked so hard to keep hidden, and how it might be useful 
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to reveal those sides of himself by speaking about them rather than acting on those 
impulses.  At the same time, the motivation to keep his “negative” side hidden and to 
firmly present a rosy, salutary view of his life during some our sessions may have felt 
false and dissonant to him.  For example, in a session following a no-show, Cuadli said 
he was feeling drained and robotic lately. When I asked how that might play out in the 
session, Cuadli replied,  
“I felt like I was trying too hard.  I’m tired of having to go places, fake 
myself, always having to smile and laugh…it’s exhausting.  
 
[You feel like you have to smile and laugh here?]  
 
No, but I feel like I was faking myself.   
 
[Are you thinking about the last session?]  
 
Yes, that’s what I’m referring to… I was trying to reinforce myself, to 
have a positive outlook…but it was just too much to deal with….” 
 
In one session immediately preceding spring break in April 2001, Cuadli was first 
able to express how such breaks in the treatment left him feeling empty and alone.  In that 
session, Cuadli acknowledged that his contemporary responses to loss were associated 
with his longing as a child for contact with his father.  Cuadli described how important 
his father’s attention had been to him as a child, how his father had been absent during 
Cuadli’s waking hours during the work week, how their separations at that time were 
extremely painful for Cuadli, and how Cuadli felt an emptiness as a result of his father’s 
absence.  It is interesting that Cuadli again recounted the story of his “running away from 
home” as a small boy; however in this telling, his father left by himself, not with his 
sister, and Cuadli did not run away from home but rather ran after his father’s car and 
kept on going down the road, thinking his could catch his father, until he wandered into 
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an electronics store.  The competitiveness and anger present in the old version of the 
story was replaced by more direct expressions of need and longing toward his father in 
this version.  Cuadli associated these past experiences of separation with emptiness that 
he felt in contemporary scenarios involving both the treatment and his relationship with 
Eric.   
Back in February 2001, I had begun to make a determined effort to help Cuadli 
reflect on the meanings of the enactment patterns in which he would find himself 
engaged, and on the external events that might trigger them.  It was difficult for Cuadli to 
step back and examine his thoughts and actions in this way.  Yet the development of this 
kind of reflective ability would be of great help to him if he were to adopt more 
functional substitutes for some of his more problematic action patterns.  During this time, 
Cuadli and I identified and explored one repeated scenario: when Cuadli feared a break 
with an important other, he would attempt to draw the other person to him by 
withdrawing and by eluding the other’s initial attempts to (re)connect.  We discussed the 
idea that, implicit in this scenario was Cuadli’s hope that his elusive behavior would 
energize the other to make active efforts to chase after Cuadli in order to reconnect.  In 
our sessions, I referred to this enactment in its many manifestations as “the Elusive 
Scenario”.  I had hoped my steady reference to the Elusive Scenario as such, and an 
exploration of Cuadli’s role as the Eluder, would help Cuadli begin to disengage from the 
enactment, to reflect on it as a strategy implemented to repair breaks, and to put the fears 
and feelings that precipitated the enactments into words instead. 
Cuadli showed a readiness to entertain and discuss the meaning of his acting out 
per se, although he was always reticent to discuss the meaning of those enactments that 
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specifically involved me (though he did take small steps in that direction).  For example, 
following breaks in the treatment, Cuadli seemed to have trouble remembering to come in 
on time or to come in at all.  On further exploration, he would show great difficulty 
entertaining the possibility that he valued the caring parts of our interactions and that the 
conscious experience of separations from me would be painful for him.  He would 
typically have less difficulty acknowledging these feelings in relation to other people, 
e.g., his friends, boyfriends, parents, etc. 
The following session excerpt (taken from a session in the first semester of 
treatment) illustrates the extent to which the topic of desire for intimate connections had 
an anxiety-producing and disorganizing impact on Cuadli.  In this early session, we had 
been talking explicitly about Cuadli’s disappointing and fearful experiences with 
intimacy.  Cuadli suddenly stated, “Intimacy is a breakable glass in the shape of a 
unicorn.”  He then explained that there was an important moment in the play The Glass 
Menagerie when the withdrawn girl and the gentleman caller start warming to each other 
and then dance energetically.  According to Cuadli, their enthusiasm causes an abrupt 
interruption: 
“The glass unicorn falls from the table and the horn breaks off, then 
everything stops and the whole gentleman caller situation is over.  He 
leaves forever.  A relationship is like that.  That’s what happened in my 
past.... There shouldn’t be expectation in any relationship.  That’s the 
force that breaks the glass, and there will be no one.  [However,] when 
you put [the expectations of connection] aside, that creates another force 
that breaks the piece of glass inside my head.  I feel hurt and the pieces 
of glass are so sharp it cuts my head open.  [Cuadli then referred to The 
Picture of Dorian Grey]…one of my favorite books.  The painting got so 
rotten and bruised and decomposed.  It feels like broken pieces of glass 
breaking through the skin of the blood vessels, of guts.  On the outside 
he is hiding it, but the picture is showing it.  It hides the gross portrait of 
raw silk covered…and ... when I’m by myself and look at myself, I feel 
gross; there are cuts and bruises and pieces of skin hanging down.... 
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Pieces of glass of the relationship is, like, replacing everything inside my 
body.  I bleed constantly like I might die.  Not physically ... emotionally.  
Like the apples and the honey inside is going to be rotten [Q?] There are 
fruit flies…and ants.  Ants love honey.  The apples and the honey are 
hiding inside the glass.  Before the glass breaks they were perfect; now 
they’re broken, they’re unprotected, and there are ants and it 
decomposes and there are germs.” 
 
As shown here, the idea of desire for intimacy gives rise to powerfully primitive 
and grotesque images, about which about which meaning one can only speculate, e.g.,   
(i) that expression of desire for intimacy leads to destruction of an already fragile phallic 
instrumentality (“I threw the expectation on the glass; inside, the glass is broken by the 
ugly expectations”), and (ii) that disappointment or giving up on intimacy creates another 
powerfully destructive force, i.e., frustration/aggression, that produces such pain or 
anxiety that Cuadli’s sense of physical integrity is shattered and leaves his precariously 
preserved idealized object vulnerable to contamination. 
Cuadli would become visibly anxious when we would examine what he felt he 
needed from me as well as those parts of himself that he felt he must not show me.  He 
did express feelings of wanting to be better known by me, and my helping him to “open 
the box of his emotions”.  However, he feared what he might do to me and to our 
relationship by sharing the “bad” inside him.  He sometimes implied that I would be 
repulsed by those parts of him or find him too burdensome; perhaps he feared that I 
would ultimately reject him.  Those fears may have prevented him from more fully 
verbalizing those needs and fantasies involving me.  When I brought up enactments 
involving me, fear about the power of his “badness” led Cuadli to respond in self-
castigating terms, e.g., saying that he must tell himself to try harder to be more 
responsible and to keep the “bad” in him locked up.  At the same time, Cuadli showed a 
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strong desire to keep me connected and affectively engaged with those needs and 
fantasies.  It may have been this desire to remain connected that continued to drive him to 
express himself to me through action.   
In June, 2001, Cuadli took a month-long trip to India.  Beforehand, he would not 
commit to any sessions in July, and he did not attempt to schedule any on his return.  On 
September 10, Cuadli and I met for our first session since late May.  In this session I 
asked Cuadli if he had any thoughts about the goals of our future work together.  He 
spoke about the usefulness of our sessions as a place in which he could “cleanse himself” 
of his problems.  However, he also made it clear that there were other places in his life 
where he could enjoy benefits similar to those offered in therapy.  He also said quite 
pointedly that he is functioning much better nowadays, and that if he were to continue, it 
would be as a result of an “autonomous” choice made by him rather than feeling “forced” 
to come in because of his own desperately unhappy feelings, as had been the case.  
Midway through the session he expressed a desire to terminate at the end of the month.  
In the last ten minutes he expressed the desire to terminate in the next session.  
I had a sense that Cuadli might be trying to engage me in our familiar enactment: 
rather than articulate a need or desire for a connection with me, Cuadli would try to 
withdraw from me or elude me, hoping that I in turn would become engaged, activated, 
and would pursue a connection with him.  To be more explicit, rather than repair the 
rupture by telling me that he missed having contact with me or that the separation was 
painful for him, he would try to reengage me or reactivate me by initiating the Elusive 
Scenario, where he would float off or become inaccessible and I would make great efforts 
to reconnect with him.  I wondered aloud whether this might be the case.   
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At the same time, I sensed more strongly than before that Cuadli’s attempt to 
separate from me and the treatment was at least partially an expression of his desire to 
live independently and to take control over the course of his life.  Attempting to serve a 
mirroring selfobject function, I also explicitly agreed with him that it was important for 
me to respect and support him as a responsible, autonomous and capable decision maker 
and purchaser of psychotherapy, and that in light of any improved functioning, I could 
understand his desire to be free of the treatment.  It should be noted that Cuadli did not 
bring in payment for his outstanding charges to this session, as we had agreed he would 
when we set up this appointment.  It should also be noted that this session took place on 
September 10, 2001.  Cuadli “no-showed” for his following appointment the next week, 
did not contact the clinic and did not return my phone call.  I was left to speculate about 
the relationship between Cuadli’s lack of communication and the impact on him of the 
events of September 11th (which speculation I will not undertake here).  After a few 
weeks without contact, my supervisor and I determined that it was appropriate to consider 
Cuadli to have terminated the treatment.   
B. Traditional Theoretical Views of the Clinical Case 
Cuadli presented a wide variety of clinically meaningful characteristics: there 
were periods of pronounced dysthymia, episodes of self-destructive fantasy, enduring 
expectations that others would regard him callously, critically or exploitively, self 
representations that were quite polarized, and chronic manifestations of the schizoid 
dilemma – a strong desire for human connection (born out of fear of complete isolation) 
concomitant with a strong desire to stay separate from others (born out of fear of painful 
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interpersonal outcomes), along with a fragility of cognitive function exacerbated by his 
anxiety about human connections.    
In exploring Cuadli’s provocative behavior – e.g., his vagueness, secrecy, 
passivity and withdrawal, as well as his episodic lateness and non-payment – it would not 
be surprising to find multiple motives or goals at work, or to identify multiple 
explanations for his thoughts, feelings and behavior.  The theories about enactments 
explored in Sections C and D of the literature review present a rich assortment of 
traditional lenses through which to view Cuadli’s psychic world.  In this section, these 
theoretical perspectives will be applied to the facts of this case.  The traditional theories 
for the most part would describe the behaviors in question as efforts to disconnect from 
another.  I will argue that provocative enactments can be viewed as efforts to recruit 
others to modulate arousal and affect states, and that this approach can provide a useful, 
additional lens by which to view some of Cuadli’s fantasies and behaviors.   
Cuadli was quite convinced that others would reject him if they knew who he 
was.  He specifically identified the needy parts of him as quite repellant and took great 
pains to avoid expressing his needs.  There were many examples: his aversion to asking 
someone to help him, his fear of asking others to spend time with him or inquiring into 
how they felt about him, and his difficulty in describing himself as needing anything 
from me.  It seemed as though he believed that his needs were so great that they would 
overwhelm everyone, “you, my friends, my boyfriend, everyone around me”, like the 
peaceful baby turned into the ravenous baby who eats up the town.  In addition to the 
shame he seemed to feel about his needy side, Cuadli at times viewed himself in a 
generally debased way, as a “stupid whore” who is “lazy [with] a low IQ”.  He suspected 
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that if he felt that way, others must see him that way too, and they would eventually be 
repelled and leave him.  Given these beliefs on Cuadli’s part, it would not be surprising 
for him to want to be disconnected from others, either because (i) he feared rejection after 
building up hope that his needs might be met, and/or (ii) he feared that his own 
aggression would emerge and have a destructive impact on good relationships with 
others.  
An early Freudian view might focus on Cuadli’s paranoid ideation and his 
willingness to be “subordinate” and used like a blow-up doll, as Cuadli put it.  Such a 
masochistic orientation might be viewed as evidence of a fixation at the narcissistic stage 
of development, where Cuadli’s adult experiences of object decathexis (via empathic 
breaks or real absence from me or his boyfriend) would rekindle more intense 
expressions of the immature object choice.  Freud (1911) posited that such fixation would 
lead to choice of an object bearing similarity to the ego, i.e., a homosexual object choice.  
The dammed-up libido would emerge causing a “return of the repressed” in the form of 
homosexual impulses (“I love him”).  If such loving impulses caused Cuadli a great deal 
of fear or anxiety, then a defensive transformation of homosexual desire might take place: 
reaction-formation (“I hate him”), followed by projection (“He hates me”), which would 
result in paranoid beliefs about that homosexual object.  Likewise, Freud circa 1919 
might view Cuadli’s masochistic orientation as a sign of repression of genital desires and 
the return of regressive anal sadistic ones, where his guilt over his entertainment of such 
desires would represent a punishment both for forbidden genital love for his father and 
for the regressive sadistic substitute for that love – sadism “turned round upon the self” – 
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and expressed via the adoption of a primarily “feminine”, i.e., passive orientation toward 
the object. 
A more modern classical theorist might wonder whether Cuadli’s conflicted 
feelings also revolved around his aggressive wishes, where the expression of such wishes 
with others might produce so much anxiety that Cuadli would prefer to separate from his 
objects when his aggression was stirred.  Ego strength can be gauged by the extent to 
which the ego has the capacity to neutralize aggression (e.g., by using it to further mental 
integration, superego formation, or mastery of the environment) rather than to turn it 
against the self in an unmitigated form.  In this way, Cuadli’s intense masochism would 
be a manifestation of ego weakness, in that Cuadli’s aggression would produce so much 
self-loathing and impulses so intensely self-destructive.  Other signs of ego weakness – 
e.g., impairment of memory, intention, speech, reality testing, and judgment – might be 
found in Cuadli’s difficulty keeping appointments, difficulty managing his anxiety to 
accomplish necessary life tasks (dealing with the registrar, keeping in touch with friends), 
and his propensity to lapse into incomprehensible speech and occasionally primary-
process thinking when anxious.   
A Kleinian approach might emphasize equally the loving, idealizing fantasies 
Cuadli maintained toward the good object as well as his fearful and destructive fantasies 
involving the bad object.  The fantasies that Cuadli expressed in such powerful, primary 
process terms reflected “paranoid-schizoid” fears, i.e., that the bad object will inevitably 
blot out the good.  By contrast, “depressive anxiety” is reflected in Cuadli’s fear that his 
own reaction to bad objects may cause a loss of the good object.  Such anxiety would 
give rise to feelings of guilt should Cuadli show a reaction to his bad objects.  Cuadli did 
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not show much confidence in his ability to repair or reactivate the good object (at least 
through overt expressions of his desire to repair.)  He seemed more comfortable dealing 
with depressive anxiety via the “manic defense”, i.e., by devaluing the importance of the 
good object, for example, by turning to other people or inanimate objects and treating 
them all as equivalent, and through such means gaining a sense of power over the object 
world and a respite from the potential for helpless, ungratifying dependence on a 
particular individual identified with the good object.  Such devaluation can be found in 
Cuadli’s repeated desire to leave treatment, in his unwillingness to find the treatment 
more valuable in dollar terms to common consumption purchases, in his devaluation of 
Noel as soon as he broke up with him, and in his quick substitution of new relationships 
without any sign of mourning. 
 To the Kleinian, the aggressive content of enactments, as well as splitting and 
projective defenses, highlight not only the vicissitudes of the aggressive drive but also the 
representations involved in the patient’s problematic object relations early in 
development.  Sadism may be viewed in this light as the expression of destructive wishes 
engendered by actual early experiences with a caretaker who embodied a bad object.  
Sadistic attacks might also represent an envious attack on the wholesome but unavailable 
qualities of the good object.  Similarly, for Kernberg, good and bad self- and object 
representations are based on actual experiences.  What Kernberg would call moral 
masochism may be evidenced by harsh superego forerunners representing concrete 
fragments of punitive parenting episodes introjected as a child.  Thus, Cuadli’s 
masochistic ideation and enactments may represent his almost literal implementation of a 
scenario abstracted from repeated exchanges with a caretaker where he was 
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narcissistically injured by neglect or devaluation.  Sadistic or disparaging ideation may 
likewise represent his way to preempt an attack from a sadistic or devaluing other.  It 
may also be useful to view Cuadli’s vague or idiosyncratic speech and occasional 
circumlocution as “attacks on linking” – one way to break mental connection with a 
potentially disregulating other whom Cuadli believed had no capacity to contain or 
modulate his own painful feelings. 
Unfortunately, Cuadli did not recount many specific childhood interactions with 
his parents and older sisters, so one can only speculate about the narcissistic injuries he 
suffered in development; however, other theorists would also infer that his harsh view of 
himself and his expectation of harsh treatment from others have their roots in the way 
Cuadli was treated by caretakers.  For example, Fairbairn’s approach might view Cuadli’s 
devaluing descriptions of himself as his defensive internalization of the antilibidinal 
object – his locating the bad object in himself – as a way to preserve his conscious view 
of the parent/boyfriend/therapist as good.  If the theories of Klein, Kernberg or Fairbairn 
are applied, Cuadli’s elusiveness and withdrawal may be seen as his attempt to keep 
himself apart from those he identified with the good object, out of fear of he might 
destroy the good that they have to offer. 
Bowlby, as well as the self psychologists, might have noted that Cuadli described 
two distinct aspects of his own “badness”: (i) a debased aspect (e.g., stupid, lazy, whore, 
piece of meat), lacking in power, and (ii) a destructive aspect (e.g., the baby that devours 
the town, the parts of himself that could give everyone a heart attack if he showed them).  
These theorists would focus on the intense rage that fueled Cuadli’s destructive feelings.  
Bowlby might view the rage as a vestige of the underlying anger and anxiety over what 
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Cuadli in childhood perceived as a frustration of his need for ongoing care and parental 
availability.  His physical separations from me (e.g., vacation, scheduled or unscheduled 
breaks) may have triggered irruptions into the transference of his anger at the original 
failing caregiver; it may have been Cuadli’s fear of the destructive force of this anger that 
led him to disconnect from me following such breaks.  Similarly, self theorists regard the 
expression of rageful or destructive aggression to be a by-product of the instability or 
fragmentation of self experience.  Such disturbance is ultimately due to a real-life 
disruption of the selfobject relationship.  Where there is a fragile and easily undermined 
sense of self, such disruptions result in narcissistic rage, the goal of which is to forestall 
further self disintegration by channeling the associated anxiety outwardly via the 
destructive retaliation against the injuring other.  Such rage can be viewed as a sort of 
omnipotent reaction formation against the painful shame, helplessness and emptiness that 
resulted from dependence on the failing selfobject.  This rage can then create a difficult 
conflict, conceptually similar to the depressive position: how was Cuadli able to reconcile 
the desire to devalue, and in effect destroy, an object from whom he might still hope to 
receive something good.  
The discussion thus far has emphasized those aspects of himself that Cuadli 
identified as “bad”.  However, Cuadli did not always describe himself by reference to his 
debased or destructive attributes.  There were other times when he spoke very 
disparagingly about others, and on rare occasions he acknowledged his disappointment in 
me.  At times he seemed quite pleased with, and proud of, his ability to be manipulative 
or seductive as a way to control the feelings of others or to control the extent to which he 
could be seen and understood.  Bowlby was another theorist who believed that inner 
 162
models and their enactments in the therapy accurately reflect actual parent child-
transactions or what the child has been repeatedly told by parents.  In the transference, 
patients may adopt either the child or parent role.  In this view, both the elevated and 
devalued senses of himself that Cuadli demonstrated would reflect an actual role adopted 
in childhood by either himself or on the part of a caretaker. 
Self theorists might view Cuadli’s attempts to be vague, “mysterious” and elusive 
as a bid for a mirroring selfobject function.  To the extent that Cuadli’s behaviors and 
ideation reflect a fantasied sense of omnipotence and grandiosity, as manifested in his 
need to display his evolving capacities and to be admired for them, a self theorist might 
infer that he had suffered a deficit of the mirroring selfobject function in development.  
His elusiveness in the treatment as well as his techniques for it (lateness, non-payment 
while disclosing regular expenditures on restaurants, Starbucks, CDs, etc.) may have 
represented his attempt to elicit recognition for his talents and his ability to be 
instrumental out in the world.  It was noteworthy that discussions of his elusive and 
devaluing tendencies produced an open, playful attitude in Cuadli, rather than a mean-
spirited or defensive one.  These discussions sometimes led Cuadli to describe some 
grandiose fantasies; a self theorist might see such thoughts and gestures as manifestations 
of Cuadli’s bid to have me (or others) show positive regard for those states of mind – the 
implication being that Cuadli suffered a deficit of this kind of positive regard in 
childhood.  
C. Alternative View of the Clinical Case 
In the previous section, I attempted briefly to survey those theoretical views that 
would explain Cuadli’s enactments as a manifestation of his aggression.  The classical 
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views focus more on the role of the two drives and their concomitant wishes, while the 
relational and self psychology views place slightly more emphasis on the destructive 
impulses that derived from actual early interactions.  Nonetheless, these views have one 
thing in common: they maintain that the goal of the provocative enactment would be the 
devaluation or destruction of the relational connection between the individual and the 
enactment partner; the existence of a connection would bring about anxiety in 
apprehension of mounting unpleasure and/or shameful outcomes, and the break or 
devaluation represents an attempt to stave off those unpleasant outcomes.  However, in 
my work with Cuadli, I wondered whether the enactments were effected with a different 
motive and goal.  Rather than disconnect or devalue, it seemed that some of the 
provocative gestures and behaviors took place at times when unwanted disconnections 
were feared or were taking place.  Cuadli seemed to expect that his gestures and 
behaviors would stir me or others to act in a way that would somehow repair the break or 
reverse an impending loss, an expectation he was eventually able to verbalize. 
Clearly, there were times when Cuadli’s desires to keep himself separate led him 
to behave evasively.  But at other times, he seemed to believe that his evasive behavior 
was enticing to others; these beliefs suggested that he may have had past experiences of 
success with provocative scenarios, such that he felt he could rely on these scenarios to 
regulate his anxiety over the painful anticipation or experience of disconnection and loss.  
In fact, it could be said that such opposing motive forces might have existed in Cuadli 
simultaneously, as part of a presentation that might be well described as manifesting 
various aspects of the schizoid dilemma (see Guntrip, 1952) – his desire for connection 
and his desire for independence existed in a dynamic tension because each had equally 
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attractive and frightening connotations for him.  In this section I will present the case data 
that provide support for this alternative view of the motives and goals behind Cuadli’s 
provocative enactments; in the next section I will suggest a theory – synthesized from 
selected theoretical and research literature – to account for the developmental origins of 
the representations inherent in those provocative scenarios. 
 This alternative view of the enactments is supported by the consistently close 
timing of Cuadli’s experiences of disruption and loss in the treatment and the relationship 
of such timing to his provocative gestures, as well as his explicit comments about his 
motives and the outcomes he expected his behavior to produce in contemporary 
interpersonal contexts.  There were many provocative behaviors in Cuadli’s history that 
could also be construed as responses to loss.  Another important source of data is my 
countertransference, my choice of responses to Cuadli’s gestures, and his reaction to my 
choices.  In examining this data, two themes clearly emerge: (i) Cuadli showed that he 
expected others to pursue him or reassure him in response to his withdrawal gestures, and 
(ii) he acknowledged feeling very uncomfortable directly asserting his needs with others 
because he feared rejection and loss would result; as a result, he preferred that others 
assert themselves with him.  The existence (and indeed historical persistence) of this 
discomfort in expressing his needs may explain why Cuadli believed the provocative 
scenario to be the best way to react to his anxieties about rejection and loss.. 
My sense that Cuadli wanted to provoke a response in me – specifically, by 
overtly withdrawing from me or eluding my attempts to understand him – arose quite 
early on, and in the context of the first interruption in the treatment.  Recall that the 
psychotherapy sessions did not begin until three months after the three intake sessions.  
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Cuadli arrived twenty minutes late for the first scheduled therapy session, and thirty 
minutes late for the second.  In the latter session, Cuadli requested that we meet only 
every other week.  What was most striking to me in that session was that, after I agreed to 
meet every other week, he nonetheless kept stating his desire to meet every other week 
over and over again; each time he would do so I would respond with what I had hoped 
was a measured and empathic exploration of this desire.  My attempts elicited what 
seemed like superficial discussion on Cuadli’s part, but he would always pointedly 
reiterate his desire to come in only every other week.  I felt as though Cuadli wanted 
something from me, but I was not sure what.  Finally, Cuadli himself drew an association 
between the frequency of the sessions and the three month gap, saying “It’s like you 
brought out the ingredients to do therapy…and then three months later they were pulled 
back in.”  Clearly, Cuadli was acknowledging that he was “pulling in” as a result of the 
break.  What he did not explain was why he needed to keep repeating his desire to do this 
over and over again.   
It is noteworthy that, after his above remark, he immediately followed up with, 
“By the way, I stopped taking the Paxil,” volunteering that it was “silly” to make that 
decision without consulting anyone “because it could be dangerous”.  Again, I had to ask 
myself why Cuadli was informing me of this.  Here he was asserting that he was 
withdrawing from another form of treatment, and this time he wanted to make sure I 
knew that he was putting himself at risk in the way he did so.  I wondered whether this 
latter statement was, in a sense, an escalation of his preceding evident desire to not just 
withdraw, but to repeatedly make overt withdrawal gestures to me.  I began to wonder 
whether he wanted to stir in me some particular sort of response.  I had similar thoughts 
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during those times in the sessions when Cuadli would be vague and his narrative difficult 
to follow.  He acknowledged that he had some control over his vagueness, although 
undoubtedly Cuadli’s thinking and speech became “looser” when he was anxious.  He 
had alluded to his ability to purposely behave “mysteriously” and his belief that such 
behavior had an alluring quality. 
Over the course of his treatment, Cuadli expressed the desire to terminate three 
times; all three times occurred after there had been interruptions in the treatment as well 
as feelings of disconnection from important others in his life.  I have described how his 
first attempt to terminate had an activating effect on me: I made a concerted effort in that 
session to stir some degree of hopefulness in Cuadli and to make clear how I thought 
therapy could help him in his feelings about himself and in his relationships.  I remember 
drawing an analogy to his story about wandering away from home when he was small, 
and wondering aloud whether he hoped to have me chase after him; he seemed to 
resonate with the idea that his withdrawal gestures presented an opportunity for me to 
show that I cared enough about him to pursue him or to otherwise try to stop him from 
acting against his own interest.  I noted that his second attempt to terminate several 
months later was distinctly half-hearted, and seemed to me a gesture to get me to pay 
attention, encourage him to be more hopeful or otherwise become more active in the 
session.  I mentioned in an earlier section how I made consistent efforts to identify the 
enactment scenario explicitly as the Elusive Scenario – where his elusiveness would 
cause me to actively pursue him –  and Cuadli appeared to find this description of his 
motives true to life. 
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The Elusive Scenario seemed to capture the paradigmatic enactment of the 
treatment, in a way that reflected the “model scene” (Lichtenberg, Lachmann & 
Fosshage, 1992) quality of Cuadli’s childhood “running-away-from-home” incident.  Just 
as important, his deeply held belief that direct expression of need would be repellent to 
others explains why a competing, more functional interpersonal scenario had never taken 
root as a practical alternative for him.  Cuadli clearly felt confident that his vagueness and 
“mysteriousness” had an alluring quality and would draw others to him; when I began to 
explore this issue, Cuadli at first could not see the problematic aspect of expecting people 
to chase after him.  However, he could readily see that expression of his needs directly to 
people entailed (in his eyes) a high risk of pain and loss; expression of his needs of me in 
the therapeutic setting connoted that same high risk.  As he conveyed in his vivid, 
imagistic remarks excerpted above, such expression to others would be tantamount to 
releasing the bad that he kept sealed off and hidden within him; if released, the bad would 
injure people, contaminate relationships and lead to rejection and loss.  Such expression 
would also shatter the “glass” that protected the good within him and kept it pure and 
pristine.  It was obvious to me that these dual beliefs – in the efficacy of the Elusive 
Scenario and in the destructiveness of the expression of needs – went hand-in-hand and 
reinforced one another; these beliefs also engendered interpersonal scenarios and 
outcomes that confirmed his expectations. 
Cuadli’s “elusive” behavior in contemporary relationships also suggested a 
provocative motive on Cuadli’s part.  There were certainly times when it was clear he 
hoped the other person would make efforts to chase after him.  I have recounted an 
episode in which Cuadli went out with another man on a Saturday night in a manner that 
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seemed to elicit an agitated and angry response from Noel.  Cuadli had already described 
Noel as “jealous” to me, and described Noel as becoming “furious” with Cuadli over this 
behavior.  The incident also led to a long phone conversation between the two that Cuadli 
felt strengthened their connection.  Although this episode suggested to me that Cuadli 
went out with another man as a way to activate Noel and induce a reconnection to him, it 
cannot be proven from the data I have.  Likewise, I cannot prove that Cuadli initiated this 
episode because he apprehended a sense of loss in his relationship with Noel.  Cuadli had 
described with some frustration that Noel had kept him at arm’s length though Cuadli 
seemed to maintain strong positive feelings toward him (“maybe my soulmate”).  But I 
did not gather enough information about Cuadli’s feelings prior to his provocative acts to 
prove that his anxiety about loss always preceded the provocation, and therefore I do not 
have a full and detailed picture of the way the distancing behavior on both their parts had 
escalated, or why it escalated.  As a result, I cannot determine whether Cuadli’s gestures 
were motivated by a fundamental desire to create more distance between them or to draw 
Noel closer to him, or both.  But there was enough in the way he recounted this episode 
to make me suspect that Cuadli was trying to provoke a jealous response in Noel – at 
least in part – as a way to get Noel to show he cared. 
While it cannot be proven which motives were primary in the above episode, 
Cuadli consistently offered evidence of his acute fear of being left or rejected by people 
he needed.  More to the point, he strongly believed that others would either find 
expressions of need to be repellant or burdensome, or else those expressions would 
provide others an opportunity to exploit him.  The last thing he expected was that people 
would try to help meet those needs.  It is not surprising, therefore, that he was extremely 
 169
hesitant to express those needs to the person who could possibly fulfill them.  There are 
many examples: his hesitance to approach people at the registrar’s office to work out a 
problem because he feared they would be “grudgy”, his anxiety about being exploited by 
real estate brokers when he searched for a new apartment, his unresponsiveness to a 
friend (who had invited Cuadli to take a trip) because Cuadli was not sure if the invitation 
was genuine, his overwhelming anxiety that the men he met in cafes and bars only 
wanted to exploit him sexually and then discard him, etc.  Most poignantly, when he 
uncharacteristically asserted his desire to spend the evening with his new boyfriend Eric 
and they ended up spending several days together, Cuadli worried that he had initiated 
something that was “too much”, i.e., burdensome and smothering to Eric, and he was 
quickly overcome with ruminative thoughts and fantasies that Eric would shortly leave 
with him (e.g., “maybe next week he’ll disappear.”)   I encouraged Cuadli to speak 
directly to Eric to get more information about Eric’s reaction; in this way Cuadli could 
actively confirm or refute his presumption that the experience was too much for Eric, 
rather than simply withdraw and wait around to be rejected.  Cuadli acknowledged that 
speaking to Eric might be a good idea; however he could not bring himself to do so.  
(Fortunately Eric did not disappear but rather initiated contact soon afterward without 
conveying that anything was wrong; whereupon Cuadli stopped worrying that Eric would 
disappear.) 
Some of the historical incidents that Cuadli recounted suggested his belief in the 
efficacy of loss-induced connection-reparative provocative scenarios.  The childhood 
“running-away-from-home” scenario seemed paradigmatic of this approach to loss, 
where his running away led others to worry, come to his aid and initiate a reunion.  
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Cuadli’s anecdote about wetting himself on the first day of school contains the same 
elements: separation from his mother, followed by an action that worried someone, which 
action led that person to initiate caretaking.  It should be noted that this episode resulted 
in a good deal of social embarrassment for Cuadli, according to him.  One also wonders 
about the impulses behind Cuadli’s decision to “come out” in junior high school, a social 
act that was highly unusual and had disastrous social consequences; indeed, Cuadli stated 
that his suicidal/self-destructive ideation first arose as a result of the social 
marginalization he experienced during this period.  Had it occurred to me, I might have 
asked Cuadli whether he had feared or experienced any loss or rejection immediately 
prior to his coming out, which feelings might have led him to put himself at risk socially 
in hopes, on some level, that someone would appear, show that they cared about him and 
rescue him. Alternatively, fear or loss at that time might have led him to assert his object 
choice publicly because it was comforting for him to do so, regardless of the social 
consequences.  (Nonetheless, it is hard to imagine that he was unaware that asserting his 
sexual identity in this context would lead to his own victimization, although he indeed 
implied that he was unaware.)  I do know that there were times in the sessions in which 
he seemed subtly to imply that he might be at risk, at which times I felt stirred to come to 
his aid.  This was certainly true in the intake sessions when he described his active self-
destructive ideation and behavior, but also during the many times he spoke about himself 
in demeaning terms, e.g., as a piece of meat or blow-up doll, and suggested that he could 
turn tricks in Van Cortlandt Park.  I felt similarly when he would threaten to drop out of 
treatment, when he informed me that he stopped taking Paxil without medical 
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consultation, and even when his anticipation of rejection by his partners seemed so strong 
that I feared his resultant actions would sabotage these relationships. 
As I have mentioned, the data gathered in Cuadli’s sessions is neither exhaustive 
nor unambiguous enough to prove unequivocally that many of his provocative gestures 
were triggered by a sense of impending loss and were implemented in an attempt to 
reconnect.  However, I detected what I thought were patterns in his beliefs, statements 
and behaviors which gave rise to particular interpersonal outcomes outside our sessions 
and particular countertransference feelings on my part during the sessions.  As a result, I 
formulated a hypothesis about the enactments upon which Cuadli seemed to rely but 
which were causing problems in his current functioning – namely, that there was a 
scenario, the Elusive Scenario, that Cuadli habitually tried to actualize as a way to 
regulate his affective reactions to separations and loss.   
I presented this hypothesis to Cuadli to see whether he also thought he might be 
applying this set of expectations and behaviors in ways which were problematic.  He 
seemed to think there was some validity to this construct, and so I encouraged Cuadli to 
reflect on those situations in which he felt the desire to manifest this enactment pattern.  
(But Cuadli’s acknowledgement is not proof that the set of emotional triggers, behaviors 
and outcomes that I identified was actually in effect.  One could argue that I identified the 
enactment and labeled it, and that Cuadli accepted it only because I suggested it and it 
seemed at least plausible to him.)  It suffices to say that I suspected that his provocative 
enactments might have been triggered by anticipation of loss with the belief that a 
reparative outcome would result.  I then began to wonder what sort of developmental 
precursors might lead to the representational components of these sorts of enactments.  In 
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the following section, I attempt to synthesize some of the theoretical and experimental 
literature to suggest how such enactment patterns may be based in particular sorts of 
physiological experiences – and caretaker responses to those experiences – in early 
childhood. 
D. Provocative Enactments as Regulators of Underarousal and Associated Affects 
 
In the literature review, I discussed the established theoretical approaches to 
representations, transference and enactment by surveying a range of approaches derived 
from psychoanalytic theory and infant research.  Traditionally, provocative enactments 
have been viewed from these perspectives.  The psychoanalytic approaches surveyed 
make important contributions to our understanding of provocative enactments generally, 
and provide a useful theoretical foundation by which to understand some of the motive 
forces at work in the clinical case discussed above.  But as I have been suggesting, these 
approaches leave some aspects of provocative enactments less than fully explained.   
Ideas about dyadic affect regulation that are elaborated upon in the infant research 
literature suggest a view of provocative enactments as the byproduct of the patient’s 
effort to utilize the therapeutic dyad to modulate his or her own arousal level – 
specifically, level of underarousal – and affect state, specifically the affects associated 
with separation and loss.  This view has implications for the theoretical understanding of 
transference and enactments, as well as the clinical efforts to work with transference 
phenomena.  In this section, I will enumerate a series of premises upon which this 




1. Arousal and affect states can be divided into two categories: positive valence and 




This premise is a core assertion that is difficult to prove using psychoanalytic 
constructs.  To what can valence refer except to either pleasure or displeasure?  Classical 
theorists allude to pleasure, displeasure/unpleasure and pain; though some may seek to 
contextualize such phenomena, for example, by exploring the phylogenetic origins of 
motivational systems, the experience of pleasure and unpleasure is usually taken as a 
given and treated as elemental and irreducible.  Such theorists define it using a simple 
“economic” paradigm: it is the by-product of drive discharge or lack thereof (e.g., Freud, 
1905), to be measured in a unidimensional, scalar way.  The economic model was a 
reasonable provisional construct in 1905, and since that time classical theory has 
continued to find it useful as a psychological concept (e.g., Brenner, 1982).  Moreover, 
nonclassical analytic theories and attachment theory similarly view pleasure and pain as 
the result of the fulfillment or frustration of the individual’s particular primary instincts 
or motives, as defined by those respective theories (e.g., Bowlby, 1973; Fairbairn, 1951; 
Kohut, 1971).   
In keeping with this consensus, a similar view of the valence of affect states will 
be adopted, i.e., that the valence of an affect state can be measured in a scalar way.  
Further, it is suggested that the valence of an affect state is determined by the individual’s 
arousal state, where the arousal state can also be measured along a single axis.  In 
essence, this is an economic view of affect valence, where affect valence is a function of 




Rapaport (1960) made a strong case that motivations should refer to causal forces 
that are “internal forces, thereby distinguishing them from external stimuli, ... [that 
likewise] cannot be equated with any specifiable physiological process, thereby 
distinguishing them from any internal stimuli” (p.864).  In other words, psychology is 
concerned with what is construed to be “the mind” as compared with the body, so a 
psychologically-relevant definition would equate “motive” with the causal forces of the 
mind, and so it seems reasonable to adopt this definition.  Unfortunately, such a 
definition is only as certain as the boundary that can be identified between the mental and 
the physiological.13 
Although neurobiologists understand the biochemical elements of pleasure and 
pain, the biochemical substrates of the motivational aspects of pleasure and pain are still 
somewhat a mystery.  A variety of neurochemical pathways of pleasure and pain have 
been identified.  It is assumed that some kind of activation of such pathways in higher-
level organisms gives rise to motive, which at the most rudimentary level can be equated 
with the desire to implement immediate attraction or avoidance behavior.  Psychoanalytic 
and attachment theories treat wishes as givens, specifically as the byproduct of instinctual 
or fundamental organismic processes, and so it seems reasonable to adopt this view.  
                                                 
13  Rapaport’s further limitations on the definition of motivation, which limitations serve 
to place classical drive theory at the center of his suggested theory of motivation, are as 
follows: a motive must be (i) peremptory: produce involuntary behaviors that the 
individual “cannot help doing”; (ii) cyclical: show “the accumulation and discharge of 
energies of the motive force”; (iii) selective: “direction of the motive force is determined 
by its object and varies with the changes in ... the path by which the object is attainable”; 
(iv) displaceable: “if the object is not available, objects lying on the path toward it ... 
become its substitutes in triggering the consummatory action, that is, the discharge of the 
accumulated drive energy” (1960, pp. 865-866).  
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However, it will be useful to assert explicitly that positive and negative arousal and affect 
states give rise to two motives that can be viewed as the most basic motives: (i) the desire 
to preserve or maintain the positive state, and (ii) the desire to shift out of the negative 
state into the positive.  Thus, the connection of arousal level with the most basic human 
wishes and motives represents the nexus of physiological regulation and psychological 
experience, i.e., affect. 
2. Negative affects have their origin in the experience of underarousal or overarousal 
A particular set of negative affects can be thought of as attendant to the 
anticipation of underarousal or the actual experience of it.  These affects can range from 
feelings of emptiness, deadness or boredom, to a painful longing or deep sadness.  It can 
also be argued that feelings of being smothered, intruded upon, irritated, overwhelmed, 
panicked to the point of exploding, etc., are affects associated with actual or impending 
overarousal.  The challenge of this premise is to prove that a physical state causes a 
specific emotional experience.  Although arousal can be described in purely physiological 
terms, it is hard to say whether emotional experience is based more on physiological 
sensation or on some primeval psychological phenomena.  Moreover, there is a higher-
level cognitive component to emotion as well.  The James-Lange, Cannon-Bard, and 
Schachter and Singer models all suggest different causal relationships between external 
data, physiological state and the experience of emotion.  These theories all posit a 
mediating role for cognitive processing, if perception is considered to be a cognitive 
function.  However, this premise (and subsequent premises) will suggest that disregulated 
arousal is at the root of the experience of unpleasure, and that the motivational qualities 
of the unpleasure predate the development of the kind of cognitive processing to which 
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these theorists allude.  No doubt that as cognitive abilities mature, affective experiences 
become elaborated and distinct from one another, regardless of which of the three 
theories is applied.   
In any case, this premise adopts the view that Hebb and Eysenck advanced (as 
discussed in Section A of the literature review) – that affect valence is related to arousal 
level in a bell-shaped function, i.e., “hedonic tone” reaches its highest level at moderate 
levels of arousal and decreases as arousal becomes higher or lower in intensity (Hebb, 
1955; Eysenck, 1967, 1981).  If pleasure and unpleasure are considered to be motive 
forces, then there can exist in the individual’s mind the construct of a desired arousal 
baseline, as distinct from the current felt level of arousal; in such cases there would exist 
a motive to have actual arousal be in line with the desired arousal baseline.  Such a 
motive would be manifested as either (i) the desire to maintain arousal within particular 
bounds, neither too low nor too high, when actual arousal is felt to be “moderate”, i.e., 
the desired and actual arousal levels are not too far apart, or (ii) the desire to shift out of 
an arousal state that is felt to be unpleasant, because the actual arousal is too low or too 
high.   
This view of motivation is related to Freud’s view of the motivational sequelae of 
the energic forces that give rise to wishes.  In that model, the energic forces create 
motivation only when they rise too high, whereupon they cause the individual to desire to 
discharge those forces.  This premise attempts to address the question, what if unpleasure 
arises when the energic forces rise too high or fall too low?  A classical theorist might say 
that underarousal leads to unpleasure (and/or anxiety) as does overarousal, that the 
unpleasure and anxiety in either case create an energic force that, unless discharged, 
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threatens to overwhelm the psyche, and therefore the unpleasure and the affects that arise 
from underarousal and from overarousal are psychically equivalent.  What this premise 
begs the reader to consider is that bodily states of underarousal and overarousal are 
physiologically different, and thus phenomenologically distinct, and that these 
distinctions will have important implications for the way representations of arousal states 
and affect begin to cohere in early development. (These points will be considered further 
in Premise 4.)  
As described earlier, Hebb and Eysenck’s model can be elaborated upon as 
follows: (i) The absolute measure of the desired arousal baseline in a given individual 
will itself vary over time.  This baseline level is undoubtedly influenced by cyclical 
physiological changes as well as exogenous events; (ii) the quantitative attributes of the 
change in actual arousal level over time may help define the particular qualities of the 
positive or negative affect.  In other words, the perceived direction of the change in 
arousal may influence the quality of the affect, as might the rate of change of arousal 
level; and (iii) apprehension of the potential for underaroused or overaroused states may 
give rise to a component of the negative affect that can be conceptually compared to 
signal anxiety, with all the representational implications elaborated upon by Freud 






3. Early regulation of arousal and affect typically takes place in a dyadic context, and 
information about dyadic activity is sensed as part of the phenomenology of the altered 
arousal and affect state  
 
a. In infancy  
The human organism shows signs of some self-regulatory capacity pre- as well as 
post-natally.  However, no mammal is capable of autonomous function at birth; rather, it 
must maintain regulatory connections with its mother.  To encourage such connectedness, 
newborns possess the “inborn” capacity to produce behaviors that enable them, in effect, 
to seek out and respond to environmental stimulation.  These capacities have been 
highlighted in various ways in the literature, e.g., in the British object relations school’s 
central principle that the primary human motive is a fundamental “object-seeking” drive 
(Fairbairn, 1941).  Similarly, attachment (i.e., proximity-fostering) motives have primacy 
in Bowlby’s theories (e.g., 1969).  As Freud did, Bowlby identified a group of 
phylogenetically-defined, innate instincts that comprised the human organism’s essential 
motive system, which system Bowlby termed the attachment instincts.  These component 
instincts all predictably produced physical proximity to the organism’s caretaker as their 
byproduct.  Implicit in Bowlby’s views is the idea that dyadic regulation systems cohere 
around interpersonal signals and responses, the most important of which are affective 
displays (Bowlby, 1973).   
In addition, infant researchers have long adopted a systems perspective of the 
dyad members’ regulation of their own and their partners’ arousal level and affective 
state (e.g., Beebe, Jaffe, et al., 2000; Brazelton, Koslowski & Main, 1974; Gianino & 
Tronick, 1992; Stern et al., 1986).  Most researchers agree that both the mother and infant 
potentially possess the tools for self-regulation and mutual regulation.  The system itself 
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is dynamic, in that the system can remain stable while flexibly handling the variety of 
self-regulatory and mutual-regulatory strategies of each partner, given the predispositions 
of the members as well as the vagaries and exigencies of real-life circumstances. 
b. In adulthood 
People do not lose their capacity to enter into effective mutually regulating dyads 
as they mature.  Beebe & Lachmann (e.g., 1996) and Steven Knoblauch (e.g., 1998) 
among others, studied the analyst’s use of synchronized nonverbal communications in 
their analytic technique as a way to regulate the patient’s level of arousal.  In addition, the 
literature exploring the significance of attachment behaviors and attachment style in 
adulthood and the impact of adult attachment on adult interpersonal relationships 
presumes that attachment behavior in adults exists, primarily to regulate the individual’s 
affect states.  Along the same lines, the Boston Process of Change Study Group has 
focused on the development of implicit relational knowledge (taking place during 
“present moments” (Stern, 1998)) in the therapeutic dyad, specifically on the mutative 
impact of emotional reciprocity as constructed via the patterned exchange of nonverbal 
microgestures (Lyons-Ruth, 1999, 2000).  It is not a far stretch to infer that the implicit 
procedures co-constructed out of these microtransactions are, at bottom, dyadic 
procedures to regulate the arousal, and later the affect states, of the dyad members.   
4. Dyadic regulation of arousal is remembered, represented, abstracted and stored as 
internal models 
 
The regulation of arousal in humans requires more than simple stimulus-response 
reflexes to effect varying levels and qualities of interaction with their environment.  The 
more the stimulus information can be processed in a rich and complex way, then the more 
the information can be analyzed in a meaningful and organized way, and the more likely 
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the individual can successfully negotiate changing environmental factors.  If changes in 
stimulus information over time can be stored, and if various abstractions and inferences 
about it can also be stored, then the organism can have the capacity to form flexibly 
organized strategies to adapt to and work with the environment.  As the individual forms 
adaptive strategies, various pieces of information about self in interaction with 
environment must be represented in the individual’s mind.  As such points, the individual 
can be said to form mental models of experienced reality: stimuli, stimulus patterns and 
categories, traces of experiential episodes, stimuli associations and inferences all have to 
be represented and “modeled” in the psyche.   
Analytic theorists, attachment theorists and infant researchers all have views of 
the processes that comprise this representational system and of the contents of such 
representations.  In every view of this system, all representations have affective 
components.  For example, according to Dan Stern (1985), the building blocks of 
representations are memories of bits of real-life experiences stored in episodic memory as 
associated “clumps” of “sensations, perceptions, actions, thoughts, affects, and goals, 
which occur in some temporal, physical and causal relationship” such that they begin to 
seem coherent to the infant.  At some point in early development, generalized categorical 
representations are formed.  Stern focused upon those episodes involving interactive 
experiences and their abstracted representations – Representations of Interactions 
Generalized (RIGs).  Similarly, Bowlby (1973, 1988) suggested that early instinctually 
motivated interactions with attachment figures are encoded in Internal Working Models 
of self and others, where such models include expectations, beliefs, emotional appraisal 
and rules for processing attachment-related data.   
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Internal Working Models of attachment have some equivalence to Kernberg’s 
(1976, 1980) Self-Object-Affect units (Diamond & Blatt, 1994), comprised of (i) an 
object-image, (ii) an image of self in interaction with object, and (iii) the affective 
coloring of both the object-image and the self-image present at the time of the interaction.  
There is also some similarity to Joseph Sandler’s model of representations (Sandler & 
Sandler, 1978) which likewise includes self, object and affects elements.  Sandler also 
identified one further representation element: the wish spawned by the self-object-affect 
experience.  Sandler explicitly rejected libidinal and aggressive drives as the impetus for 
these wishes.  He believed wishes to be comprised of the desire to maintain and prolong a 
relationship to a pleasurable dyadic constellation, and the desire to obliterate from 
experience unpleasure and pain.  In this way, Sandler described a motive component to 
representations that sounds very similar to the primary motives that I have described as 
inextricably connected to positive and negative affect states.  Though Sandler’s wish 
component is rooted in one of the two primary motives he described, such wishes become 
associated with specific dyadic scenarios through real experiences.  According to 
Sandler, the represented scenarios – or roles – that have proven to be successful in the 
actualization of the primary wishes are also stored as part of the representation. 
According to Sandler, the motive (or wish) aspect of affect is the degree to which 
it reflects the feeling of safety or conversely the frustration in the experience of an 
obstacle to the feeling of safety (e.g., Sandler & Joffe, 1969; Sandler & Sandler, 1978).  
This feeling is not merely the absence of discomfort or anxiety but its own distinct 
feeling-state of which people are motivated to maintain a minimum level (Sandler, 2003).  
Accordingly, the most common affects which generate wishes are 
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anxiety and other unpleasant affects, but we must equally include the 
effect of disturbances of inner equilibrium created by stimuli from the 
outside world (including the subject's own body) as motivators of needs 
and psychological wishes....  [In the experience of safety,] the individual is 
constantly obtaining a special form of gratification through his interaction 
with his environment and with his own self, constantly providing himself 
with a sort of nutriment or aliment, something which in the object 
relationship we can refer to as 'affirmation'.  Through his interaction with 
different aspects of his world, in particular his objects, he gains a variety 
of reassuring feelings.  We put forward the thesis that the need for this 
'nourishment', for affirmation and reassurance, has to be satisfied 
constantly in order to yield a background of safety (Sandler & Sandler, 
1978, pp. 274-275).  
 
It certainly seems reasonable to adopt Sandler’s main point – that representations 
include wishes, and that all wishes can be reduced to the fundamental wish to preserve 
“good” feelings and to eliminate “bad” feelings.  In the explication of this premise for the 
purpose of this dissertation, it is important to focus on the connection between arousal 
regulation and affect regulation: arousal states associated with the individual’s 
environmental experiences – underarousal, overarousal, moderate arousal – are central, 
organizing elements of representations.  In keeping with the emphasis on arousal 
regulation as a basic life process and as the primary motive force behind dyadic 
interaction, it is important to stress that representations do not merely include arousal 
(and thus affective) information as one of many pieces of experiential data.  Rather, 
representations first cohere around core arousal experiences, i.e., experiences of 
successful and unsuccessful arousal regulation, such that they are categorized first and 
foremost by the arousal qualities.14  This position is not very different from Stern’s 
                                                 
14 This view of arousal regulation as central to the formation of representations can be 
distinguished from the classical drive theory of memory (Rapaport, 1950, 1951, 1953) 
which views the formation of ideas and memory as a separate process from the formation 
of affects, both of which flow from the existence of some obstacle to immediate drive 
discharge.  Accordingly, such “safety valve” affective sensations do not impact the 
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theory that the infant forms categories of patterns of interpersonal experience (RIGs) 
based on certain shared sensory qualities of the experience.  However, Stern does not 
claim that arousal experiences are central in the formation of the first categories; he does 
not assert that the infant favors any particular sensory data when it forms RIG categories.   
I have earlier suggested that arousal states impact the mind, giving rise to motives 
specifically relating to arousal state and to expectations and internal models regarding 
future arousal states.  I am also suggesting that positive valence is not associated with 
simple arousal reduction but rather with maintenance of a moderate level of arousal 
within particular bounds.  Likewise, negative valence is not associated simply with rising 
excitation; rather it is a function of an actual or expected shift of arousal level to a point 
either above or below these particular bounds.  Representations of real-life experience are 
then organized around the arousal-regulating motives.  My claim about the importance of 
the experienced arousal patterns (and thus the affective content) in the early and ongoing 
categorization of representations is crucial to my larger argument, i.e., that patients 
manifest changing transferences and behaviors patterns when they detect changes in their 
own affects states, and that they enact in order to modulate these affect states.  A similar 
claim is found in Beebe and Lachmann’s (1996) discussion of the “three principles of 
salience”, where they enumerate the experiential cues the infant uses when processing 
and representing information about the experience. 
                                                                                                                                                 
formation of ideas and memories.  Only displacement of drive energies do.  Later, as the 
ego develops, it becomes able to “tame” such affect into “signal affect” to be used for ego 
purposes.  Thus the affect becomes “structuralized” and can be reproduced as a signal 
without “affect discharge” taking place.  Such ego-produced signal affects comprise what 
the individual consciously feels as valenced affect, whereas the “safety valve” affect is 
unconscious affect (Rapaport, 1953).  
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I have already proposed that representations have at their core the bodily 
experiences associated with various arousal states and the expectations formed from 
arousal-modulating outcomes.  Further, there is some experimental support for the idea 
that the physical discomfort of underarousal is experienced as something distinct from the 
discomfort of overarousal.  As mentioned in the literature review, experimental research 
indicates that the experience of understimulation impacts the developing brain and body 
in a way that is distinct from overstimulation (see Schore, 2003).  Such research has 
shown that experiences of maternal deprivation and hypoarousal have led to significant 
elevations in the secretion of glucocorticoids (e.g., cortisol) and ACTH (Zhang et al., 
2002), whereas hyperarousing stressors cause the elevation in the secretion of not only 
glucocorticoids, but also of the catecholamines – epinephrine, norepinephrine, and 
dopamine.  Only increases in the latter neurotransmitters initiate the “fight-or-flight” 
response: increased heart rate, increase in blood pressure, dilation of the bronchioles, and 
increased metabolic rate.  (Studies have also found that chronic overstimulation and 
chronic understimulation lead to two distinct patterns of cell death in the brain, and so 
one might wonder if the impact on cognitive functioning and personality are distinct as 
well.)  Based on these studies, one might reasonably infer that the pain resulting from 
disregulated arousal is not physically experienced as simply one sort of pain, but that 
very early on, the infant can distinguish the pain caused by understimulation from the 
pain caused by overstimulation.  Although both arousal states are obviously aversive and 
both are motive forces behind the desire to change the arousal state, studies suggest that 
these two forms of pain are of different physiological origin, and as such they could be 
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detected as distinct physical experiences as soon as representational systems begin to 
cohere.   
The above experimental literature also supports a related point: an infant can 
distinguish between the physical feeling of understimulation and overstimulation.  
Because it would soon become apparent to the infant that the ways to relieve 
understimulation are very different from the ways to relieve overstimulation, one might 
assume that very early in development, the individual organizes arousal regulation 
strategies into two distinct groups based on two different goals: strategies that lead to 
increased stimulation and strategies that lead to decreased stimulation.  When set in the 
dyadic context, these would be clustered as strategies either to elicit/increase stimulation 
from the dyadic partner or to prevent/reduce stimulation from the dyadic partner.  
Regulatory successes and failures during attempts to organize such strategies, along with 
the concomitant cognitive processing and affective environmental cues, will color the 
affective correlates of disregulated arousal.  Thus, what start out as two distinct forms of 
pain give rise to two branches of negative affective experiences – for example, boredom, 
deadness, melancholy and longing in the case of underarousal, and feeling smothered, 
intruded upon, irritated, overwhelmed, panicked in the case of overarousal – as well as 
the wishes that accompany these feelings. 
At this point, it is important to emphasize an observation about representations 
that was central to Bowlby’s understanding of Internal Working Models of attachment.  
For Bowlby, Internal Working Models exist so that the individual can not only 
understand the environment, but can also go on to form strategies involving the 
environment in the successful pursuit of instinctual desires.  Bowlby emphasized that 
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Internal Working Models include probabilistic expectancies about the outcomes of 
various interpersonal strategies and scenarios.  Bowlby’s focus on outcomes can be seen 
as a logical extension of Sandler’s idea that representations contain wish-fulfilling 
scenarios.  Internal Working Models contain a variety of scenarios that may effect wish 
fulfillment, where each scenario is associated with some experience-based expectancy 
about outcome.  It is also important to note that shifts in affective experience could be 
linked to shifts in expectations about arousal outcomes in addition to the sensation of 
shifts in actual level of arousal or in baseline (desired) arousal.   
To summarize, this premise argues for a view of representations as the 
organization of self-object-affect-wish units into a range of self-object scenarios, where 
each scenario has a probabilistically associated arousal-state (and thus affect-modulating) 
outcome.  For convenience sake, these amalgamations of self-object-arousal/affect-wish-
scenarios-outcomes will be referred to as “Internal Models”.  They are similar to 
Bowlby’s Internal Working Models of attachment in that the models of interactions with 
regulating others involving probabilistic expectations of outcomes are derived from real 
experiences with caretakers.  It is mainly the emphasis on arousal regulation as the key 
correlate of motive that is different.  In Bowlby’s model, the affective wish component is 
derived from (and secondary to) a hypothesized primary proximity-maximizing instinct.  
In Sandler’s view, the motive force is the nourishing “feeling of safety” that comes from 
proximity to caretakers, from positive interactions with the environment, and from 
freedom from anxiety and from the bodily experiences commonly observed to be painful.  
By contrast, this premise argues for a view of arousal regulation as the foundation of the 
most primary force of all and can be viewed as an ontogenetic (and perhaps phylogenetic) 
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predecessor to the desire to maximize safety or proximity, and as such, the entire array of 
positive and negative affects would be founded on changes in arousal states. 
5. Transference phenomena can be understood as the manifestation of these “Internal 
Models” in interpersonal settings  
 
The above premises posit that early dyadic systems exist to regulate the infant’s 
level of arousal, and later, as the child’s cognitive abilities grow, dyadic systems regulate 
the level and quality of affects as well.  The strategies, techniques and heuristics that 
develop as part of those regulatory systems are stored as representations.  As Bowlby 
described, these representations cohere to constitute models useful in explaining and 
making predictions about regulatory outcomes in a variety of interpersonal contexts.  As 
development proceeds, the individual’s capacities change, and as real-world interaction 
with others continues, representations may incorporate and be shaped by new reality 
experiences.  On the other hand, successful adaptation to old environments may in some 
cases hinder subsequent adaptation to new, substantially different environments. 
Early classical theorists viewed transference as the patient’s defensive transfer 
toward the analyst of previously repressed impulses, where such impulses were too 
fraught with conflict to direct toward the original love object (e.g. Freud, 1915).  Thus, 
repression gives rise to the “repetition compulsion”: “The greater the resistance, the more 
extensively acting out (repetition) will be substituted for remembering (Freud, 1913b, p. 
150).  Such a definition implies the existence of an original internal model that is 
repressed and of another “compromise-formation” internal model that has been activated.  
Object relations, self psychology and attachment theorists would probably not view 
transference as necessarily a defense against forbidden or repressed impulses, but rather 
as a more general expression of the continuing influence of “organizing principles and 
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imagery that crystallized out of the patient’s early formative experiences” (Stolorow et 
al., 1987, p. 36).  In this more modern, broader definition of transference, the patient 
“assimilates” the analytic relationship to fit into a coherent preexisting representational 
system, where the original formative impulses, wishes and real experiences may or may 
not be repressed.  Boesky (1982) cited Loewald (1971), Weiss (1942) and Sandler (1970) 
to support this view that patient “acting out” is not necessarily a measure of the patient’s 
inability to consciously access memories. 
This latter, broader view of transference supports this fifth premise which implies 
that, in any given individual, some Internal Model is always active; thus there can always 
be identified some transferential aspect to an individual’s interpersonal transactions.  To 
be more explicit, if people are always motivated to regulate their own level of arousal and 
their affects, and if people always rely on Internal Models to guide their regulatory 
efforts, and if representations of self-in-interaction-with-other are always components of 
these Internal Models, then some particular Internal Model is always active in any 
interpersonal context.  Further, if all interpersonal transactions can be viewed as some 
sort of enactment of an activated Internal Model, then all enactments15 have an arousal- 
and affect-regulatory purpose.  This conception of transference and enactment is very 
similar to Sandler’s concept of “role actualization” (Sandler & Sandler, 1978).  As 
discussed, Sandler viewed every representation as having a wish component as well as 
self, object and interaction (i.e., role) components.  Accordingly, the patient is always 
attempting to actualize one of these roles by seeking to enact it with the analyst.   
6. Shifts in arousal states trigger shifts in the activated internal model 
                                                 
15 Here I use the broad meaning of “enactment”, i.e., as any interpersonal scenario 
initiated by a manifestation of transference.   
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Given that an Internal Model is always active in the therapeutic setting, and 
indeed in any interpersonal setting, it is clinically meaningful to ask “When does 
transference shift?” or in other words, “When is one Internal Model discarded in favor of 
another?”  Using the combined aspects of the representation theories of Kernberg, 
Sandler and Bowlby, I have posited that every Internal Model contains a wish component 
arising out of the individual’s current arousal state and that the wish component is linked 
to a number of scenario outcomes where each scenario has a range of outcomes 
associated probabilistically with it.  If these Internal Models cohere around core arousal 
experiences, then they are categorized in the mind of the individual first and foremost by 
the arousal attributes of the affective experience.  If it is true that there are only two basic 
groups of arousal (and thus affective) experiences, then there are likewise only two basic 
groups of Internal Models.16  It can then be argued that an expected or actual shift in the 
core affective experience (i.e., from positive to negative or from negative to positive) will 
cause the individual to abandon the Internal Model applied from one group in favor of an 
Internal Model from the other.   
If there are important sensory differences among, for example, the negative 
affective experiences, then distinct subgroups of negative-affect Internal Models may 
form at some early point in development.  In Premise 1, it was suggested that an 
algorithmic relationship exists between actual arousal level, “baseline” arousal level, and 
affect valence; several different arousal levels can all be identified as “negative” yet may 
                                                 
16 This is not to say that only one type of Internal Model must be active at one time.  It is 
possible for both to be activated, e.g., where there exists the risk of overstimulation and 
understimulation are both significant, and thus the affective experience at such a time 
would be complex and mixed.   
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also be experienced as qualitatively different, for example, gross underarousal as 
compared to mild underarousal or gross overarousal.  If such distinctions among these 
negative arousal states were sensed by the individual early enough in development, then 
early subcategories of Internal Models may have developed along those lines.  As 
described above, three affect categories of Internal Models would form: one for positive 
affect, a second for the negative affects produced by underarousal, and a third for the 
negative affects produced by overarousal.   
Given the represented relationship of arousal level to affect valence, an expected 
or actual shift in the physical arousal experience will consciously or unconsciously 
trigger a shift in the Internal Model that is active, as the individual attempts to apply the 
Internal Model’s strategies to regulate arousal and affect in the dyadic context.  Shifts in 
arousal and affective experience can be caused by a number of factors.  Steven Ellman 
(1998) has written that enactments (i.e., shifts in enactments) occur when “analytic trust” 
has either been disrupted or has not yet been firmly established.  As Ellman stated, 
premature interpretation can create a disruption in the patient’s sense of the therapist’s 
empathic attunement with the patient.  Such a disruption may be experienced as a loss of 
the therapist or as an intrusion by the therapist, and the disruption may shift the patient 
into the apprehension or actual experience of a negative affect state that would result 
from either an underaroused or overaroused state. 
Along these lines, any single bit of data received by the patient from the therapist  
e.g., a facial expression or some seemingly neutral comment by the therapist – can 
potentially cause the expectation or the actual experience of a disregulated, negative 
affect state.  The negative affect state may or may not be perceived by the patient to be 
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directly caused by the therapist.  Such perception depends on the patient’s past 
experience and level of reflectivity.  In such a case, the patient could expect or experience 
a shift from a regulated arousal state to a disregulated one, and at that moment, a different 
Internal Model would become activated as the patient seeks to reregulate arousal level 
and affect state.  When a different Internal Model is activated, it can be said that the 
transference shifts and a new enactment is manifested.   
However, it is important to emphasize that the transference paradigm can also 
shift based on information that has nothing to do with the therapist.  A patient’s affective 
state can be different from one session to the next based on the extra-therapy impact of 
outside information or events, transactions in other relationships or changes in life 
circumstances, etc.  If a patient is in one arousal/affect state at the end of one session and 
comes to the next session in a different arousal/affect state, then the patient will present 
with different regulatory wishes or motives in this second session.  The Internal Model 
applied in the dyadic context to actualize the resultant wishes may appear to be 
drastically different from the Internal Model active in the first session.   
7. Some Internal Models require the patient to induce negative affect in the other person 
to impel the other’s participation in the regulating scenario; manifestations of such 
scenarios emerge as provocative enactments 
 
Another way of stating this premise is that if patient-therapist scenarios emerge as 
provocative enactments, it can be inferred that the patient’s active Internal Model 
requires that the patient kindle negative affect in the dyad partner in order for the 
patient’s own successful affect regulation to take place; the goal in such cases would be 
either reconnection with or disconnection from the other.  The most important 
implication of this definition of provocative enactment is that regulation of arousal and 
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affect need not take place via scenarios where the patient elicits concerned, rescuing, 
soothing or empathic expressions by the therapist.  If the patient can provoke, e.g., angry 
or sadistic expressions by the therapist, successful regulation can possibly occur as well, 
if dyadic reconnection is the goal.  (Regulation can also take place if the therapist feels 
bored, confused, or overwhelmed, if dyadic disconnection is the goal.) 
As has been emphasized in previous sections, some provocative scenarios are 
triggered when the patient expects or experiences some form of underarousal, the 
negative affective correlates of which may mild or severe emptiness, loss, longing, 
sadness, deadness, etc.  The implication is that, at bottom, what the provocative patient 
hopes to elicit from the therapist in such cases is simply stimulation – a stimulating 
response that will have the effect of raising the patient’s arousal to a moderate level or at 
least reassure the patient that the risk of impending or continued understimulation, 
rejection, loss, etc., is significantly less than was first feared.  Unfortunately, the Internal 
Model that is active in these provocative enactments requires that the patient kindle 
negative affect in the therapist to elicit the therapist’s stimulating response.  As will be 
explored more fully in the next premise, these provocative Internal Models incorporate 
low expectations of success for those scenarios that involve the kindling of positive affect 
in the therapist; in other words, a high level of comfort with provocative scenarios 
reflects the expectation that non-provocative scenarios will not yield the best-regulating 
outcome.   
To restate, when reparative provocative scenarios are manifested, the most 
important part of the actualized scenario is the activation of the therapist by the patient’s 
provocative gestures: the therapist is activated, the therapist then provides stimulus or 
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reassuring information to the patient, and through receipt of such stimulus or information, 
the patient shifts out of the negative affect state associated with underarousal.  It is the 
kindling of underarousal affects that makes this sort of patient want to provoke the dyadic 
other into producing more or “better” stimulus.  An interesting implication is that the 
stimulus that is received by the patient that increases arousal (or reassurance that future 
underarousal risk is reduced) is sufficient for affect regulation even in those cases where 
the stimulus the patient receives back from the therapist appears to be painful stimulus.    
8. When individuals implement reparative provocative scenarios, it can be inferred that 
the associated internal models were indeed the best-regulating models at the time the 
models were formed 
 
Individuals who implement scenarios involving the kindling of negative affects in 
the dyad partner do so because such interpersonal scenarios indeed yielded the best 
affect-regulating outcomes in earlier times when the Internal Model was formed; 
moreover, those particular Internal Models are still believed by the patient to yield the 
most successful affect-regulating outcomes.  Implicit in this statement is that all other 
gestures by the patient to dyadic partners in the past tended to produce (and, in the 
patient’s mind, may continue to produce) poorer outcomes.  These other gestures are all 
associated with scenarios having a higher risk for outcomes that are ineffectively-
regulating or disregulating.  Any apprehension that these poorer-regulating scenarios may 
become actualized will make the patient anxious, and this anxiety is directly 
proportionate to the degree of disregulation feared.  Thus, this anxiety – based on the 
feared return of bad outcomes of the past – will limit the patient’s ability to attempt, 
consider or even entertain in consciousness scenarios involving successful applications of 
these other solutions to regulation problems in the future.  It might even be that the 
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degree of anxiety in such cases is directly proportional to the poor “expected value” of 
the worse-regulating scenario: the more likely the regulatory failure of the scenario seems 
to be, the more anxiety will be associated with the idea of the scenario’s actualization; 
likewise, the more extreme the regulatory failure associated with that scenario, the more 
anxiety will be associated with the idea of the scenario’s actualization.  As will be 
discussed in the “clinical implications” section that follows, the patient’s contemporary 
beliefs about the likelihood and degree of regulatory failure for any given set of Internal 
Models may or may not be accurate.   
The points made in the above paragraph are not controversial per se.  When 
applied to provocative scenarios that are connection-destructive, few would dispute that 
the represented scenarios are derived from past experiences of dyadic connection in the 
context of particular arousal and affect parameters that led to bad outcomes.  Perhaps 
overstimulating outcomes and affects are implicated, so disconnection is the outcome 
sought and inducing pain in the other is one way to achieve it.  However, it is less 
commonly argued that the best way for some people to regulate underarousal and its 
associated affects is to kindle negative affects in someone else.  Yet there undoubtedly 
exists some subset of parents who become the most reliable, predictable and successful 
regulators when the child elicits a negative affective response from them.  As suggested 
previously, with such parents, subtle shifts in the child’s affective expression may not be 
responded to; the child’s attempt to elicit friendly engagement as a way to achieve 
successful regulation may too often lead to rejection, humiliation or in any case, to bad 
regulatory outcomes; the simple, direct expression of need and unedited affect may carry 
the same risks.  In such cases, the child may be able to actualize a well-regulating 
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scenario most predictably and most successfully by making the parent feel guilty, angry, 
ashamed, irritated or frightened.   
Reference was made above to “other gestures” that had proven to be more risky 
for the patient to make when the patient experienced underaroused negative-affect states.  
As a general matter, these other ways to remedy underarousal and its associated affects 
can fall into two groups.  The first can be called direct, explicit, undefended expressions 
of the need for affiliation and attunement, and this group would include all forms of 
straightforward expressions of desire for a pleasurable, comforting, intimate connection 
with the dyadic other.  An important element of the direct gesture is the unfiltered 
expression of the affects associated with actual or anticipated disregulation of arousal.  
Direct gestures include explicit expressions of desire for dependence, nurturance and 
soothing, as well as active expressions of fondness and caring for the other.  These 
gestures would not be described as “provocative”: although the patient is trying to get 
something from the therapist, one would not expect such expressions to kindle negative 
affects in the analyst, nor would one think the patient would expect it.  Some of these 
gestures could be termed “seductive”, and some of them would probably considered to be 
expressions of “positive transference” or the undefended expression of desire for 
intimacy and support from the analyst.  
The second group of solutions to underarousal can be called self-regulating 
behaviors.  Such behaviors are not gestures; they are not meant as communications to an 
other with the desire that the other react.  Just the opposite, attempts to self-regulate in 
response to an underaroused affect state imply that the patient has little confidence in any 
dyadic affect-regulation strategy as a way to shift out of that state.  Rather, past 
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experience has created the expectation that any gestures to the object would either elicit 
nothing useful (and therefore lead to continued understimulation), or lead to a response so 
excessively stimulating that the patient would shift into an overaroused state.  Given such 
experiences, detaching from the dyad and implementing a purely self-regulating scenario 
is most likely to lead to the best-regulated outcome.  Such behaviors would have both a 
self-stimulating and a dyad-detaching quality.  For example, they may appear to be 
“attacks on linking” (Bion, 1959) through the presentation of vague, disconnected or 
idiosyncratic thoughts or speech, or the communication of information that is meaningful 
or interesting only to the patient, through denial of negative affect, or through denying or 
actively devaluing the analyst’s potential regulatory impact on the patient’s negative 
affect.  Such devaluation can range from the subtly dismissive (where there exists a 
representation of a neglectful ineffectual object), for example, by adopting the “manic 
defense” to ward off depressive anxiety (Klein, 1940) to the openly disdainful, rageful 
and destructive (in the case of a representation of an actively withholding or frustrating 
object); in either case, there is both a detaching and a self-stimulating aspect.  Similarly, 
the schizoid patient’s expression of intense interest in and overvaluation of his own 
internal processes and creative products might serve the same function. 
The disconnecting behaviors in this latter category might indeed lead the therapist 
to experience negative affect and to react to it.  Or to otherwise view it as a connection-
destructive provocative strategy.  In one sense, such behavior can be called “provocative” 
because it would seem so obviously obnoxious to the dyad partner; in another sense, 
calling it “provocative” is not quite apt because the patient is not trying to provoke the 
therapist into doing anything and because the patient’s activated affect-regulating Internal 
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Model does not include a scenario that requires any affective experience in the dyad 
partner, negative or otherwise.  Self-regulating scenarios require the absence of 
involvement of a dyad partner.  Although activation of such scenarios might have a de-
activating impact on the therapist, it might also be highly frustrating for the therapist, 
depending in part on the therapist’s temperament and needs.  In any case, it is important 
for the therapist to think carefully about the patient’s goal in devaluating the therapeutic 
connection and attempting to disengage the therapist.  Devaluing comments made with 
the expectation that the comment will elicit an energetic response have quite a different 
clinical meaning from devaluation as a way to disconnect from the therapist and to 
“inflate” the self independently.  Likewise, disengagement sought as a way to elicit 
pursuit must be distinguished from disengagement sought because engagement is 
worrisome to the patient. 
When a patient implements a provocative scenario to regulate underarousal and 
the related negative affects, it can be inferred that the patient’s past experiences, as 
represented in Internal Models, justify greater confidence in provocative strategies to 
produce affect regulation, as compared either to direct gestures or to self-regulation 
strategies.  Given such experiences, the latter two strategies can be said to be so fraught 
with conflict and anxiety that the patient cannot or will not apply these non-provocative 
strategies.   
Strategies to regulate arousal and affect, and attachment classification 
If arousal regulation strategies can be identified as one of three subtypes –  
(1) explicit/direct, (2) indirect/connection-reparative, (3) self-regulating/connection-
destructive – then one might wonder whether a particular strategy might be characteristic 
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of a particular attachment category.  As described earlier, the Strange Situation studies 
present the child with an experience of decreased stimulation and loss – the initial 
separation from the parent – followed by a reunion and the potential to renew the parental 
connection as a source of stimulation, soothing, etc.  These sorts of studies have yielded 
inferences about mothers’ differential reactions to their children’s affects and behaviors 
among attachment categories (described in literature review Section A), and about the 
way such reactions translate into the children’s affective expressions and attachment 
behaviors.  One might speculate about the relationship between attachment classification 
and preference of regulation strategy, as follows: 
a. Anxious-resistant pattern and regulation strategies 
Recall that parents of these children are unpredictably and insensitively 
responsive to the child’s bids for comfort, more disengaged from and less responsive to 
crying, discouraging of autonomy, and unresponsive or unavailable in free play.  
However, in contrast to parents of avoidant children, they are not physically or verbally 
rejecting (Ainsworth et al., 1971, 1978; Cassidy & Berlin, 1994); rather, their 
responsiveness is merely impaired.  The affects conveyed by the child seem to have 
varying impacts on the parent, spurring the parent to act (or perhaps overreact) on some 
occasions, but overwhelming the parent into inactivity at other times.  Resistant children 
seem to have adopted a strategy of exaggerating attachment behaviors as the only way to 
elicit the comforting or protective parental responses that the child desires (Main & Hess, 
1990).   
It would not be hard to draw an association between unpredictable or insensitive 
caretaking and bids for attachment that feature the exaggerated affective displays 
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characteristic of insecure-resistant children.  Among such children, one might expect a 
good deal of reliance on the connection-reparative provocative strategies that have been 
the subject of this dissertation.  One must presume that the unpredictability and 
insensitivity of the parents are overcome by the child’s exaggerated affective displays; 
otherwise it seems unlikely that the resistant response to loss would be so stable and 
unyielding.  Parents of resistant children have been shown to have lower reflective 
function than parents of securely attached children (Fonagy et al., 1991; Slade, 2005), 
and thus would manifest a lower degree of empathy and interest in the child’s mental 
states.  One might suspect that these parents wait to become well-regulating caretakers 
until their child’s expressions of disregulation simply become too noisome or painful for 
the parent to tolerate; those expressions, however, seem to dependably push the parent 
into action as a predictable and effective reregulator.  But when these parents are 
presented with more measured gestures or subtle signs that the child is just beginning to 
become disregulated, they probably respond ineffectively (i.e., by being underresponsive, 
misresponsive or overstimulating).  With a parent like that, the child’s attempt to get 
dyadic affect regulation through direct, measured gestures or through genuine verbal or 
affective appeals to the parent’s empathy will probably yield poorer, or at best, more 
unpredictable outcomes; to the child, this strategy will be cognized as a high-risk 
strategy, as compared to the more predictably effective connection-reparative provocative 
strategy.   
One can imagine that these insensitive or erratic parents would allow their infants 
to lapse into highly disregulated states a greater percent of the time, as compared with 
parents of the children with the other attachment styles.  When such disregulation-
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reregulation scenarios are played out repeatedly, there might form in the infant’s mind a 
representation of the entire cycle of the scenario from the beginning disregulation through 
to its reregulating outcome.  This is a somewhat tortuous regulatory scenario, yet the 
infant would probably store it on some level as part of a coherent, single model.  We 
might speculate that, as the infant develops cognitively, the infant’s reflexive production 
of disregulated behaviors might be co-opted as the child becomes more instrumentally-
capable, and these behaviors might be actively implemented in emulation of the extreme 
disregulated state.  Or if not in emulation, there might be some process by which the child 
stirs up an actual disregulated state for instrumental means.  In any case, the resistant 
child has learned, on some level, to automatically exaggerate the level of disregulation to 
effectively engage the parent. 
One can further speculate about the causes for this parent’s characteristic inability 
to attune to a well-regulated child.  Some parents might be made anxious by the 
independence and curiosity of a well-regulated child, i.e., the child’s relative lack of need 
of the parent.  A depressed, substance-abusing or chronically fatigued parent may “come-
to-life” as an effective caretaker only after a great deal of agitation on the infant’s part.  A 
parent who is made anxious for whatever reason by the parenting role itself might be 
similarly disconnected.  In all these cases, the parent may not be attuned, e.g., to a baby 
in quiet wakefulness, but may nonetheless be effective at soothing the baby if it is 
overaroused or cranky. 
b. Anxious-avoidant pattern and regulation strategies 
Recall that these parents are made anxious by the child’s affective life (and 
especially by the attachment-related affects and behaviors) and thus try to avoid the 
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experience of it because it is too painful (Main, 1985).  As a result, they do not construct 
a responsive relationship featuring genuine affective engagement, freedom in play rather 
than parental control, and effective soothing of their children during times of stress; 
rather, they are actively rejecting of attachment overtures (Ainsworth et al., 1971, 1978).  
Their children adapt by avoiding attachment behavior, and instead tend to produce 
indifferent, autonomous behavior and untroubled affective expressions; in interaction, 
both mother and child appear to act in concert to avoid affective engagement (Lyons-
Ruth, 1991).  Avoidant-pattern children appear very independent, and though internally 
disregulated after separations, they do not appear to register feelings of loss.  Rather, they 
divert their attention, continue active exploration while the parent is gone, and are equally 
friendly to an unfamiliar adult as they were to the parent.  On the parent’s return, these 
children provide little acknowledgement in response and tend to avert their gaze when the 
parent enters. 
If parents of resistant children are poor at maintaining the child in a well-
regulated state but are good at reregulating the child after it becomes very disregulated, 
then parents of avoidant children are just the opposite: they can maintain a good 
connection with the child so long as the child is in a well regulated arousal/affect state, is 
able to rely on exploration instincts while keeping attachment impulses inhibited.  
However, as described, these parents cannot tolerate their child’s attachment-related  
affects.  When coping with separation, loss and reunion aspects of the Strange Situation, 
avoidant children have been described as independent and calm and friendly in 
presentation.  This behavior suggests that they have a great deal of faith in self-
regulating, connection-destructive strategies, and less faith in explicit/direct strategies 
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and connection-reparative provocative strategies.  In fact, studies have shown that 
avoidant children tune-out mother’s gestures, initiate fewer interactions, and instead 
implement mostly self-regulation strategies (e.g., Tronick, 1989).   
In contrast to resistant children, avoidant children do not believe that their highly 
disregulated states can be effectively managed in a dyadic context.  One might expect 
that any overtures which reflect their disregulated state will elicit parental reactions that 
are underresponsive, misresponsive, or overarousing.  One can further speculate about the 
causes for such parental inability to attune to a disregulated child.  It would not be 
surprising for a parent with a dismissive adult attachment style to be made anxious, angry 
or frightened by the child’s strong expressions of under- or overarousal; after all, these 
parents are made anxious, angry or frightened by their own affective experiences of 
disregulation.  Or the parent, though not necessarily dismissive, may nonetheless be 
mainly interested in the pleasing or “ego-boosting” expressions or qualities of the child.  
These parents might be enraged by or ashamed of any other of the child’s expressions, 
perhaps being narcissistically injured by evidence that the child is disregulated and thus 
inferring that their child is not a “perfect” child or that they are not “perfect” parents. 
One might imagine that an avoidant infant was left mostly to self-sooth, relying 
on whatever reflexive, homeostatic mechanisms of its own to effect reregulation.  To 
such an infant, reregulation may be sensed as happening in some diffuse, global way, but 
not as the result of any affectively-engaged interaction with a real-world caretaker.  In 
fact, interactions with a caretaker may have actually interfered with the progress of 
efforts to self-regulate, in effect prolonging and perhaps exacerbating the disregulated 
state.  During those times when disregulation takes place while the parent is present, the 
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infant will learn to produce behaviors that emulate the infant’s well-regulated behaviors, 
because those behaviors will bring out what is most helpful or least harmful from the 
parent.  In the same way that resistant children have co-opted their reflexive disregulated 
behavior to create a tool by which they can manage their parents, so too have avoidant 
children learned (consciously or unconsciously) to suppress disregulated behaviors and 
emulate a well-regulated state as a way to manage their parents so that the parents will 
not hinder the child’s efforts to self-regulate. 
E. Theoretical implications 
The literature review section on representations explored the views of classical 
analytic, object relations and attachment theories, as well as the research involving infant 
affective and cognitive development.  This dissertation proposes a particular 
configuration of Internal Models that is implicated in provocative responses to 
underarousal and its associated affects.  This proposed approach incorporates the idea 
inherent in object relations and attachment theories that representational systems emerge 
from the vicissitudes of innate motivational systems as the child develops cognitively and 
affectively in the context of early relationships with caregivers.  Included is Bowlby’s 
(1969) idea that representational systems are more adaptive if goal-correction is not 
merely based on immediate real-time data but also based on accurate predictions about 
likely future events.  With such system, the individual can assess, internally and ahead of 
time, the likely outcomes that would be contingent on the behavioral choices available.  
The proposed approach to the development of representations from simple to complex is 
a commonly accepted one among both analytic theorists and infant researchers; for 
example, Blatt has written that representational systems become “increasingly accurate, 
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articulated and conceptually complex” over the course of developments.  “[H]igher levels 
of representation evolve from and extend lower levels; thus new representational modes 
are increasingly more comprehensive and effective than earlier modes... 
[Representations] can range from global, diffuse, fragmentary, and inflexible to 
increasingly differentiated, flexible, and hierarchically organized” (Blatt & Levy, 2003, 
pp. 121-122). 
The proposed approach also incorporates some qualities shared by drive theory: it 
hypothesizes that a homeostatic, energic control system, and the bodily experience of this 
system, is at the root of affective experience and at the core of the representational 
system.  This approach to the development of representations has two advantages over 
existing relational and attachment models.  Boesky (1983) criticized the early Sandler 
model (Sandler and Rosenblatt, 1962) and especially the Jacobson (1964)/Kernberg 
model (1976, 1982) of representation-formation as lacking an account of any overarching 
guiding force: “[they describe] the reified self- and object representations undergoing all 
kinds of amalgamations and regrouping without much discussion of the organizing 
influence of unconscious fantasy in forming these self- and object subsystems (p. 577)”.  
The organizing force for which Boesky would like these theorists to account is the drive 
system.  Boesky is not unreasonable in his request since the authors of both these models 
claim to have founded them in drive theory.  It is one of the benefits of the proposed 
approach that it does present an overarching guiding force in the formation of 
representation systems, which force includes deeply-rooted, primary wishes and 
fantasies.  It is another benefit that this approach need not be reconciled with drive and 
structural constructs; one can simply describe the primary motive force as the desire to 
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regulate arousal and the affects that arousal states engender.  Drive theory could exist 
coextensively with the theoretical approach proposed, although it is outside the scope of 
this dissertation to describe how such an integration might be accomplished. 
The role of unconscious fantasy in the proposed approach should also be 
addressed.  Most living organisms show biologically-based approach and withdrawal 
behaviors in response to system variation.  However, psychology is concerned with the 
study of “the mind” of the human being, and thus with the mental manifestations of 
regulation of physiological states.  In the motivational system proposed, physiological 
regulation of arousal states creates in the “mind” the motivating “wish” or “desire” to 
maintain a moderate arousal state.  Likewise, disregulated arousal states create the wish 
or desire to obliterate or shift out of the present arousal-state.  Such wishes, in their 
earliest form, are one-person, passive wishes set in no temporal or historical context, and 
other animals may in fact have “minds” in which such wishes exist as well.  However, in 
human infants, many analytic theories suggest that this motive system is represented as 
polarized mental images of an all-good state and an all-bad state, and so the proposed 
theoretical approach does not differ from these widely accepted concepts, e.g., as 
reflected in Kleinian theory and the Jacobson/Kernberg models.  As infants advance 
cognitively, and as they develop some concept of cause-and-effect relationships and a 
sense of goal-oriented action, such ideas might possibly be represented in the mind as an 
all-good object and the wish to merge with it and maintain it, and as an all-bad other and 
the wish to obliterate it.  All such wishes can exist in the proposed system as unconscious 
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fantasy17.  However, because the proposed theory does not attempt to address motives 
that are associated with the drives, there has not been identified a role for drive-
determined discharge fantasies, i.e., fantasies of how sexual and aggressive energies 
might be discharged. 
As mentioned, Internal Models are organized around the apprehension or 
detection of changes in the patient’s own arousal state.  Each Internal Model has 
associated with it a scenario designed to produce an affect-regulating outcome.  Although 
a given scenario has a number of outcomes associated with it, it may be that the scenario 
associated with the best affect-regulating outcome is more conscious than the scenarios 
associated with more poorly regulating, more painful outcomes.  Nonetheless, memories 
of failed scenarios and poor outcomes must be stored so that these outcomes might be 
avoided18; one might suspect that memories of these painful outcomes are defended 
against and thus less available to consciousness (because the memories of disregulation 
are too painful to be held in consciousness).  The proposed approach incorporates the 
idea that the mind implements defenses as mechanisms to minimize or eliminate the 
experience of negative affects (e.g., Brenner, 1982), specifically those affects associated 
with the recollection of experiences of the affects associated with disregulated arousal.  
These negative affects can be kindled when interpersonal cues cause the individual to 
                                                 
17 See also Sandler (2003/1995): “The homeostatic, balancing functions of the phantasies 
... are directed toward the doing away with unpleasure and the gaining of pleasure... as 
well as safety and reassurance... and in particular bring about intrapsychic adaptation 
through the use of various mechanisms of defense and the creation of dialogues with 
phantasy objects rooted in childhood introjects” (pp. 23-24). 
18 See Bowlby’s review of a number of studies, discussed in Separation (1972), that 
suggests his belief that internal working models cohere into two, horizontally split 
models: (i) a conscious model of the caregiver as “good”, where painful interactions are 
caused by “bad” aspects of the self, and (ii) an unconscious model containing the hated or 
disappointing qualities of the caregiver. 
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anticipate or experience worse-regulating scenarios or failed outcomes.  Such “bad” 
scenarios may be dealt with defensively via repression, denial, reaction formation, 
projection, etc. (although something akin to signal anxiety may result when the patient is 
reminded of these scenarios.)  These defenses serve to block the negative affect 
associated with conscious awareness that a failed outcome is actually materializing or 
that a disregulating scenario is playing out.  Such defended-against scenarios and 
outcomes could still exist unconsciously as futile good fantasies and related unconscious 
bad fantasies, comprised of feared (rather than wished-for) outcomes.   
F. Clinical Interventions 
 
It can easily be argued that Cuadli invoked withdrawal or disconnecting gestures 
to meet different goals at different times, or to pursue seemingly opposing goals at the 
same time.  As discussed, there were times in which he felt that sharing himself with 
others would open himself up to rejection and loss.  At such times, his desire to create 
distance between himself and other was intended to protect himself from loss and protect 
the other from the destructive effects of exposure to his bad qualities.  Similarly, Cuadli 
had also conveyed that staying connected with others required that he present a false self 
and/or keep the “bad” parts of him hidden; Cuadli implied that there were times when he 
withdrew simply because it was too draining to keep constructing this sort of 
presentation.  Cuadli was certainly sensitive to rejection and loss, and was vigilant for 
signs that he was being judged poorly by others; he may have attempted to create 
distance as a way to preempt the rejection by others that he often felt was imminent.  So 
there were probably times when his desire to keep others at bay was evident and 
straightforward: he did not want to “elude” them as a way to goad them into chasing after 
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to him; rather, he really wanted them farther away because he feared the destructive 
consequences of his connection to them and the pain of abandonment that would 
inevitably follow.  However, there is no reason why both goals – connection-destructive 
and connection-reparative – might not have been on occasion operating simultaneously.  
The fear of rejection and the wish for acceptance are not mutually exclusive.  Each might 
wax and wane, e.g., in proportion to Cuadli’s self-loathing or self-pride. 
In constructing a view of the interventions of choice associated with traditional 
analytic theories, it must be acknowledged that most psychodynamic practitioners would 
use a combination of transference interpretation and empathic reflection as part of their 
clinical technique.  Most would acknowledge the importance of the therapeutic alliance 
and the crucial fundamental task of building the patient’s trust gradually over time.  
Moreover, most practitioners would try to come to some sort of position, in consultation 
with the patient, as to the sort of change that would alleviate the patient’s suffering and 
improve functioning.  In Cuadli’s case, he first came for treatment because he was 
depressed and lonely to quite an acute degree.  However, by the time the treatment 
actually started, it was clear that Cuadli was having some discomfort in his interpersonal 
relationships, especially the more intimate ones.  He felt that others would judge him and 
treat him poorly or that others would treat him callously and exploitively; moreover, he 
tended to judge himself harshly, which reinforced his expectation that others would 
abandon him once they experienced a real connection with him.  Yet at the same time, it 
was clear that Cuadli deeply wanted to be connected with others; his dread of loss 
confirms the intensity of his desire.  It is outside the scope of this dissertation to survey 
thoroughly the views of therapeutic change associated with different schools of theory. 
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That being said, I will try to describe the interventions in Cuadli’s case that might be 
chosen by clinicians of different psychoanalytic orientations. 
1. Interventions indicated by traditional theories 
Classical theorists, including ego psychologists, might view the therapeutic goal 
as the strengthening of the ego.  They would identify Cuadli’s problematic withdrawal 
behaviors as a conflict involving Cuadli’s aggressive wishes, his sexual wishes and the 
superego.  Certainly Cuadli would acknowledge that his aggressive impulses were very 
troublesome to him.  When they were stirred, Cuadli feared their destructive impact (thus 
these impulses conflicted with his desire for affiliation); moreover, he probably felt 
unable to modulate those feelings and, overwhelmed with anxiety, he had difficulty 
bringing about satisfactory resolution of the events which kindled his aggression, 
implying some impairment in ego function.  Thus, classical theorists might interpret 
along these lines.  It is not clear how much of these conflicts really took place on an 
unconscious level; Cuadli seemed quite aware of a good deal of this material, although he 
had great difficulty talking about it because it made him so anxious.  Therefore, 
exploration of the transference would not really be in service of “making the unconscious 
conscious” – one of the classical goals – but rather would help in strengthening his ego: 
by enabling Cuadli to talk more and more about the aggression that made him anxious, he 
would be able to tolerate the anxiety better (especially once he would see that his 
aggression did not produce the destructive effect he feared), and he would develop the 
skills to be able to convey his thoughts better and negotiate interpersonal solutions more 
effectively.  Exploration of the erotic transference would likewise improve anxiety 
tolerance; Cuadli’s fear that his expression of need or desire would be destructive 
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likewise induced great anxiety.  By encouraging discussion about this transference, 
anxiety tolerance would improve, and problematic actions based on primitive fantasies 
and fears might give way to more realistic, modulated transactions with people.  
Empathic attunement is seen as important because the ego apparatus can best develop in a 
context where primitive wishes per se do not lead to destructive outcomes, and so the risk 
of object loss is lowered, leading to a greater feeling of safety and improved anxiety 
tolerance. 
Practitioners of the British Object Relations school might make interpretations 
that frame the central conflict as a depressive-position conflict – how to love without 
destroying by hate.   In this view, the treatment should provide a place where the patient 
can experiment with the experience of love without his hate actually destroying anything.  
There were also signs that Cuadli felt his needs would be overwhelming to others, and 
therefore he would also be grappling with the problem of how to love without destroying 
by love.  Encouraging the patient to be able to reflect specifically on these conflicts 
would be important; just as important, the therapist has to be able to tolerate the patient’s 
aggression and/or overwhelming level of need without being destroyed, i.e., without the 
therapist-patient connection being unduly disrupted or left unrepaired.  Likewise, a 
therapist influenced by Bion would make special efforts to “metabolize” the patient’s 
anxiety, i.e., not to simply resonate with it to the same (or greater) degree that the patient 
feels it, but rather to resonate with it less, while providing for the patient explicit 
language, affective constructs and cause-and-effect explanations so that the patient can 
better understand and cope with his anxiety.   
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The central conflict may also be framed squarely in terms of the “schizoid 
dilemma” (Guntrip, 1969).  This construct describes the schizoid individual’s constant 
oscillation between the two poles of affiliation and alienation: although the schizoid 
individual has a desire for human connection, there is also a fear that connection 
necessitates a dystonic self-devaluation or loss of true self; but while withdrawal from 
human connection removes the emotional burden of suppressing true-self in favor of 
false-self, such withdrawal also stirs an intense loneliness and anxiety associated with the 
disconnection from humanity, social reality and the potential for social validation.  Thus, 
the schizoid individual is constantly and uncomfortably buffeted between these two 
poles, driven from each to the other as the anxiety associated with existence at a given 
pole becomes too great.  Indeed, Cuadli found this construct an apt and pithy account of 
his difficulty with individual relationships and his own functioning within the constraints 
of social norms, which norms Cuadli often railed against.  The central conflict can be 
framed as one that exists between his ability to accept and foster his true-self and his 
ability to affiliate; to Cuadli, the achievement of one necessarily connoted the sacrifice of 
the other.  From this perspective, the treatment should provide a place where Cuadli can 
find empathy with, and respect for, the contents of his true self, such that he would 
become confident that he could maintain human connection without an enormous 
sacrifice of self.   
The focus on the articulation and acceptance of Cuadli’s true self could also be 
found in the approach of self psychologists.  They might say that Cuadli’s problems in 
social functioning are rooted in his variable and easily undermined self-esteem.  Self 
psychologists might infer that Cuadli experienced a deficit in the mirroring selfobject 
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function.  They would find the schizoid dilemma an apt construct, but might refine it to 
say that his desire for social connection is not a general one, but rather a specific need to 
connect with those who could serve the mirroring selfobject function he needs – the 
provision of admiration, approval, respect, empathy, and the ability to be tolerate and 
support those times when Cuadli’s sense of self is inflated.  By the same token, failure of 
this selfobject function when sought would fill Cuadli with an intense feeling of shame 
and the resultant narcissistic rage.  As discussed, this rage (i.e., aggression) is quite 
frightening to Cuadli, both in the experience of it and in the feared destructive 
consequences.  A self psychologist would say that Cuadli was loath to create social 
connections and was quick to dissolve them because he perceived the risk of selfobject 
failure, shame and resultant rage to be very high.  In addition to interpreting along these 
lines, the self psychologist would work to provide the mirroring that Cuadli needed, 
making sure to address and alleviate any feelings of shame that Cuadli might experience 
in the transference, and to respect and tolerate the rage that would inevitably arise from 
those feelings of shame. 
In Kernberg’s approach, focus is placed on building reflectivity in the patient 
about the specific problematic transference dynamics that may be at work in the 
therapeutic setting.  This emphasis can be described as one approach to the strengthening 
of the patient’s ego apparatus.  Central to this approach is an articulation of the self- and 
object representation at play, as well as the affects experienced by the scenario 
participants and a subsequent explicit exploration of the role relationships constructed in 
the active Internal Model.  In Cuadli’s case, one Internal Model might be comprised of a 
weak, disappointing self, a judgmental and rejecting other, where the rejection would 
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inevitably result, and shame and rage would follow.  Another scenario might be 
comprised of a hungry, needy, devouring self, and a smothered, overwhelmed other, 
where abandonment would inevitably result, and shame and rage would follow.  Yet 
another might consist of a vulnerable, “longing” self, a selfish, exploitive other, where 
exploitation and abandonment would inevitably result, and shame and rage would follow.  
Given any manifestations of these transference scenarios in the treatment or outside, the 
Kernbergian therapist would foster the patient’s ability to reflect on the contents of the 
self- and object representations and the linking affective experience, eventually moving 
on to reflect on these transferences as such by steadily reminding the patient that he is 
experiencing what is, in fact, transference phenomena.  As the therapy proceeds, the 
therapist might draw connections between contemporary transference manifestations and 
original interpersonal scenarios that gave rise to these transference models; such 
interpretations are often effective in vitiating the affective charge of the contemporary 
manifestation of the transference and in strengthening the patient’s ability to reflect on 
the transference and its precipitants rather than enact it. 
Clinicians who adopt Bowlby’s theories of motivation might simply note that as 
anxiety levels increase – specifically, anxiety about loss – the exploration motive 
diminishes and the secure-base/proximity motive increases.  This is another way of 
saying that elevated anxiety impairs the ability to go out into the environment, meet 
challenges posed by the environment and solve problems.  Elevated anxiety encourages 
the patient’s withdrawal from the environment and his return to whatever the patient 
identifies as a secure base.  Some patients, such as Cuadli, may not feel that secure base 
properties can be counted on from people.  Rather than seeking emotional support and 
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“recharging” from people, some patients may instead attempt to self-regulate as a way of 
modulating their anxiety.  Such self-regulation can take the form of “self-medication” 
(i.e., food/drug/alcohol abuse) or withdrawal into independent or solipsistic activity of 
varying levels of functionality.  In such cases, interpretations may be made along these 
lines.  Likewise, interpretations about the transference would highlight the expected 
failure that might occur should the patient rely on the clinician to help modulate the 
patient’s anxiety states.   
Recall that Bowlby viewed aggression and anger by the patient in the transference 
as replications of the angry or hostile treatment of the child by the parent, or it may 
reflect that patient’s lingering, unextinguished resentment toward parental victimization, 
exploitation, frustration or neglect.  Such anger and anxiety result from frustration of the 
child’s need for ongoing care and parental availability, and therefore, interpretations 
along these lines would be indicated.  Bowlby recognized that experiences of separation 
and loss in the treatment are significant transference triggers.  In Cuadli’s case, vacation, 
illness and other scheduled or unscheduled breaks, or the therapist’s perceived emotional 
unavailability or potential to be rejecting, should be carefully examined for their 
relationship to Cuadli’s withdrawal or perceived disconnection behavior.  As would be 
the case in most of the theoretical contexts described above, provision by the therapist of 
empathy, respect, “metabolism” of the patient’s anxiety and hostility, and efforts to repair 
disruptions in the alliance are considered mutative.  Such measures would help change 
the patient’s expectations about interpersonal outcomes, i.e., they would help alter the 
patient’s Internal Working Models such that he could have faith in those scenarios that 
modulate his anxiety without requiring withdrawal from the interpersonal field.    
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2. Clinical contributions of the proposed theory 
As discussed, Cuadli’s withdrawal behaviors could have been implemented as a 
way to destroy connections, but also could have been intended to further the repair of 
connections by spurring the other to initiate such repair.  I have argued that the 
provocative scenario as means to dispel a sense of loss is the enactment of choice only 
when experience has taught the actor that other means of eliciting stimulation and 
repairing disconnections will not be as effective as the provocative gestures.  I have 
grouped the other means of regulating arousal into two categories: direct gestures, which 
rely on direct, explicit expressions of need and depictions of affect to an other, and self-
regulatory measures, which are meant to exclude participation by an other.  Thus, where 
problematic provocative enactments are manifested, the therapist might at some point 
explore the patient’s feelings about each of the three methods of regulating arousal and 
the affects related to loss.   
However, it first must be established that the provocative patterns in question 
have been problematic for the patient.  Exploration of any particular transference pattern 
will be seen by the patient as useful only when the patient believes that there might be 
some connection between the pattern in question and the patient’s life problems.  Next, it 
must be established that there is some nexus between the enactments in question and 
experienced or anticipated underarousal and its associated affects – specifically, that the 
feelings states preceded the enactments.  It can then be hypothesized that the enactments 
were implemented with the belief that the actualization of those scenarios would change 
the feeling states.  In other words, once a problematic action pattern has been identified, 
one must ask what sorts of situations and feelings immediately preceded the action 
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pattern, and then suggest that the latter might have precipitated the former.  Given that an 
anticipated or actual sense of underarousal and loss preceded the provocative actions, it 
might then be useful to explore the patient’s feelings about each of the three methods of 
regulating underarousal affect states.   
One might ask at this juncture, how does the therapist determine which regulatory 
strategy or strategies are in effect at any given point in time?  More specifically, how can 
one tell when a gesture that feels provocative is meant to serve a connection-reparative 
versus connection-destructive function?  To answer this question, more basic questions 
must be addressed: how does the therapist know that a given transference scenario is 
being played out?  What sort of evidence is required before the therapist can draw a 
conclusion or at least go forward with a construct that is clinically useful?  How much 
certainty does the therapist need to possess before a helpful clinical intervention can be 
made?  Indeed, many clinicians might say that relevant transference metaphors are co-
constructed in a dialogic process, so that it is clinically sufficient for the therapist simply 
to suggest that a certain line of thought about transference be reflected upon and 
discussed.  In other words, it is not necessary (and indeed, it might be impossible) for the 
therapist to “know” anything for sure in order to provide a useful clinical intervention. 
That being said, the literature review section covering representations provides 
support for a view of the representational schema underlying any given transference 
scenario as an agglomeration of representations of (i) self, (ii) object, (iii) arousal state 
and its concomitant affect, (iv) role relationships, and (v) expectancies about the various 
arousal-modulating and affect-regulating outcomes possible in the actualization of the 
transference scenario.  Exploration of any of these components will yield some evidence 
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about the affective goal of a transference scenario that is being manifested.  However, the 
patient’s initial experience of underarousal and the associated affects could give rise to 
either the connection-reparative or the connection-destructive transference scenario, or 
both.  The components that would most readily distinguish a connection-reparative 
provocative scenario from a connection-destructive one would be the representation of 
the role relationship and of the expectancies associated with the possible affect-regulating 
outcomes.   
Given a connection-reparative scenario, there would be evidence of a high 
expectation of predictable, well-modulated reactivity from the enactment partner; by 
contrast, in a connection-destructive scenario a modulated level of predictable 
engagement is not expected or desired.  Information about roles and expectancies 
regarding outcome can be uncovered in many ways.  The patient might describe his 
contemporary expectations about the reactions of others to particular provocative 
gestures.  The patient might also talk about the predictable patterns of provocative 
interaction with important early objects upon which the contemporary expectations might 
be based.  The therapist could also ask about the patient’s expectations in vivo, for 
example, “so when you told me about X, did you have any thoughts about how I’d 
react…what I might say?”; the response might indicate whether reconnection or 
disconnection is the expected outcome.  Note that the focus of inquiry would not be on 
the patient’s expectations about the therapist’s thoughts and feelings per se, but rather on 
the way the patient expected the stimulating aspects of the therapist’s dyadic participation 
– e.g., speech, tone, animation, synchrony – to be caused to change.   
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Moreover, in the connection-reparative scenario, one would expect that the 
therapist’s predictable, well-modulated reactivity to be followed by an actual shift in the 
patient’s affective state – the patient would begin to display “positive” affects and signs 
of decreased anxiety – whereas the same sort of reactive response to a connection-
destructive overture would be frustrating for the patient and cause the patient’s 
unpleasant affective state to persist or to become exacerbated.  In the connection-
destructive scenario, the patient seeks to reduce or shut down the therapist’s participation, 
such that the patient could be then free to self-regulate without hindrance.  By contrast, a 
non-response to a connection-reparative overture would yield overt signs that the 
patient’s unpleasant affective state is persisting or intensifying 
 Self- and object representations may or may not serve as evidence for the primacy 
of a connection-reparative scenario over a connection-destructive one.  Awareness that 
the patient maintains a representation of the object as caring, worried, aloof, selfish, 
disgusted or ashamed may help explain why the patient expects the therapist to feel a 
certain way.  However, such awareness on its own will not shed much light on the 
patient’s expectations of change in the therapist’s dyadic participation.  For example, a 
therapist who is disgusted by the patient might on the one hand be expected to express 
disgust in an animated and affectively charged way, but on the other hand, might be 
expected to withdraw from or reject the patient or shift the focus of conversation 
elsewhere.  The contents of self- and object representations are quite important, however, 
in understanding the narrative that has been created to account for the way the scenarios 
unfold, especially the unquestioned causal links that drive the scenario forward. 
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Over the course of treatment, Cuadli did convey some of his expectations about 
the relative efficacy of explicit/direct strategies, connection-reparative provocative 
strategies, and self-regulating/connection-destructive strategies.  He explicitly evinced 
some confidence that the provocative gesture would elicit activated responses by the 
therapist and others, i.e., the outcome sought in the Elusive Scenario.  By contrast, he was 
quite afraid that direct expression of need and would be met with indifference or 
exploitation, and eventual rejection.  A future therapist of his might wonder aloud about 
the origins of such convictions, which origins no doubt could be found in early dyadic 
interchanges.  One might also explore the patient’s expectations about self-regulation 
scenarios.  In Cuadli’s case, he evinced a conflict over such solutions characteristic of the 
schizoid dilemma: disconnection would produce both a sense of satisfaction and intensely 
sad sense of aloneness.  In sum, it was clear that Cuadli believed (at least some of the 
time) that the outcomes of both direct reparative gestures and self-regulatory methods 
would produce worse outcomes than provocative gestures; when Cuadli consciously 
entertained the possibility of implementing scenarios involving direct gestures or self-
regulatory methods, he would become quite anxious (although moreso for the former 
than the latter.) 
All of the exploration and interpretation described thus far would be in service of 
strengthening the patient’s ability to reflect on the enactment scenarios and their triggers.  
It would be hoped that the development of reflective functioning will enable the patient to 
better exercise ego functions, i.e., the strength to delay the impulse to enact, and the 
ability to assess consequences, consider alternative approaches, and choose the actions 
that best serves the patient’s own long-term interests.  However, it is arguable whether 
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the mere development of self-awareness and reflective skills would be sufficient to 
change the patient’s expectations about the outcomes associated with the various 
approaches to the regulation of arousal and affect.  One can argue that the patient’s 
expectations will change only when enough real-life experiences accrue to support such a 
change in the representational scheme.   
In this case, both psychodynamic and cognitive-behavioral approaches may be 
effective in generating these mutative experiences.  The goal of either therapeutic 
approach would be to alter the specific Internal Models triggered by the patient’s 
underaroused affect state.  Ideally, the Internal Models would evolve to a point where 
flexibility of regulation method is maximized, such that the patient could manage the 
anxiety associated with different affect-regulating scenarios and consciously implement 
the strategy that is most adaptive or desired, given the specific real-life situation.  
Therapeutic change is effected in both approaches by bringing about interpersonal 
experiences, the outcomes of which discomfirm the expectancies contained in the 
existing Internal Models.  The patient attempts to implement new strategies for arousal 
and affect regulation – strategies which have failed in the past and which now go unused 
because they engender great anxiety.  When successful outcomes are achieved, the 
relevant Internal Models will accommodate the new experiences and produce revised 
outcome expectancies.19    
In what may be considered a CBT-like approach, the therapist could encourage 
the patient to achieve insight through a sort of Socratic method with the therapist and 
                                                 
19 See also Weiss and Sampson’s (1986) view that enactments comprise important “test-
passing” experiences that can serve to disconfirm a long-standing “unconscious 
pathogenic belief”.   
 221
through autonomous record-keeping.  The therapist would then convince the patient 
gradually to try particular new “cognitions” and gestures with people in the real world, 
confident that the patient will be able to elicit a series of new, mutative, affect-regulating 
outcomes in day-to-day life.  In more traditional psychodynamic treatment, insight is 
likewise achieved through a dialogic process in which the therapist makes interpretations, 
including transference interpretations.  The therapist may convince the patient to 
gradually try new behaviors with people in the real world.  The therapist will also use the 
therapeutic relationship itself to encourage the patient to try particular new 
communicative gestures with the therapist in the session.  Once the therapeutic alliance is 
sufficiently strong and analytic trust is established, the patient will begin to feel safe 
enough to take risks with the therapist.  The enduring empathy and attunement of the 
therapist evident in the therapist’s responses to the patient’s new gestures create new 
outcomes and cause the patient’s Internal Model of affect regulation to revise its outcome 
expectancies.  Psychoanalytic treatment may have an advantage over CBT approaches in 
that the therapist can monitor the patient’s response to the interchange in real time and so 
has much finer control over the outcomes and their affect-regulating quality (whereas 
interactions elicited in the real world are more unpredictable); as such, the therapist can 
produce a very consistent, responsive, and highly attuned level of affect-regulation.   
Once the patient develops the desire to regulate arousal and affect through non-
provocative means, the therapist can encourage the patient to attempt the other, non-
provocative strategies with the therapist, so that the therapist can respond in ways that 
help to regulate the patient’s affect and thus reinforce the non-provocative solutions; in 
this way, the therapist can provide a “new object” experience.  The therapist’s mission 
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would be to provide outcomes for the patient’s direct-gesture and self-regulation 
strategies that are always more effective (in their appropriate contexts) than the patient’s 
tried-and-true provocative strategies, such that the patient has sufficient incentive to keep 
trying new strategies rather than continue to over-rely on provocative strategies.  In other 
words, the therapist sets up something akin to an extinction paradigm, although in this 
case the goal is to reduce problematic reliance on the provocative solution rather than 
extinguish it completely (because there are times when it is functional) and to enable the 
patient to feel less anxious and more comfortable with other solutions such that the 
patient has the freedom and capacity to choose the most functional solution in any given 
context.   
One important clinical implication of such a mission is that the analyst would 
implicitly adopt the view that positive change can be brought about by means outside the 
rubric of classical interpretation as well as within it.  The goal of classical interpretation 
is the undoing of a repression followed by the patient’s recollection of a once-
unconscious memory or representation.  In other words, insight in an affectively-charged 
context would make the unconscious conscious and thereby strengthen the observing 
function of the ego such that the stronger ego can better delay, control and relinquish 
drive aims.  By contrast, it can be said that the goal of more relational clinical theories is 
the creation of new representations via the “corrective” aspects of the therapeutic 
relationship.  That is to say, the therapeutic relationship itself provides some functions 
essential to the patient’s psychic growth that were not available in early development.  
Given this kind of salutary interaction, developmental processes that had been “stuck” 
can resume.   
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One extension of the relational approach to therapeutic change has been the 
exploration by the Boston Process of Change Study Group of the mutative impact of 
moments of nonverbal attunement between therapist and patient.  According to Stern et 
al. (1998), the mutative impact of therapeutic exchanges occurs primarily in the sphere of 
“implicit relational knowledge”, a nonverbal realm that he presents in contrast to the 
domain of explicit verbal knowledge.  These researchers draw an analogy between such 
“present moments” of change and the moments in which mother and infant do not merely 
construct and repair dyadic affect-regulating systems, but somehow initiate 
developmentally appropriate epigenetic shifts in the organizational structure of such 
dyadic systems.  In a similar emphasis on change through non-interpretive means, Lyons-
Ruth (1999) suggests that real therapeutic change takes place when procedural rules are 
unconsciously enacted in the context of, and altered via, patient-therapist interactions, 
and that therapeutic progress does not require that the procedural changes be reflected on 
and translated into symbolic language. 
There is an “integrative” quality to therapeutic change in the proposed approach: 
it can be said that insight and relational factors interact, and that both factors 
simultaneously impact the complex interpersonal system by which Internal Models are 
created, maintained and changed.  For example, Ellman (1998) has emphasized that 
interpretations will only have a mutative impact once “analytic trust” has been 
established.  Without analytic trust, the interpretation will be “premature”, i.e., will only 
be incorporated by the patient as part of the manifest enactment.  Such analytic trust 
requires the establishment of a pattern of attunement and constancy on the therapist’s 
part.  And as Bromberg (1979) put it, “the deeper the regression that can be safely 
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allowed by the patient, the richer the experience and the greater its reverberation on the 
total organization of the self” (italics added).  Making a similar point, Loewald (1960) 
noted that the patient resumes ego development though integrative experiences where the 
therapist functions as a representative of a higher state of organization and mediates this 
function to the patient.  However, the patient can only internalize the relationship with 
this new object when “the patient, through a sufficiently strong ‘positive transference’ to 
the therapist becomes available for integrative work with himself and his world....  The 
therapist must also be in tune with the patient’s productions, that is, he must be able to 
regress within himself to the level of organization on which the patient is stuck” (pp. 404-
405).  These then are the relationship factors implicit in classical interpretation. 
By the same token, relational approaches acknowledge that the goal of therapy is 
not the provision of missing interpersonal experiences merely for the sake of relieving the 
patient’s distress or to be otherwise supportive.  Rather, it is for the sake of changing 
conscious and unconscious self- and object representations and the motivational systems 
built around them, such that these new Internal Models will function independently of the 
therapeutic relationship and can be applied by the patient in real life (see, e.g., Kohut’s 
(1971, 1977) view of “selfobject” and object functions; Bion’s (1959) “containing” 
function; Winnicott’s (1972) “holding”, Bowlby’s (1988) “secure base”, and Fonagy’s 
(2001) “mentalizing” function of the analyst).  This dissertation describes an arousal- and 
affect-regulating function that is manifest in the interpersonal field that likewise can be 
used to further intrapsychic change.  It is important to note that relational approaches 
(such as the proposed approach) consider it a crucial aspect of therapeutic relationship to 
evince attunement and constancy in the context of an explicit dialogue about the patient’s 
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inner world, which dialogue the therapist seeks to foster, and therein lies the interpretive 
element of the relational approaches. 
Applying the alternative theoretical approach proposed, the therapist may use any 
means at her disposal to produce reliably arousal- and affect-regulating outcomes.  Such 
means may include nonverbal techniques to regulate arousal (see e.g. Beebe & 
Lachmann, 2001), or interventions that may seem more supportive or even directive than 
psychoanalytic, including those that in some way encourage the patient to alter something 
about his life or his external environment.  For example, in Cuadli’s case, I had 
encouraged discussion of his needs of me; a great deal of sensitivity empathy was 
required to be able to broach this subject without engendering too much anxiety, because 
such discussion made Cuadli acutely anxious.  I also encouraged Cuadli to express 
particular feelings to his partner when it seemed to both of us that it would be helpful to 
do so; to help reduce his anxiety, I discussed with him, and even roleplayed, what sort of 
approach he might take.  It was just as important that I worked to create a general 
expectation in Cuadli that I would care about what he was feeling and that I would treat 
him with respect rather than judge him.  Indeed, such a general expectation must exist 
before one could have expected Cuadli to take any risks with me or tried to utilize me in a 
way that was new and potentially uncomfortable.  (Again, such attuned interventions are 
meant to complement ongoing transference interpretations.)  It is important to emphasize 
that the therapist must be sensitive to the timing of the affect-regulating responses so that 
the patient’s non-provocative strategies are encouraged but that the provocative gestures 
are not.   
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It may also be true that the therapist ought not produce responses to provocative 
gestures that are as helpful at affect regulation as his responses to non-provocative 
gestures.  In this sense, the therapist must work against the primacy of the patient’s 
comfortable provocative strategies.  While interpretive efforts in response to provocative 
gestures are certainly indicated, affect-regulating responses might not be.   To be more 
explicit, the therapist’s responses to provocative enactments in underarousal contexts, 
once these enactments are clearly identified as problematic, must be ones that do not add 
liveliness and energy to the interaction.  (Indeed, one might wonder whether the therapist 
response should be, in a sense, deadening, to the extent that such a response does not 
unduly tax the alliance.)  The lively, energetic, engaged responses should be reserved for 
the patient’s non-provocative attempts to cope with underarousal and the loss affects, 
which attempts the therapist must actively and regularly encourage because they are less 
habitual for the patient.  My reactions to some of Cuadli’s provocations, namely his 
threats to quit treatment, unfortunately betrayed a good deal of my own anxiety about a 
sudden termination.  Such anxieties were rooted in my own needs, specifically in my 
need to be successful in my first treatment and to convince my supervisor of my abilities, 
and therefore my reactions to Cuadli’s termination attempts might have undermined the 
treatment in two ways.  First, my activation and attempts to encourage him to continue 
might have indeed been reparative and effectively modulated Cuadli’s sense of 
disconnection and loss, and thus merely reinforced to Cuadli the efficacy of his 
provocative strategies.  Second, by betraying my anxiety, I could not help but convey to 
Cuadli that I needed something from him, which would encourage him to wonder about 
my own agenda in the treatment, and potentially present a false-self adapted to what he 
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might imagine my agenda to be.  Aside from the reinforcement of Cuadli’s false-self 
presentation, the imposition of my own agenda would create more layers for me to 
understand and would probably add to my confusion rather than clarify my 
understanding. 
As mentioned, there exist real-life interpersonal settings in which provocative 
strategies are still the most appropriate, best-adapted strategies, e.g., when it is 
appropriate to express anger or to make the another person feel anxious, guilty, 
embarrassed, etc.  Norms vary widely across subcultures and social contexts.  For 
example, socially acceptable teasing and ribbing can be seen as a mild, adaptive form of a 
provocative enactment.  There are certainly interpersonal settings in which direct gestures 
are most effective, for example, in those relationships or on those occasions where it is 
appropriate to make warm, dependent, nurturant, or otherwise affectively transparent 
disclosures of need.  Likewise, there are social settings in which most of the individual’s 
needs must be regulated on one’s own.  However, in all real-world settings, the 
adaptiveness of direct, provocative or self-regulating strategies is more or less 
circumscribed; a fully functional individual must be able to implement any of the arousal- 
and affect-regulating strategies when it is in the individual’s interest to do so.  If one goal 
of psychotherapy is to help the patient to be as free in the choice of problem-solving 
strategies as possible, then the therapist must encourage the patient to rely not only on 
direct strategies but on self-regulating strategies as well when the latter are most adaptive.  
How would the therapist encourage the patient’s confidence in self-regulating strategies?  
The implication in such cases is that the therapist must be only a “good enough” regulator 
of the patient’s affect, i.e., by not helping the patient regulate his affect on some 
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occasions except by supporting her efforts to self-regulate, or by otherwise doing what is 
necessary to encourage the internalization of the therapist’s affect-regulating function. 
G. Conclusion 
This dissertation attempted to assemble a cluster of ideas or arguments, some 
more speculative than others as a way to explain a particular set of enactments; these 
ideas could have been organized in a number of different ways.  A good portion of the 
ideas discussed involved speculation about events taking place very early in 
development, namely, early arousal states and the way in which they form the core of 
mental representations.  This dissertation attempted to address a number of questions 
regarding the regulation of arousal states, and then weave these thoughts together into a 
coherent whole:  
(1) What if the painful experiences of disregulated arousal can be equated with 
the psychoanalytic construct of “bad object”, and the pleasurable experience or 
reregulated arousal with the “good object”?  Different analytic theorists have proposed 
subcategories of bad object.  I have suggested that it would be useful to consider two 
subcategories of bad object: the bad object associated with understimulated arousal states 
and the bad object associated with overstimulated arousal states; I have argued that the 
pain of understimulation is phenomenologically distinct from that of overstimulation, and 
thus representations of those experiences separate out into these two subcategories quite 
early in development.   
 (2) What if there are certain sorts of caregivers who allow their young children to 
chronically lapse out of well-stimulated states into understimulated states, where the 
caregivers were perhaps unreactive to initial, subtle cues of the child’s discomfort but 
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reacted when the child communicated more extreme disregulation?  One might wonder 
whether such caregivers were less empathically attuned and responsive to their children, 
at least with regard to the child’s experience of understimulation and its affective 
sequelae, e.g., the child’s anticipatory anxiety or discomfort with physical or empathic 
breaks.  I have tentatively explored in this dissertation what sort of parents might react 
this way by reference to attachment style.  
(3) What if some set of these slow-to-react parents would eventually react to their 
child’s extreme understimulation, not out of empathy but because the child is emitting 
communication that is noxious to the parent and the parent simply wants that noxious 
stimulus to stop?  In such a case, the parent would have the incentive to become activated 
and to interact with and stimulate the child.  These are caretakers who, in cases of their 
child’s understimulation do not react in a subtle, attuned, empathic way, i.e., in way that 
anticipates their child’s underarousal so as to be ready to address it.  Rather, they only 
respond to the extreme, pain-inducing communications that arise from the child’s 
extremely understimulated states.  It is only at that point that these caretakers offer the 
stimulation that will return the child to a well-regulated state.   
(4) What if some of these children learn to co-opt the affects and the 
communications that, early on, arose involuntarily?  In other words, what if they learn to 
stir up these affects in themselves “on demand”, such that the affective experiences and 
communications associated with understimulation and loss are wielded instrumentally in 
anticipation of these understimulated arousal and affect states?  And what if the resultant 
communications became the most reliable tools of these children in eliciting the 
stimulation from others that they needed to dissipate their anxiety over impending loss?   
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What this dissertation argues is that there is a class of provocative enactments that 
are manifestations of the representations abstracted from this set of arousal- and affect-
regulating experiences, where there are particular self representations, object 
representations, arousal and affect components, and contingent expectancies with regard 
to good and bad outcomes.  The good outcome for the transference scenarios associated 
with these representations is increased stimulation from, and reconnection with, the 
transference partner.  In this dissertation, I sought to contrast such provocative 
enactments from those in which the good outcome sought is the disconnection from the 
transference partner (and perhaps the actor’s desire to reduce stimulation is implicated).   
If there really do exist these two classes of provocative enactments, then the 
clinical intervention indicated would obviously depend on which sort of enactment was in 
effect.  Provocative enactments initiated with the hope of drawing stimulation and repair 
of breaches with others can potentially have unfortunate consequences when manifested 
in adult life.  As one can easily imagine, because provocative gestures can be obnoxious 
to others or otherwise viewed as hostile gestures, they can elicit either hostile or abusive 
responses from others (which can be grossly overstimulating not to mention dangerous) 
or rejection and further disconnection by others, exacerbating the unpleasant loss-related 
affects that the provocative gestures were meant to dispel.  With either sort of response, 
reregulation of arousal and affect is not achieved, and the individual who has habitually 
relied on such methods will be unhappy and hopefully detect that something must 
change.  On the other hand, where the “provocative” enactment is meant to further 
disconnection from an other, the hostile or distancing behavior elicited will enhance the 
actor’s sense of instrumental ability to push away people whose proximity makes the 
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actor anxious.  A clinician working with the former sort of enactment would attempt to 
make the patient conscious of the meaning of the enactment, mindful of the potential 
precipitants of the enactment, and aware of the discrepancy between the fantasied and 
actual odds of a successful outcome.  Just as important, the therapy would explore the 
sources of anxiety that prevent the patient from choosing more functional ways regulate 
arousal and affect; the therapist and patient would try to construct an environment where 
reliance on those less functional approaches to reregulation can be reduced, and the more 
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